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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of two essays on IPO failures around the world. IPO failures are defined 
as IPO withdrawals (Essay 1) or delistings of recent IPOs for negative reasons (Essay 2). A 
common theme that runs through the two essays is the importance of institutional and cultural 
characteristics in explaining cross-country differences in IPO failures.  
The first essay examines how firm and country-level information asymmetry, and Hofstede’s 
uncertainty avoidance influence IPO withdrawals. Using a sample of 13,751 IPOs (of which 3,212 
are withdrawn IPOs) in 31 countries over the period 2003-2010, results show that information 
asymmetry measured at both the firm and country levels is negatively related to the likelihood of 
IPO withdrawal. Contrary to my prediction, IPOs located in societies threatened by unknown or 
ambiguous situations have a lower likelihood of being withdrawn.  
The second essay examines how national culture, in particular societal time orientation, is 
associated with the likelihood of post-IPO failure. The sample consists of 16,308 IPOs from 36 
countries over the period 1999-2008. Using logistic regression and Cox proportional hazards 
models, results indicate that IPOs from countries with a long-term and future orientation are less 
likely to fail post the IPO.  
Overall, this thesis provides further evidence on the importance of national culture 
influencing corporate finance decisions, with particular emphasis on IPO failure.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis consists of two essays on initial public offering (IPO) failures around the world, 
where IPO failures are defined as IPO withdrawals (“pre-IPO failures”) or delistings for negative 
reasons (“post-IPO failures”). Withdrawn IPOs are defined as firms that have filed an IPO 
registration with a securities commission (e.g., the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) in Australia) to conduct an IPO but subsequently did not go ahead with the 
public offering. Delistings from the trading exchange for negative reasons are due to bankruptcy, 
in administration, in liquidation, or inability to meet listing requirements.  
IPO failures have been an ubiquitous empirical phenomenon for decades. Past studies on 
the subject of IPO failures have largely been confined to US firms. This thesis contributes to the 
literature by bringing the research on IPO failures to the international setting, thus filling the gap 
in the extant literature. In particular, it focuses on differences in institutional and informal 
arrangements to explain variations in IPO failure rates internationally.1 The benefit of using a cross-
country approach rather than a single country approach is that it permits a test of whether variation 
in national culture and other country-level factors impacts on IPO failures beyond firm-specific 
factors.  
The first essay focuses on firm and country-level measures of information asymmetry and 
national culture. The highly pervasive information asymmetry problem in the IPO market and thus 
the associated risk of adverse selection arising from the lack of track record for the typical issuer 
poses a challenge to potential investors in determining the value of the IPO. I argue that the higher 
the information asymmetry between issuer and potential investors, the greater the ex-ante 
                                                 
1 The terms “informal institutions,” “extra-legal institutions,” and “culture” are used interchangeably in this thesis 
(North, 1992; Pejovich, 2012). For example, Pejovich (2012, p. 166) defines informal institutions as “traditions, customs, 
moral values, religious beliefs, and all other norms of behavior that have passed the test of time.... Thus, informal institutions are the part 
of a community’s heritage that we call culture.” 
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uncertainty about firm value. As a consequence, IPOs issued by firms with higher information 
asymmetry are more likely to be withdrawn as both parties to the transaction are less likely to agree 
on the offer price. Proxies for country-level information asymmetry are transparency and 
disclosure indices based on CIFAR (developed by the Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research); exchange disclosure requirements (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006); 
earnings management; and opacity (Leuz, 2010; Kurtzman, Yago and Phumiwasana, 2004); and 
media penetration. Firm-level proxies of information asymmetry are firm size; venture capital (VC) 
backing; the size of the underwriting syndicate; underwriter reputation; and the use of proceeds. 
Results from logistic regressions on an international sample from 31 countries from 2003 to 2010 
show a higher likelihood of IPO withdrawal in countries and firms characterised as having higher 
information asymmetry.  
The first essay also examines whether national culture, specifically Hofstede’s (2001) 
uncertainty avoidance dimension, is related to IPO withdrawal. A culture is characterised by high 
uncertainty avoidance when its members feel threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity. In contrast, 
low uncertainty avoidance indicates “willingness to enter into unknown ventures” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 
164). Potential investors in high uncertainty avoidance countries perceive IPOs as a more risky 
investment as they are more concerned about the legitimacy of the IPO and the outcome (e.g., will 
the IPO perform as promised) than investors in low uncertainty avoidance countries. In a high 
avoidance country, the smaller the pool of potential investors that issuers can tap into, the lower 
the investor participation rate in the IPO and the higher the likelihood of IPO withdrawal. 
Contrary to expectations, the results show that Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index is 
negatively associated with the probability of IPO withdrawal, controlling for firm and country level 
measures of formal institutions, financial market development, economic development 
characteristics, and other determinants that may affect withdrawals. A possible explanation is that 
high uncertainty societies tend to rely greatly on rules as a means of coping with uncertainty, 
making the environment more predictable, resulting in fewer withdrawn offerings. The results are 
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robust to additional country-level characteristics (e.g., measures of political connection, societal 
trust, and litigation risk) and an alternative estimation methodology (i.e., country-weighted logistic 
regressions) to mitigate unequal country representation.  
The second essay (Chapter 3) examines the factors that explain the propensity of IPO 
involuntary delisting.2 Although there is a sizable literature investigating different facets of short 
run and long run IPO performance, little research has been conducted in determining country-
specific characteristics that are associated with delisting. This essay augments our understanding 
of the determinants of IPO delisting across national borders. Using logistic regression and Cox 
proportional hazards models on a large sample of IPOs from 36 countries during 1999-2008, the 
empirical results show that societal time orientation (as measured by long-term orientation and 
future orientation) is negatively and significantly related to post-IPO failure. Therefore, IPOs 
issued by firms in societies with a future outlook where thrift, persistence, and planning are valued, 
have a lower likelihood of delisting and a high probability of surviving longer. The results are 
robust to several sensitivity checks, including alternative model specifications and measures of time 
orientation.  
The reminder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a cross-country 
analysis of the determinants of IPO withdrawals, while Chapter 3 examines IPO delistings for 
negative reasons. Finally, Chapter 4 summarises and concludes the thesis. 
 
  
                                                 
2 Stocks are removed from equity markets because of merger and acquisition or various negative reasons. The latter 
include insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity, insufficient float or assets, liquidation, bankruptcy, delinquent in 
filing or non-payment of fees, failure to meet exchange’s financial guidelines for continued listing, insufficient number 
of market makers, price falling below acceptable level, and insufficient number of shareholders (Ang, 2012; Jain and 
Kini, 2000).  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IPO WITHDRAWALS AROUND THE WORLD 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Raising equity through the IPO process is a major phase in the growth of many firms,3 but 
not all are successful in their quest to become a publicly listed company. In the US, for example, 
around 21% of IPOs during the 1996-2005 period were withdrawn, and this figure rose to a 
staggering 90% in 2008 (Hao, 2011). In fact, IPO withdrawals are a common phenomenon 
globally.4 For a sample of 13,751 IPOs in 31 countries over the period 2003-2010, this study 
reports that about one-quarter of IPOs were withdrawn, with the withdrawal rate varying from 
country to country and from year to year. The lowest percentage of withdrawn offerings is 
observed in Japan, at 2.1%, and the highest in Russia at about 72.7%. The percentage of IPO 
withdrawals has increased from 14.3% (n= 957) in the 2003-2006 period to 31.9% (n = 2,255) in 
the 2007-2010 period. 
IPO withdrawal is not without its consequences. Cancellation of the offering carries with it 
significant losses, including the irrecoverable initial outlays related to the filing and marketing of 
the IPO in road shows (Hao, 2011), and underwriting, accounting, and legal fees.5 IPO withdrawal 
                                                 
3 Traditional corporate finance theories propose a number of motivations for corporations to go public. Some of these 
benefits include funding for growth (Ritter and Welch, 2002); enhancing the company’s financial flexibility 
(Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006); reducing the cost of capital (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Scott, 1976); permitting 
owners to cash out (Mello and Parsons, 2000; Zingales, 1995); helping to set up merger and acquisition undertakings 
(Brau, Francis and Kohers, 2003; Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani, 2010; Hsieh, Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2008; 
Zingales, 1995); increasing the firm’s liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986); and enhancing investor recognition 
(Merton, 1987). Brau and Fawcett (2006, p. 406) survey a sample of 336 CFOs in the US and find that the most 
important motivation in the transition from a private to a public company is to “create public shares for use in future 
acquisitions.” In a survey of 78 CFOs from 12 European countries, Bancel and Mittoo (2009) report that enhanced 
visibility and prestige, funding for growth opportunities, and financial flexibility as the most important benefits of 
going public.  
4 Withdrawn IPOs are defined as firms that have filed an IPO registration with a securities commission to conduct an 
IPO but subsequently chose not to go ahead with the public offering. 
5 The withdrawal of the IPO carries with it substantive costs, both tangible (e.g., underwriting and other advisors’ 
expenses) and intangible (e.g., reputation loss). Many elements play a role in determining the cost of an offering but, 
in all instances, the costs of going public are significant and many fees are not recoverable when the IPO is withdrawn. 
These costs generally include underwriting fees, fees related to accounting and legal consultants, and printing costs.  
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can also significantly weaken the firm’s cash flow position, reducing funding for growth initiatives 
and thus firm value (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Dunbar and Foerster, 2008; Lian and Wang, 2009). 
Examining firms that withdrew their IPO between 1999 and 2004, Boeh and Dunbar (2013) 
document that 11% of them subsequently declared bankruptcy. There is also the adverse publicity 
associated with IPO withdrawals, as noted by Lerner (1994, p. 312): “A firm that withdraws its IPO 
may later find it difficult to access the public marketplace. Even if the stated reason for the withdrawal is poor 
market conditions, the firm may be lumped with other businesses whose offerings did not sell because of questionable 
accounting practices or gross overpricing.”  Thus, by cancelling its IPO, a firm may not only relinquish the 
advantages of going public but also incurs irrecoverable costs.   
The increase in the number of withdrawn IPOs over the last decade has captured the 
attention of academics and made media headlines, as exemplified by the following excerpt from 
bizmology.hoovers.com (Panek, 2012): “Normally my inbox fills up with news about companies filing IPOs 
and getting ready to go public. So it caught my surprise when I noticed that there seems to be more announcements 
of IPO withdrawals than anything else.” If adverse market condition is a major reason for IPO 
withdrawal (Brau and Fawcett, 2006), it is intriguing why only very few issuing firms subsequently 
return to the market.6 The decision to withdraw an IPO, therefore, is perplexing given that it will 
hamper a company’s access to the fairly inexpensive and liquid stock market (Dunbar and Foerster, 
2008).  
The literature on IPO withdrawals has largely been confined to US firms, thus leaving a gap 
in the extant literature about what happens globally. As Boeh and Southam (2011, p. 333) note: 
“To the best of our knowledge, there are no academic studies on withdrawn IPOs outside of the US market. The 
financial media suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to the US equity markets and that it is becoming an 
increasingly important issue in the global equity markets. According to Thomson Financial, 36 Asian firms 
withdrew equity offerings in Asia in the first half of 2011, twice the number as in 2010. International IPO 
                                                 
6 Dunbar and Foerster (2008) and Boeh and Dunbar (2013) find (respectively) that about 10% and 13% of withdrawing 
issuers in the US return later for a successful IPO. Boeh and Dunbar (2013) also report that 36% of issuers that 
withdraw manage to raise capital privately and 42% are either acquired or merged, with 11% declaring bankruptcy. 
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withdrawals would be an interesting avenue of future research. While there is a sizable body of literature on IPOs, 
it appears there are more puzzles to solve.” In relation to firms’ decision to withdraw their offerings, this 
essay aims to fill this gap by bringing the research on IPO withdrawals to an international setting. 
This study argues that the propensity of IPO withdrawal around the world can be explained by 
firm- and country-level measures of information asymmetry and national culture.  
The pervasive information asymmetry problem between the issuers and potential investors 
at the IPO can lead to withdrawal if the two parties to the offering fail to agree on the offer price.7,8 
This disagreement is expected to increase with the level of information asymmetry, suggesting that 
the greater the information asymmetry, the more likely the IPO will be withdrawn. At the firm 
level, I proxy information asymmetry by the number of underwriters, offer size, the technology 
sector, whether the use of proceeds is for general purposes, the reputation of the lead underwriter, 
and whether the offering has venture capital (VC) backing. My proxies for country-level 
information asymmetry are country-level measures of corporate disclosure, opacity, and media 
penetration.   
Although intuitively appealing, the impact of culture on economic outcomes is a relatively 
new field of research9 that has received increasing attention in the finance literature (e.g., 
Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Chui, Titman and Wei, 2010; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Shao, Kwok 
and Guedhami, 2010;  Shao, Kwok, and Zhang, 2013). In light of the recent wave of corporate 
scandals worldwide which has undermined investors’ faith in corporate leadership, financial 
reporting, and the integrity of stock markets, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008, p. 2592) remark 
that “the finance literature has thus far ignored the role of trust in explaining stock market participations.” North 
                                                 
7 Financial markets are characterised by asymmetric information, creating a classic “lemon” problem of adverse 
selection (Akerlof, 1970). Stock issuers are likely to possess valuable inside information and thus have better insight 
into the long run performance of the firm than general investors. With existence of knowledge gaps between the issuer 
of stocks and the investor community, the market may be trapped in an adverse selection process with good IPOs 
withdrawing and only lemons staying in the market, leading to market inefficiencies. 
8 Busaba, Benveniste and Guo (2001) examine a sample of 113 withdrawn and 423 completed US industrial IPOs 
registered with the SEC between 1990 and 1992. They propose that the decision to withdraw an IPO depends on the 
position of the issuer's reservation value in comparison to potential investor valuations of the issue. 
9 Breuer and Quinten (2009) suggest the establishment of “Cultural Finance” as an autonomous discipline. 
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(1990, p. 3) also documents that institutions are the “rules of the game in a society” that consist of both 
formal and informal rules. The law and finance literature has already shown the importance of 
formal institutions in corporate finance (e.g., La  Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). As firms’ financial decisions are also affected by societal and cultural factors (Shao, Kwok, 
and Zhang, 2013), this thesis also considers informal institutions, namely national culture, in the 
analysis of IPO withdrawals.  
Using several firm- and country-level measures of information asymmetry and national 
culture from 31 countries over the period 2003-2010, results show that IPOs issued in countries 
with better financial disclosure requirements and transparency, and greater media penetration have 
a lower likelihood of withdrawal. At the firm level, the probability of IPO withdrawal is 
significantly negatively related to information asymmetry proxies, namely offer size, number of 
underwriters, and VC backing, and positively associated with the use of proceeds for general 
purposes. These findings thus support the hypothesis that the likelihood of IPO withdrawal 
increases with country- and firm-level measures of information asymmetry. National culture, in 
particular uncertainty avoidance, is also a significant explanatory variable for IPO withdrawals 
although the direction of the relation is opposite to that predicted. Nevertheless, the findings 
confirm that Hofstede’s culture dimension of uncertainty avoidance is an important factor in 
explaining the likelihood IPO withdrawal.  
This essay contributes to the literature in the following important ways. First, by analysing 
IPO withdrawals across countries, I extend prior empirical work that tends to be US-centric.10 The 
benefit of examining IPO withdrawals internationally is that, apart from increasing the power of 
the tests, it permits a test of whether variations in country-level formal and informal institutions 
impact on IPO withdrawals. Such an analysis would not be possible in a single-country research.   
                                                 
10 See among others, Dunbar (1998), Busaba, Benveniste and Guo (2001), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu 
(2003), Dunbar and Foerster (2008), Chen, Guo and Lin (2010), Latham and Braun (2010), Boeh and Southam (2011), 
Hao (2011), and Boeh and Dunbar (2013). 
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Second, I extend the literature on IPO withdrawals by providing a cultural explanation. Most 
notably, this is the first study to relate national culture to IPO outcomes. This thesis therefore 
contributes to our understanding of the interaction between the “unwritten, unspoken rules of the game” 
(Siegel, Licht and Schwartz, 2012, p. 11) and corporate finance outcomes.  
Finally, the findings documented in this thesis have practical implications for investors, 
issuers, investment banks, regulators, and stock exchanges around the world in curtailing the 
likelihood of IPO withdrawals. For example, the results of this research will help investment banks 
to identify issuers with a potentially high probability of withdrawal, thus reducing their cost of 
doing business.11 Regulators should be concerned about high IPO withdrawal rates as they inhibit 
capital market development and thus impede economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998). Hence, 
it is important to determine what parameters are most important in determining the propensity of 
IPO withdrawals, particularly if those factors can be addressed by regulation. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the extant 
literature on IPO withdrawals and summarises the key factors that are most significant in 
explaining the withdrawal. Section 2.3 develops the hypotheses and presents firm- and country-
specific attributes that can explain the likelihood of IPO withdrawal. Data and research method 
are presented in Section 2.4. Results are discussed in Section 2.5, with robustness checks provided 
in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 summarises and concludes this chapter.  
 
2.2. Literature review 
This section surveys the theoretical and empirical work on IPO withdrawals. While the 
literature provides important insights into why IPOs are withdrawn and their potential outcomes, 
it is confined to the US market. Appendix A summarises the determinants of IPO withdrawals 
identified from the literature. 
                                                 
11 Investment banks earn reputation by successfully carrying out offerings. Withdrawing IPOs can adversely impact 
bankers’ reputation (Dunbar, 2000). 
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2.2.1 Agency theory 
Relying on agency theory, Latham and Braun (2010) study a sample of 124 internet IPOs in 
the US that filed with the SEC between 2000 and 2002, near the end of the technology boom. 
They find an inverse U-shaped relation between CEO ownership and IPO withdrawal as equity 
markets deteriorate. They explain that in weakening capital market conditions, CEOs with high 
(low) firm ownership show risk aversion by withdrawing the IPO in order to protect their own 
wealth (job). The authors also find that firms with a higher level of debt are less likely to withdraw 
their IPO in deteriorating capital markets. The latter is consistent with Pagano, Panetta and 
Zingales (1998) who report the primary incentive for companies to go public is to decrease 
financial leverage. Latham and Braun (2010) find that leverage intensity moderates the relation 
between CEO ownership and IPO withdrawal. CEOs with low equity ownership in firms with 
low leverage are more likely to withdraw the IPO in weak capital markets in order to protect their 
employment. So do CEOs with high equity ownership in high levered firms in order to preserve 
their personal wealth.  
Boeh and Southam (2011) study a sample of 1,071 completed and 584 withdrawn US IPOs 
between 1999 and 2004. Results from their probit model show issuers with lower information 
asymmetry are less likely to be withdrawn, where information asymmetry is proxied by the number 
of underwriters and information disclosure.12 Moreover, indications of lower bonding mechanisms 
and thus higher agency costs, as proxied by the use of IPO proceeds to reduce debt, are associated 
with a greater propensity to withdraw. Having distinct CEO and chair roles, and more experienced 
directors (proxies for additional monitoring, indicating lower agency costs) result in a lower 
likelihood of IPO withdrawal.  
 
                                                 
12 Information disclosure is proxied by the number of words in IPO prospectuses. Number of underwriters is the 
total number of both lead- and co-managing underwriters for the IPO. 
10 
 
2.2.2 Information spillover 
Welch (1992) contends that adverse information cascades can cause investor valuation of an 
IPO to tumble below a level viewed justifiable by the issuing firms, causing the IPO to be 
withdrawn. He presents a model in which later investors can infer the value of new issues from 
the buying decisions of earlier investors (ignoring their own private information), thus generating 
a nearly infinite demand for the offering. IPOs can succeed (fail) if demand by earlier investors is 
strong (weak).  
 Benveniste, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) investigate the impact of information spillovers 
on the decision to withdraw for a sample of 6,181 completed and 1,422 withdrawn US IPOs 
between 1985 and 2000. They find evidence that information spillovers, measured by 
contemporaries’ average proceeds revision, average initial returns, relative withdrawal frequency, 
and relative return, during the book building phase affect a firm’s decision to withdraw its IPO.13 
Specifically, contemporaneous positive information spillovers (i.e., average proceeds revisions, 
average initial returns, relative withdrawal frequency, and relative return) during the book building 
stage increase the probability of IPO completion.14 They also find a significant positive relation 
between the IPO’s position in an industry wave and the likelihood of completion. Pioneers, as 
compared to followers, are less likely to complete their IPO as valuation uncertainty is higher in 
the early stage of an industry wave. The concept of information spillovers/cascades is also useful 
in explaining the propensity of issuing companies to withdraw an IPO. Negative (positive) 
information cascades, which cause decision-makers to ignore their own private information and 
                                                 
13 Contemporaries are defined as firms in the same Fama-French industry which file, complete, or withdraw an IPO 
between the filing date and its offer or withdrawal date. 
14 Average proceeds revisions is defined as the percentage deviation between the final gross proceeds (excluding the 
overallotment option) and expected proceeds (the product of the midpoint of the indicative price range and the 
number of shares reported in the issuer’s S-1 registration filing). Average initial returns are calculated using the first-
day closing price reported by the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) tapes if available within six days of 
the offer date, and otherwise from Thomson Financial’s SDC database. Relative withdrawal frequency is defined as 
the number of withdrawers during firm i’s book-building phase, divided by the number of firms with active 
registrations at the time of firm i’s SEC filing. Relative return equals (1 + industry return)/(1+ market return). 
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instead choose to mimic the actions of earlier investors, are likely to result in the withdrawal 
(completion) of an IPO. 
 
2.2.3 Projected outcomes 
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) study a sample of 7,442 completed and 1,473 withdrawn US 
IPOs from 1980 to 2000, and note that very few issuing firms that withdrew an IPO ever get a 
second chance to issue an equity offering. Of the withdrawn IPOs, only about 9% ever return for 
a successful IPO. Boeh and Dunbar (2013) find about 13% of their sample of 588 withdrawn 
issuers between 1999 and 2004 successfully return for an IPO. The percentage is even smaller (7%) 
in Hao (2011) for a sample of 594 withdrawals from 1996 to 2005.  
The more relevant issue to the issuers is the potential hazard arising from the withdrawal, 
such as bankruptcy. Chen, Guo and Lin (2010) examine a sample of 420 completed and 110 
withdrawn firm-commitment US IPOs from 1990 to 1992, and show for the first time that IPO 
withdrawals can be a costly corporate event. They model a firm’s subsequent probability of 
bankruptcy using a system of switching hazard models. The anticipated effect of withdrawal 
(measured as the difference between post-IPO and post-withdrawal survival probabilities) 
provides a feedback to the firm on whether or not to proceed with the offering. Their main 
findings are as follows. First, the anticipated effect (i.e., cost) of withdrawing the IPO is an 
important determinant of a firm’s decision on whether to complete or withdraw its IPO. That is, 
a firm is less likely to abandon its offering if the expected cost of the decision is high. Second, IPO 
withdrawal is costly. Ceteris paribus, the firm’s performance (quantified by the subsequent survival 
rate of issuing firms) worsens after the withdrawal, i.e., there is a significantly higher likelihood of 
bankruptcy for firms that choose to withdraw their IPO. Boeh and Dunbar (2013) find the 
likelihood of post-withdrawal bankruptcy has a significantly negative impact on the probability of 
withdrawal for a sample of 588 withdrawn and 1,072 completed US IPOs from 1998 to 2004. In 
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addition, 11% of the withdrawn issuers later filed for bankruptcy. Hao (2011) reports 6% of firms 
that aborted their IPO subsequently file for bankruptcy or undergo substantial financial distress. 
Three studies examine the valuation of withdrawn IPOs that return to the equity market. 
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) and Lian and Wang (2009) find that withdrawn offerings adversely 
impact the IPO valuation when the firms come back to the market. Dunbar and Foerster (2008) 
find withdrawn issuers that are successful in their second attempt have higher price discounts 
(underpricing) than first-time IPOs. They report firms that face the choice to withdraw but do not 
expect another opportunity15 are more likely to push forward and complete their offering even if 
that requires reducing the offer price during the bookbuilding process.  
Lian and Wang (2009) document that withdrawn IPOs that return to the market obtain 
considerably lower valuations (i.e., lower offer price multiples) than comparable first-time IPOs. 
The reason for the lower IPO valuation is due to investors’ perception of higher risk. Hao (2011) 
reports that when pre-market demand for the IPOs is weak, issuers with a greater likelihood of 
withdrawal underprice their IPOs by a larger extent in order to increase the probability of finalising 
the deal. In contrast, Boeh and Dunbar (2013) find the valuation of issuers that have successfully 
returned for an IPO does not change significantly between IPO filing and post-withdrawal.  
Overall, the decision to abandon a public offering can have a negative impact on the firm, 
with possible outcomes of lower offer valuations and an increased likelihood of bankruptcy. Thus, 
issuers need to consider these costs associated with withdrawal when deciding whether or not to 
proceed with an offering.   
Aside from bankruptcy and lower valuations for second-time IPOs, Boeh and Dunbar 
(2013) report that 42% of the companies that withdrew their IPO between 1999 and 2004 are 
either acquired or merged.16 In Hao (2011), the figure is 27%. This raises the question as to whether 
                                                 
15 This is measured by the variable “probability” in their paper, which equals the probability of withdrawal multiplied 
by one minus the probability of returning to the market. 
16 Interestingly, the prevalence of post withdrawal mergers and acquisitions is much greater than found by Lian and 
Wang (2012) and Cooney, Moeller and Stegemoller (2009), even with significant sample period overlap, highlighting 
the challenges involved in data collection. 
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the potential gain from a merger and acquisition (i.e., increased valuation) is behind the decision 
to register the offering in the first place.       
Lian and Wang (2012) find that after an IPO withdrawal, the valuation of the firm increases 
when it is acquired by or merged with another firm. For a sample of 171 withdrawn US IPOs that 
are acquired as private targets after the initial IPO filing from 1984 to 2009, they report IPOs that 
are acquired before their withdrawal trade at a premium relative to similar pure private targets that 
never filed IPO registration. The acquisition premium remains only for cancelled offerings that 
are acquired prior to the withdrawal. Lian and Wang (2012) find that IPO registration and 
withdrawals have an opposite effect on the valuation of withdrawn IPOs that are subsequently 
taken over by public acquirers. Their findings suggest that there is a significantly positive valuation 
impact of IPO registration on withdrawn IPOs’ subsequent acquisitions. Conversely, their results 
show a significantly negative valuation effect of withdrawal on subsequent mergers/acquisitions, 
in line with Boeh and Dunbar (2013). The two impacts cancel each other out in withdrawn IPOs 
that are later acquired. Overall, their findings indicate that the negative information conveyed by 
the withdrawal is incorporated in the lower valuation of acquired IPOs.  
 
2.2.4 Pricing 
All of the factors influencing IPO withdrawals discussed in the literature seem to oscillate 
around the offering price. Busaba (2006) offers a theoretical standpoint using the book building 
process. The idea of book building is that the issuer (in conjunction with the underwriter) assesses 
the demand for the issue before setting the offer price. If the issuer finds that investors interest is 
low (high), the IPO is likely to be withdrawn (completed). Drawing on the information revelation 
paradigm proposed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989),17 Busaba (2006) develops a model of book 
building which incorporates the issuer’s choice to withdraw its IPO (corresponding to a real option 
                                                 
17 Benveniste and Spindt (1989) observe that adjustments to offer price during the “waiting period” (the time from 
the filing of the preliminary prospectus to the final offer date) result from information collected about the demand 
for the IPO from investors.  
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to the issuer) in the event of poor investor demand. If investors are willing to pay a higher price 
than the firm’s reservation value (the “exercise price”), the firm exercises its IPO option (similar 
to a put); otherwise it walks away. Hence, the option to withdraw strengthens the issuing firm’s 
bargaining power and reduces the degree of underpricing.  
Busaba, Benveniste and Guo (2001) examine a sample of 113 withdrawn and 423 completed 
industrial US IPOs from 1990 to 1992. They propose that the decision to withdraw an IPO 
depends on the issuer’s reservation value relative to potential investors’ valuation of the issue. They 
identify a wide range of factors that affect the issuer’s reservation value (e.g., debt ratio and a 
dummy variable indicating debt payment as the primary use of proceeds) and investors’ valuation 
(e.g., assets and annual revenues prior to the offering, market conditions, venture capital backing, 
and number of IPOs filed in a certain month). Using a probit model, their results show that issuers 
with a higher debt ratio and whose main intention is to use the proceeds to pay down debt have a 
higher probability of withdrawal. This is in line with the argument that issuers with greater access 
to capital have higher reservation values. Issuers with larger issues and which file an IPO in periods 
when many other offerings are filed are also more likely to withdraw. Conversely, firms are less 
likely to withdraw their IPO if they have larger revenues prior to the offering and venture-backing, 
and if the IPO was filed during favourable market conditions. The latter is consistent with the 
survey of Brau and Fawcett (2006) on a sample of 336 chief financial officers (CFOs) in the US 
between 2000 and 2002 regarding the IPO process. Based on a five-point scale, with 1 being “not 
important” and 5 being “very important”, they find that bad market/industry conditions (a mean 
of 4.8) and a low stock price (mean of 3.4) induce CFOs to withdraw their offering. 
The purpose of this literature review is to take stock of the extant empirical and theoretical 
knowledge regarding factors related to IPO withdrawals. Although the finance literature has shown 
interest in the determinants of IPO withdrawals, this area of research remains very much under-
researched. All of the studies reviewed above were conducted using US data, and thus highlights 
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the need for research on IPO withdrawals in other countries. By providing a cross-country analysis, 
this thesis adds to our understanding of factors that influence IPO withdrawals around the world.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
2.3.1 Information asymmetry  
In the pre-IPO phase, prospective investors screen potential firms before deciding to invest. 
However, establishing the value of an offering in the pre-IPO phase is quite challenging for 
prospective investors due to limited information and the associated risk of adverse selection (i.e., 
hidden information) and moral hazard (i.e., hidden action).18 This is because IPOs are typically 
start-up companies with no proven track record, and thus harbor many uncertainties (e.g., volatile 
cash flows).19 As Black (2001, p. 286) argues, IPO markets “… are a far more vivid example than George 
Akerlof’s original example of used cars. Used car buyers can observe the car, take a test drive, have a mechanic 
inspect the car, and ask others about their experiences with the same car model or manufacturer. By comparison, a 
company’s shares, when the company first goes public, are like an unobservable car, produced by an unknown 
manufacturer, on which investors can obtain only dry, written information that they can’t directly verify.”  
Although issuers are lawfully bound to disclose a set of parameters in the prospectus, the 
law cannot impose full disclosure of all relevant information for operational reasons (Cohen and 
Dean, 2005). Consequently, the issuers may choose to omit to disclose certain important details 
about the issue (Downes and Heinkel, 1982). In the presence of severe information asymmetry, 
prospective investors are less able to determine the value of the offering and thus may not agree 
to the offer price set by issuers. Higher information asymmetry between the issuing firms and 
potential investors is expected to give rise to higher ex-ante uncertainty about firm value. This 
                                                 
18 For a detailed discussion, see Amit, Brander and Zott (1998). 
19 Information asymmetry assumes that market players possess unbalanced information sets i.e., issuers know more 
about their prospects and the value of the firm than outside investors (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Rock, 1986).  
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increased uncertainty in turn results in a higher probability of IPO withdrawal as both the issuers 
and investors fail to converge on the offer price.20 Therefore, I hypothesise the following:    
H1a:  There is a positive association between firm-level information asymmetry and 
the likelihood of IPO withdrawal. 
 
While IPOs typically suffer from information asymmetries, this problem is more acute for 
IPO issuers operating in countries with poor institutions, suggesting that the likelihood of IPO 
withdrawal is also a function of country-level information asymmetry. I argue that differences in 
country-level information asymmetry are due to differences in accounting disclosure requirements 
(e.g., prospectus disclosure standards) and the quality of information dissemination medium. 
How financial disclosures by firms reduce information asymmetry between inside managers 
and outside investors has been thoroughly explored in theoretical work. For instance, Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) argue that an increase in the level of corporate disclosure reduces the 
likelihood of information asymmetry, which in turn reduces the discount at which shares are sold, 
thus lowering the cost of issuing equity. This has empirical support in Bhattacharya, Daouk and 
Welker (2003) who report that an increase in earnings opacity is associated with an increase in the 
cost of equity capital.21 In the same vein, country-level disclosure is expected to impact similarly 
on country-level information asymmetry. Indeed, Hail and Leuz (2006) find firms in countries with 
more extensive disclosure standards and stronger securities regulation display a lower cost of equity 
capital. Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005) also find firms in countries with expanded voluntary 
disclosures have a lower cost of both debt and equity capital. Shi, Pukthuanthong and Walker 
(2012) investigate an international IPO sample of 6,025 IPOs from 34 countries between 1995 and 
                                                 
20 This is empirically confirmed by Boeh and Southam (2011) who find that signals of lower information asymmetry 
are significantly negatively related to IPO withdrawal. 
21 Earnings opacity of a country is defined as the extent to which the distribution of reported earnings of firms in a 
country fails to provide information about the distribution of the true, but unobservable, economic earnings of firms 
in that country. 
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2002 and show that the stringency of country-level disclosure requirements, implying a reduced 
pre-IPO information asymmetry, is negatively related to IPO underpricing. 
Several other papers provide empirical evidence on the relation between disclosure quality 
and information asymmetry. Welker (1995) documents a negative correlation between disclosure 
quality (as measured by the annual corporate disclosure rating from the Association for Investment 
Management and Research Corporate Information Committee (CIC)) and bid-ask spread, which 
proxies information asymmetry. Likewise, Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2005) document that disclosure 
quality, as proxied by analysts’ ratings of firms’ disclosure policies, helps reduce information 
asymmetry (as measured by trading costs) and hence improves market liquidity. Healy, Hutton and 
Palepu (1999) show that firms with expanded voluntary disclosure experience better stock 
performance, in addition to greater institutional ownership, analyst following, and liquidity. Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) find an improvement in disclosure practices for a small sample of German 
firms that voluntarily switch from the German Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP) 
to an international accounting regime (International Accounting Standards (IAS) or US GAAP 
accounting standards). These firms that make the switch are associated with lower bid-ask spreads 
(proxy for information asymmetry) and higher share turnover (proxy for market liquidity). Using 
an alternate measure of information asymmetry, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find a negative 
association between disclosure quality, as measured by analysts’ evaluations of firms’ disclosure 
activities, and the probability of informed trading (PIN).22  
The disclosure of information materially important to investors in the IPO prospectus, 
which include the details that an investor would need to make an educated investment decision, 
differs noticeably across economies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006). For example, 
IPO issuers in Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong are allowed to include earnings forecasts 
in their prospectuses whereas it is a requirement in Malaysia. In contrast, US issuers typically do 
                                                 
22 PIN is a firm-specific estimate of the probability that a trade order originates from an investor who is privately 
informed. It captures the extent of information asymmetry among investors. 
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not provide forecast in their prospectuses. Belgium, Indonesia, and New Zealand require the 
reporting of just the aggregate number of the issuer’s shares belonging to its directors and officers 
in their prospectuses. However, countries like the US and Singapore demand the disclosure of the 
equity ownership of every director and officer of an issuer (Jog and McConomy, 2003; Shi, 
Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2013).  
Drawing from the above studies, I argue that differences in country-level disclosure 
standards are important determinants of IPO withdrawals. That is, greater disclosure standards in 
a country are likely to reduce information asymmetry between issuing firms and potential investors, 
resulting in a lower ex-ante uncertainty about firm value. This reduced uncertainty in turn results 
in a lower probability of IPO withdrawal.23  
The quality of information dissemination also plays an integral role in improving a country’s 
overall information environment (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther, 2010), which in turn impacts 
on the uncertainty about firm value. The disclosure literature commonly presumes that after 
information is revealed, it is easily obtainable by financiers through information intermediaries 
(e.g., Blankespoor, Miller and White, 2012).24 At the country level, the press plays an important 
information dissemination role (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). Pollock and Rindova 
(2003) find that higher amounts of information reported about an IPO in the media alter investors’ 
impression of the offering, and thus contribute to lower levels of underpricing and higher stock 
turnover (defined as the number of shares available on the first day a stock is traded). Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2004) point out that the absence of well-developed mass media facilities may 
restrict the flow of firm-specific information to economic agents. Fery, Gasbarro, Woodliff and 
Zumwalt (2003) find the financial press plays an important role in mitigating information 
asymmetry when they compared credit agreements that were more publicised with those that were 
                                                 
23 The information environment in market-based economies is moulded by the relative importance of two issues: the 
stewardship (agency) problem and the valuation (information asymmetry) problem (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther, 
2010). This paper focuses on the latter.  
24 For example, the media are more likely to focus on highly visible firms as they are more likely to attract a larger 
audience (Miller, 2006). 
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less publicised. I therefore assert that countries with a more established information dissemination 
base are better able to reduce information frictions between investors and issuers. The lower 
country-level information asymmetry therefore reduces the uncertainty about IPO firm value and 
results in a lower likelihood of IPO withdrawal. Based on the arguments above, I hypothesise that:      
H1b:  There is a positive association between country-level information asymmetry 
and the likelihood of IPO withdrawal. 
 
2.3.2 National culture dimension of uncertainty avoidance   
There is a growing interest in the relevance of national culture in explaining economic and 
finance phenomena, ranging from industrial growth to trading behavior (see Appendix B for an 
overview of the culture and finance literature). This thesis argues that cross-country differences in 
IPO withdrawals are influenced not only by structural differences in formal institutions but also 
by national culture. The economic relevance importance of culture can be looked at by way of 
Williamson’s (2000) framework which highlights the impact of informal institutions underpinning 
the formal rules on economic activities. North (1990) also argues that informal rules that originate 
from culture possess a more pervasive impact than formal institutions (e.g., formal laws) in shaping 
choices. 
Hofstede (2001, p. 9) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes 
the members of one human group from another.” In his highly influential study, based on an extensive 
cross-cultural survey of IBM employees, Hofstede (2001) identifies five dimensions to capture 
cross-cultural differences: (1) power distance, reflecting the level of socio-economic inequality; (2) 
uncertainty avoidance, indicating the degree of willingness to accept uncertainty or risk; (3) 
individualism/collectivism, showing the level of social interdependence; (4) masculinity/ 
femininity, indicating the extent of the focus on achievement; and (5) long-term/short-term 
orientation, showing whether a society exhibits a future-oriented or short-term perspective. Of 
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these, the uncertainty avoidance dimension provides the best fit in explaining the likelihood of 
IPO withdrawals, and is thus the focus of the remaining discussion in this section.25 
The uncertainty avoidance dimension refers to the extent to which members of a society 
feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity (Hofstede, 2001). Low uncertainty avoidance 
societies, e.g., in Singapore and Denmark, maintain a more relaxed attitude by displaying a greater 
readiness to take risk. High uncertainty-avoiding nations, e.g., Greece and Russia, in contrast, shun 
ambiguous environments and have a higher level of anxiety or “fear of failure,” and thus prefer a 
more predictable environment. They rely greatly on written rules and regulations, and adopt formal 
structures as a means of coping with uncertainty, ambiguity, and unstructured situations (Kreiser, 
Marino, Dickson and Weaver, 2010; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Ramirez and Tadesse, 2009). 
Several recent studies show that uncertainty avoidance has a negative effect on corporate risk-
taking.26 High uncertainty avoidance investors prefer savings accounts and term deposits since the 
payoff received is contractually fixed and typically backed by deposit insurance (Chui and Kwok, 
2008).  In contrast, low uncertainty avoidance “implies a greater willingness to enter into unknown ventures” 
(Hofstede, 2001, p. 164). I argue that low uncertainty avoidance investors more willingly buy shares 
which deliver better but more erratic returns. De Mooij (1998) correlates Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions with data from consumer surveys across European countries by market research 
agencies, and yields a number of insightful results. She shows that consumption behaviour depends 
on cultural values. For instance, in financial matters, people from higher uncertainty avoidance 
cultures spend less in shares and more in gems and precious metals, which points to a correlation 
between uncertainty avoidance and a search for safety. Similarly, Chui and Kwok (2008) find life 
insurance consumption is higher in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. Empirical evidence also 
                                                 
25 Long-term orientation has received less interest, possibly because the scores are available for only 23 countries. In 
2010, this dimension was expanded to 93 countries (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010;  Hofstede and Minkov, 
2010). 
26 Examining the role of culture in corporate risk-taking, Li, Griffin, Yue and Zhao (2013) find a negative association 
between uncertainty avoidance and risk-taking, implying that managers from high uncertainty avoidance countries are 
more risk averse. Further evidence is found by Mihet (2013) who reports that corporate risk-taking is higher in 
countries with low uncertainty avoidance. In a similar vein, Kreiser, Marino, Dickson and Weaver (2010) find that the 
level of uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with organisational risk taking. 
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shows that firms in more uncertainty-avoiding nations hold higher levels of cash to hedge against 
unforeseen negative events (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009; Ramirez and Tadesse, 2009).   
IPO firms, which are typically start-up firms with little or no historical track record, have an 
element of unknown and thus inherently involve more ex-ante uncertainties than other types of 
investments.27 Therefore, investors in high uncertainty avoidance countries are expected to be less 
likely to participate in IPOs. With less investor participation, the IPO is more likely to be 
withdrawn. Conversely, low uncertainty avoidance countries are open to new things and change 
so that investors in these nations are more likely to subscribe to the IPO since they are less 
threatened by unknown elements of the offering. It is therefore predicted that investors in nations 
with lower uncertainty avoidance would receive IPOs more positively than would investors in high 
uncertainty avoidance societies. Since uncertainty aversion directly influences risk-taking (Li, 
Griffin, Yue and Zhao, 2013; Mihet, 2013; Kreiser, Marino, Dickson and Weaver, 2010), issuers 
in low uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to embrace equity financing (as opposed to 
debt financing) and thus proceed with the IPO. This has support in Kwok and Tadesse (2006) and 
Aggarwal and Goodell (2009) who find that, whereas high uncertainty avoidance countries are 
inclined to embrace bank-based financial system, low uncertainty avoidance societies have a 
propensity to adopt a market-based financial system. Therefore, I predict the following: 
H2: There is a positive association between the uncertainty avoidance dimension of 
national culture and the likelihood of IPO withdrawals. 
 
 In sum, Hypotheses 1a and 1b focus on the (negative) relation between firm-level and 
country-level information asymmetry and the likelihood of IPO withdrawals. Hypothesis 2 
predicts a positive association between uncertainty avoidance and the likelihood of IPO 
withdrawals. Appendix C provides a summary of the hypotheses.  
                                                 
27 There tends to be a paucity of data vis-à-vis IPOs, and thus investors’ appraisal of the IPO and assessment of failure 
risk must involve more guess work (Demers and Joos, 2007). 
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2.4 Data and research method 
2.4.1 Data 
The sample consists of an international dataset of completed and withdrawn IPOs from 
2003 to 2010 sourced from ThomsonONE.com Investment Banking database (Thomson 
Reuters). ThomsonONE.com database provides issue details including offer proceeds, uses of 
proceeds, underwriters, and venture capital backing. As in previous studies, rights offerings, unit 
offerings, closed-end funds, trusts, limited partnerships, and depository receipts are excluded. 
Countries with less than 50 IPOs are also eliminated from the sample. Three countries (Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam) are excluded because of missing country-level data. 
The final sample consists of 13,751 IPOs (of which 3,212 are withdrawn IPOs) in 31 countries. 
Appendix D shows the sample coverage by country and year.  
 
2.4.2 Model 
To examine the determinants of the propensity of IPO withdrawals across firms and 
countries over time, a logistic regression model of the following specification is estimated: 
Withdrawn = β0 + β1 Information Asymmetry + β2 Uncertainty Avoidance + β3 Controls + Year Dummies + ε (1) 
where Withdrawn is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the IPO is withdrawn and zero 
otherwise; Information Asymmetry is a vector of firm- and country-level information asymmetry 
variables; Uncertainty Avoidance is a Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance measure; Controls is a vector 
of firm- and country-level control variables; and ε is the error term. Year Dummies are included to 
control for year effects, e.g., changes in regulations. The measurement of the independent variables 
is discussed below.  
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2.4.3 Independent variables  
Country-level proxies of information asymmetry  
Gauging the level of financial reporting and disclosure activities is challenging as no single 
measure can fully capture the breadth of such activities (Nanda and Wysocki, 2013). For this 
reason, and following Nanda and Wysocki (2013), I use four measures of accounting disclosure 
and transparency as proxies for country-level information asymmetry.  
The first proxy is the strength of a country’s IPO prospectus disclosure requirements (La 
Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes and Shleifer, 2006). There are six distinct disclosure requirements which 
assesses the strength of disclosure: (i) prospectus distribution; (ii) compensation of the issuer’s key 
officers and directors; (iii) ownership structure (disclosure of the name and ownership stake of the 
largest shareholders); (iv) insider ownership of the key officers and directors; (v) irregular contracts; 
and (vi) transaction between the issuer and its related parties (e.g., directors, officers, and large 
shareholders). A score of one is assigned to each of the above if it is a disclosure requirement in 
the country, and zero otherwise. Disclosure Requirements is constructed as the arithmetic mean of 
these six disclosure requirements, with a higher index value implying greater level of disclosure.  
The second proxy is the CIFAR disclosure index, which measures the strength of a country’s 
disclosure standards.28 It is based on voluntary and mandated financial reporting in firms’ annual 
reports (Nanda and Wysocki, 2013). This index has been previously used to measure the “quality” 
of accounting information and financial reporting intensity within a country (Bushman, Piotroski 
and Smith, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). It counts the inclusion 
or omission of 90 accounting and non-accounting items that fall into seven categories (general 
information, income statements, balance sheet, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock 
data, and special items). Several recent international studies have relied on the CIFAR disclosure 
                                                 
28 This index is formulated by the CIFAR based on firms’ 1995 annual reports. For further details, see Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2004). 
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index (e.g., Bruno and Shin, 2014; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang, 2014; Herrmann, Kang and Yoo, 
2014; Nguyen and Truong, 2013).  
The third proxy is the earnings management and opacity score based on Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003) (LNW scores) and updated in Leuz (2010). It is computed from 1996 to 2005 and 
comprises four proxies measuring the extent to which firms cover up economic performance: (i) 
smoothing reported operating earnings using accruals; (ii) smoothing and the correlation between 
changes in accounting accruals and operating cash flows; (iii) magnitude of accruals; and (iv) small 
loss avoidance. An aggregate measure of earnings management and opacity for each country is 
constructed by averaging the country rankings for the four individual earnings management 
measures. A higher score implies a higher level of earnings management and opacity.  
The fourth proxy is the Opacity index developed in 2000 by the accountancy and consulting 
company PricewaterhouseCoopers, and later produced by the Milken Institute (Kurtzman, Yago 
and Phumiwasana, 2004). Each component of opacity (corruption, legal system inadequacies, 
economic enforcement policies, accounting standards and corporate governance, and regulation) 
is rated individually and summed to give an overall opacity score that determines the country’s 
overall position in the index. 
The final proxy of country-level information asymmetry is Media Penetration, measured by the 
number of “daily newspapers” (per 1,000 people) from the World Development Indicators (WDI).  
The lower the media penetration, the larger the degree of information asymmetry.   
 
Firm-level proxies of information asymmetry  
Several proxies for firm-level information asymmetry are used: firm size, whether the IPO 
is in the technology sector, the use of proceeds for general purposes, and a set of reputation and 
certification variables. I explain below. 
Larger firms have a richer information environment and are thus associated with lower 
information asymmetry. For one, larger firms tend to attract more institutional investors  (Field 
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and Lowry, 2009; Gompers and Metrick, 2001) and financial analysts (Lang and Lundholm, 1996), 
both contributing to the firm’s information environment. Since many institutional investors are 
not permitted to finance small firms, small firms are also less likely to be followed by financial 
analysts (Vermaelen, 1981). Vermaelen (1981) notes that the extent of Wall Street Journal news 
coverage is skewed towards large firms, further contributing to the information set available about 
larger firms. Additionally, large firms possess more sources from which information may spill into 
the market (Chari, Jagannathan and Ofer, 1988). As the ex-ante uncertainty about the value of 
larger IPO firms is lower, I predict that larger firms are less likely to withdraw. This prediction is 
further supported by larger firms having a longer historical track record (How, Izan and Monroe, 
1995), which will help to enhance the firm’s chance of survival and more importantly, in this case, 
the success of the IPO. However, the US evidence on the relation between firm size and IPO 
withdrawals is mixed (Boeh and Dunbar, 2013; Boeh and Southam, 2011; Busaba, Benveniste and 
Guo, 2001; Dunbar and Foerster, 2008). Firm size is measured by the offer proceeds (Offer Size).  
Issuers that provide greater specificity on the use of proceeds assist potential investors in 
gaining an insight into the company and its top management. Above all, this specificity assists in 
easing the level of valuation uncertainty. Conceivably, issuing firms would exercise care in 
providing specific details about how the offer proceeds will be used due to the greater exposure 
to legal liability and the disclosure of proprietary  information (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). I argue 
firms that divulge vague information about the use of proceeds exacerbate information 
asymmetries between firm owners and outside investors. Use of Proceeds for General Purposes is set to 
one if the primary use of proceeds is for general purposes, and zero otherwise. 
Information asymmetries are also likely to be greater for high technology companies 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994) which derive their value mostly from intangible assets such as 
human capital, know-hows, and patents. Aboody and Lev (2000) find that research and 
development (R&D) intensive firms contribute extensively to the information asymmetry between 
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managers and investors.29 Lorek, Stone and Willinger (1999) argue that firms with important R&D 
projects have future earnings that are contingent on the completion of future investment 
opportunities, and as a result are more difficult to estimate. Thus, it is argued that high-tech IPOs 
are intrinsically more difficult to value and thus expected to be associated with a higher propensity 
of withdrawal. Technology takes the value of one for IPOs of technological firms and zero otherwise.  
Firm-level information asymmetry is also proxied by the presence of certification 
intermediaries at the IPO (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Carter and 
Manaster (1990) argue that certification through a reputable investment bank can help mitigate 
information asymmetry problems between IPO management and outside investors. Booth and 
Smith (1986) contend that investment banks can be employed to endorse the issue price and 
propose that the underwriter’s reputational capital can function as a bond that the value of the 
company’ shares reflects existing inside information.30 Issuing firms can benefit by engaging a more 
prestigious underwriter whose greater reputational capital will induce more investors to participate 
in the IPO. Thus, a high quality investment bank conveys valuable information about the quality 
of the issuing firm, suggesting lower ex-ante uncertainty. I therefore predict that the likelihood of 
withdrawal is lower for IPOs associated with reputable underwriters. Following Boulton, Smart 
and Zutter (2011), DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2004), and Kim, Palia and Saunders (2010), 
I set up an indicator variable Underwriter Reputation that takes a value of one for offerings 
underwritten by the top 25 investment banks in terms of offering proceeds, and zero otherwise.  
A potential role of IPO syndicate members is information production, e.g., IPO pricing.31 
Hence, the higher the Number of Underwriters in a syndicate, the greater the production of 
information. Corwin and Schultz (2005) find robust evidence of information production by IPO 
                                                 
29 Aboody and Lev (2000) argue about the existence of information asymmetries induced by R&D projects based 
upon two factors. First, most R&D outlays are used to develop one of a kind asset. Second, while there are trading 
markets for physical and financial assets, markets for R&D are less structured and the information required to value 
intangible assets may be trickier to get. 
30 Their model is based on the assumption of asymmetric information between issuers and prospective investors.   
31 Other roles discussed by the authors include certification of the issuer’s quality, analyst coverage, and market making. 
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syndicate members. They find that offer prices are more prone to be revised upwards in response 
to positive information when the underwriting syndicate has more co-managers. In the US, for 
example, different investment banks have different client bases, which provide additional sources 
of information about the demand for the IPO. Consequently, a lower probability of IPO 
withdrawal is expected for IPOs associated with a larger underwriter syndicate. Boeh and Southam 
(2011) and Boeh and Dunbar (2013) find supporting evidence for this.  
The certification function can also be provided by venture capitalists. Gompers (1996) 
argues that venture capitalists are motivated to take companies public early via an IPO to cash in 
on their investments, suggesting that venture capitalists have vested interest to ensure a successful 
IPO (Boeh and Dunbar, 2012). Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) contend that venture capitalists 
nurture partnerships with many financial intermediaries, e.g., institutional investors, because they 
are influential repeat players in the IPO market. IPOs backed by venture capitalists are associated 
with lower information asymmetry (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Hence, venture capital-backed 
firms (which implies greater certification) face less ‘‘lemons’’ concerns, and this lowers the ex-ante 
uncertainty about the value of the equity offering. The likelihood of withdrawal for venture capital-
backed IPOs is thus expected to be lower. VC Backing equals one if the issuer has venture capital 
financing prior to the IPO registration, and zero otherwise.  
 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Following prior research (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2010; Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010; Zheng, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami and Kwok, 2012), I use Hofstede’s cultural framework. Scores for the 
uncertainty avoidance dimension is obtained from Geert Hofstede’s website (www.geert-
hofstede.com). Uncertainty Avoidance is the extent to which a society feels threatened by 
uncertainty and ambiguity. The index is constructed using the country mean scores for three 
questions: (1) Stress, as expressed in the answer to the question “How often do you feel nervous 
or tense at work?”; (2) Employment stability, as indicated by respondents plan to remain with the 
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company for two years or less, or from two to five years; and (3) Rule orientation, as indicated by 
respondents’ agreement with the statement “Company rules should not be broken: even when the 
employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest.” The index ranges between 0 and 100. A 
higher index represents a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance.  
Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions provide a widely-cited and comprehensive 
framework to analyse cross-country phenomena, and to understand how cultural values impact on 
a country’s business organisations and decision making (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006). 
Hofstede (1980, 2001) defines culture as the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes 
members of one human group from members of another. His cultural dimensions are the results 
of a large-scale survey of IBM employees between 1967 and 1973 in 66 countries. His model 
initially identified four dimensions of culture: individualism versus collectivism; power distance; 
uncertainty avoidance; and masculinity versus femininity.32 He later updated the model to include 
a fifth dimension, i.e., long-term versus short-term orientation. Hofstede quantifies each of the 
cultural dimensions by calculating the scores for each dimension in every country included in the 
survey, and this is perhaps the most important facet of his study. While Hofstede’s work is still 
considered as the most authoritative cultural model, it has also drawn a number of criticisms (e.g., 
Jones, 2007; Kanan, Mula and James, 2015; Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006; McSweeney, 2002), 
including (i) it is overly simplistic. It is argued that five dimensions may not be sufficient to capture 
the complexity of cultural differences, and that additional important value dimensions may be 
overlooked; (ii) its method is not valid, since a survey may not be the proper instrument to precisely 
establish and quantify cultural values, when the value being measured is particularly subjective; (iii) 
its sampling method is too limited since a study based on a single multinational corporation (IBM) 
cannot conceivably offer information on the whole cultural system of a nation. Hofstede defends 
                                                 
32 The other Hofstede dimensions of national cultures are “power distance” (the extent in which individuals in a 
society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally); “collectivism versus individualism” (the degree to which 
a society emphasises the role of the individual versus that of the group); “masculinity versus femininity” (refers to a  
preference in society for achievement, assertiveness and material success); and “long-term versus short-term 
orientation” (the fostering of virtues oriented toward future rewards e.g., perseverance and thrift). 
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his choice to study a single multinational corporation, arguing that it eliminates complications like 
varying company policies or diverse management practices among different corporations. This in 
turn, he claims, allows for a more direct examination of national cultural differences; (iv) it ignores 
within-country cultural heterogeneity since Hofstede’s model assumes that an entire population is 
homogeneous, while in reality, most nations comprise various ethnic groups. In response, 
Hofstede (2001) argues that every nation has common traits carried by everyone; and (v) it is an 
outdated model as it is framed on data gathered in the 1960s and 1970s, which may not reflect 
current realities. Hofstede contends that culture is extremely stable over time, which is consistent 
with Williamson’s (2000) framework. Hofstede also explains that cultural scores do not provide a 
country’s absolute position, but its position relative to other countries, which is likely not to change 
considerably over time.33 
Despite these criticisms, Hofstede’s (2001) framework is the most widely used cultural 
framework in the literature because of its parsimony, clarity, and resonance with corporate 
managers (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006). Søndergaard (1994) reports that Hofstede’s 1980 
study was cited 1,036 times; this indicates the wide acceptance and popularity of Hofstede’s model 
even in the 1990s. In the latest release of his book, Hofstede (2001) reports 140 research studies 
that statistically confirm his cultural dimensions. A recent (December 2015) Google search using 
“Hofstede cultural dimensions” as the exact match keyword returns 4,300 hits. 
 
2.4.4 Control variables 
A number of control variables identified from the extant IPO literature are included in the 
tests.  The first control variable is Use of Proceeds to Repay Debt. Issuers that use the offer proceeds 
                                                 
33 Despite changes in culture over time, Beugelsdijk, Maseland and Van Hoorn (2013) support the continued validity 
of the Hofstede (1980, 2001) dimension scores and the cultural distance measures derived from them. They find that 
relative cultural differences measured 45 years ago continue to serve as a good proxy for cultural differences today. 
Therefore, “even though cultural change has happened, it has taken place in the same way for all cultures, leaving countries’ relative 
positions largely unaffected” (Beugelsdijk, Maseland and Van Hoorn, 2013, p. 29). 
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to repay debt are less dependent on the IPO for funding as they have greater access to alternative 
sources of capital (Busaba, Benveniste and Guo, 2001). I thus predict a higher likelihood of 
withdrawal by these firms. Empirical support for this proposition is found in Boeh and Dunbar 
(2013), Busaba, Benveniste and Guo (2001), Chen, Guo and Lin (2010), and Dunbar and Foerster 
(2008). The debt retirement dummy is set to one if the primary use of proceeds is for debt 
repayment and zero otherwise. 
The second control variable is the Number of Uses for the Proceeds of the IPO. On one hand, 
disclosing too many details may divulge proprietary information and expose firms to lawsuits 
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986). On the other hand, investors expect details on the way funds will be 
invested in order to distinguish between good and bad IPOs, and to determine the value of the 
IPO. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that a more detailed listing of uses of proceeds constitutes 
greater ex-ante uncertainty about the IPO. In contrast, Beatty and Welch (1996) argue that 
revealing a higher number of uses for the proceeds means more detailed disclosure. Thus, the 
effect of number of uses on IPO withdrawal is an empirical question.  
Third, I control for Market Conditions as they are deemed important to the withdrawal 
decision (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). Numerous papers find that stock offering withdrawals are 
higher during unfavorable market conditions (Boeh and Dunbar, 2013; Boeh and Southam, 2011; 
Chen, Guo and Lin, 2010; Hao, 2011). My first proxy is IPO Activity, defined as the ratio of the 
number of IPOs in a particular year over the total number of IPOs during the sample period for 
each country (Banerjee, Dai and Shrestha, 2011). My second proxy is Turnover, defined as the total 
value of shares traded during the IPO year divided by the average market capitalisation for the year 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000). 
The fourth control variables are Market Capitalisation and GDP Growth because variations in 
financial market development and economic development can potentially impact IPO withdrawal 
in a country. Market Capitalisation represents the overall size of the stock market, and is measured 
as total market capitalisation of listed firms in a country as a percentage of the country’s GDP. 
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GDP Growth measures the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. No directional signs are 
predicted for Market Capitalisation and GDP Growth.  
Fifth, I control for legal protection.  A country’s information environment is shaped by the 
degree of legal protection afforded to investors. The seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998), which underpins the law and finance literature, shows that some 
countries provide greater legal protection to minority shareholders than others.34 Countries that 
provide greater investor protection are associated with greater financial transparency (Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith, 2004), and thus a lower probability of IPO withdrawals.35  
Through its effect on information asymmetry, the legal regime thus influences the ex-ante 
uncertainty about firm value, which Engelen and Essen (2010) explain in two ways.36 First, weaker 
legal institutions can amplify ex-ante uncertainty similarly to ex-ante firm-specific risk at the time 
of the IPO. Second, a less developed legal framework where there is a higher probability of 
expropriation of minority outside shareholders by managers and majority owners can increase ex-
ante uncertainty as the former are less certain about the return on their investment. Indeed, Chiou, 
Lee and Lee (2010) report that a strong legal environment decreases investment risk. Hail and Leuz 
(2006) find that more effective securities regulation as well as a higher overall quality of the legal 
system result in lower ex-ante uncertainty. Therefore, IPOs in countries with weaker legal 
                                                 
34 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) show that legal regime is an important determinant of 
investor protection against expropriation by controlling shareholders, with common law countries (e.g., Australia, 
Canada, and the US) providing superior protection than civil law ones (e.g., Italy, Greece, and Spain). Compared to 
companies in French civil law countries, companies in English common law countries have more developed capital 
markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), more dispersed ownership (Kwok and Tadesse, 
2006), and higher valuation of firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002).  
35 By extension, this suggests that there is lower information asymmetry between issuing firms and investors in 
countries where investors enjoy greater protection. Gul and Qiu (2002) investigate 22 emerging financial markets, 
measuring information asymmetry by the level of importance that investors place on future- versus current-term 
accounting results. They find firms in countries with stronger legal protection/law enforcement and corporate 
governance are associated with lower levels of information asymmetry. Brockman and Chung (2008, p. 112) argue “a 
legal environment minimises information asymmetry and investor uncertainty. Because the legal and regulatory environment largely 
determines the reliability of publicly-available information, information asymmetry will be lower (ceteris paribus) for firms operating in 
stronger investor protection environments.” Brockman and Chung (2003) also point out that stock shares subject to weaker 
investor protection regulations possess more acute information asymmetry.  
36 Many Russian IPOs are “either withdrawn or issued at a reduced share price and company valuation” as a result of the poor 
investment freedom and protection of property rights (McCarthy, Puffer and Michailova, 2013, p. 238). Russia is the 
country with the highest IPO withdrawal rate among the countries sampled in this essay. 
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environments are associated with higher ex-ante uncertainty and thus more likely to be withdrawn. 
The quality of legal protection is proxied by the Revised Antidirector Rights index (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008) and capture aggregate shareholder rights, primarily with 
respect to voting. A higher index value implies a higher degree of anti-director rights. 
Finally, the model includes Year Dummies to control for inter-temporal variations since IPO 
withdrawals may fluctuate over time unrelated to included variables. Appendix E provides 
definitions and data sources for all variables used in the regressions. 
 
2.4.5 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2.1 provides the frequency distribution of completed and withdrawn IPOs by country 
(Panel A), year of filing (Panel B), and industry sector (Panel C). Panel A shows large differences 
in the number of IPOs across countries. About 17% (2,384 IPOs) and 12% (1,659 IPOs) of the 
sample IPO are from the US and China respectively. At the opposite end of the spectrum are 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, each with fewer than 70 IPOs. There is a wide 
variation in the percentage of withdrawn IPOs across the countries as well. Japan exhibits the 
lowest IPO withdrawal rate at 2.1%. Other countries with a single digit withdrawal rate include 
South Korea (6.8%), Malaysia (9.0%), and Taiwan (8.8%). In contrast, Russia displays the highest 
IPO withdrawal rate at 72.7%, followed by Spain (48.6%), Turkey (47.7%), and Indonesia (46.0%).  
Panel B indicates sizeable fluctuations in IPO volume and withdrawal rates across the sample 
years. The number of IPOs peaked in 2007, with 2,478 firms going public, more than twice the 
number in 2009. Not surprisingly, the proportion of withdrawn IPOs is highest around the global 
financial crisis (GFC) period (2007-2010), at 31.9%, compared to only 14.3% in the pre-GFC 
period. Panel C shows IPOs from the financial, high tech, materials, and industrial sectors are the 
most represented. The percentage withdrawal is roughly similar across industry sectors, except in 
the government sector but there are only 10 IPOs in this sector. 
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Descriptive statistics for the test variables are provided in Table 2.2. In Panel A, the Disclosure 
Requirements index fluctuates considerably across the countries, from the most stringent 
(Disclosure = 1 for the US and Singapore) to the most lax (Disclosure = 0.25 for Brazil) standards. 
Large cross-sectional variations also occur in the other information asymmetry proxies (i.e., 
CIFAR, Opacity, and LNW) as well as the national culture variable. For example, at 112, Greece 
has the highest score on Uncertainty Avoidance, suggesting that as a nation Greeks are not at all at 
ease with ambiguous situations. In contrast, Singapore scores the lowest (8) on this dimension.   
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of completed and withdrawn IPOs 
 
  
Country
 Completed 
IPOs 
 Withdrawn 
IPOs 
 Total IPOs 
Percentage 
Withdrawn
Australia 1,031                 165                    1,196                 13.8                   
Belgium 63                      15                      78                      19.2                   
Brazil 115                    73                      188                    38.8                   
Canada 1,106                 148                    1,254                 11.8                    
China 1,293                 366                    1,659                 22.1                   
Denmark 39                      15                      54                      27.8                   
France 287                    43                      330                    13.0                   
Germany 147                    81                      228                    35.5                   
Greece 56                      12                      68                      17.6                   
Hong Kong 316                    59                      375                    15.7                   
India 393                    193                    586                    32.9                   
Indonesia 88                      75                      163                    46.0                   
Israel 52                      34                      86                      39.5                   
Italy 101                    69                      170                    40.6                   
Japan 849                    18                      867                    2.1                     
Malaysia 335                    33                      368                    9.0                     
Netherlands 36                      29                      65                      44.6                   
New Zealand 56                      10                      66                      15.2                   
Norway 96                      25                      121                    20.7                   
Poland 241                    123                    364                    33.8                   
Russia 38                      101                    139                    72.7                   
Singapore 238                    45                      283                    15.9                   
South Korea 613                    45                      658                    6.8                     
Spain 38                      36                      74                      48.6                   
Sweden 66                      34                      100                    34.0                   
Switzerland 43                      9                        52                      17.3                   
Taiwan 457                    44                      501                    8.8                     
Thailand 186                    60                      246                    24.4                   
Turkey 45                      41                      86                      47.7                   
United Kingdom 782                    160                    942                    17.0                   
United States 1,333                 1,051                 2,384                 44.1                   
Grand Total 10,539               3,212                 13,751               23.4                   
Panel A: IPO Withdrawals by Country
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
 
Note: Distribution of completed and withdrawn IPOs from 2003-2010. Rights offerings, unit offerings, 
closed-end funds, trusts, limited partnerships, and depository receipts are excluded as well as countries with 
less than 50 IPOs. 
 
Year of Filling
Completed 
IPOs
Withdrawn 
IPOs Total IPOs
Percentage 
Withdrawn
2003 949                    145                    1,094                 13.3                   
2004 1,596                 284                    1,880                 15.1                   
2005 1,497                 221                    1,718                 12.9                   
2006 1,677                 307                    1,984                 15.5                   
Subtotal 5,719                 957                    6,676                 14.3                   
2007 1,975                 503                    2,478                 20.3                   
2008 774                    491                    1,265                 38.8                   
2009 649                    318                    967                    32.9                   
2010 1,422                 943                    2,365                 39.9                   
Subtotal 4,820                 2,255                 7,075                 31.9                   
Total 10,539               3,212                 13,751               23.4                   
Year of Filling
Completed 
IPOs
Withdrawn 
IPOs Total IPOs
Percentage 
Withdrawn
Consumer Products and Services 657                    223                    880                    25.3                   
Consumer Staples 558                    149                    707                    21.1                   
Energy and Power 616                    247                    863                    28.6                   
Financials 1,889                 687                    2,576                 26.7                   
Government and Agencies 3                        7                        10                      70.0                   
Healthcare 732                    245                    977                    25.1                   
High Technology 1,708                 308                    2,016                 15.3                   
Industrials 1,244                 376                    1,620                 23.2                   
Materials 1,629                 369                    1,998                 18.5                   
Media and Entertainment 370                    144                    514                    28.0                   
Real Estate 435                    200                    635                    31.5                   
Retail 400                    143                    543                    26.3                   
Telecommunications 298                    114                    412                    27.7                   
Total 10,539               3,212                 13,751               23.4                   
Panel C: IPO Withdrawals by Industry
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Table 2.2: Summary of selected country-level variables 
  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for selected country-level independent variables
Country CIFAR
Disclosure 
Requirements
Opacity LNW
Media 
Penetration
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Revised 
Antidirector 
Rights
Australia 80 0.75 21.00 0.08 156.9 51 4
Belgium 68 0.42 23.00 0.68 163.7 94 3
Brazil 56 0.25 40.00 0.66 35.6 76 5
Canada 75 0.92 23.00 0.16 175.6 48 4
China . . 50.00 . 71.2 30 1
Denmark 75 0.58 19.00 0.53 353.7 23 4
France 78 0.75 37.00 0.54 161.9 86 3.5
Germany 67 0.42 25.00 0.62 270.6 65 3.5
Greece 61 0.33 41.00 0.88 . 112 2
Hong Kong 73 0.92 20.00 0.52 . 29 5
India 61 0.92 48.00 0.54 69.4 40 5
Indonesia . 0.5 59.00 0.72 . 48 4
Israel 74 0.67 30.00 0.33 . 81 4
Italy 66 0.67 43.00 0.83 136.1 75 2
Japan 71 0.75 28.00 0.80 551.4 92 4.5
Malaysia 79 0.92 35.00 0.64 106.7 36 5
Netherlands 74 0.5 24.00 0.48 308.4 53 2.5
New Zealand 80 0.67 . 0.12 183.6 49 4
Norway 75 0.58 . . 522.4 50 3.5
Poland . . 41.00 . 108.9 93 2
Russia . . 46.00 . 93.7 95 4
Singapore 79 1 24.00 0.60 357.6 8 5
South Korea 68 0.75 37.00 . . 85 4.5
Spain 72 0.5 34.00 0.79 142.4 86 5
Sweden 83 0.58 19.00 0.17 478.3 29 3.5
Switzerland 80 0.67 23.00 0.50 433.5 58 3
Taiwan 58 0.75 34.00 0.64 . 69 3
Thailand 66 0.92 35.00 0.51 . 64 4
Turkey 58 0.5 43.00 . . 85 3
United Kingdom 85 0.83 19.00 0.13 296.3 35 5
United States 76 1 21.00 0.23 194.4 46 3
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
 
Note: This table reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between selected country-level variables. Definitions and data sources for all variables are outlined in Appendix E. 
Statistical significance at the 1% level in bold.  
 
 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations for the country-level variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Withdrawn 1          
(2) CIFAR 0.018-   1          
(3) Disclosure Requirements 0.053   0.333   1          
(4) LNW 0.057-   0.644-   0.404-   1          
(5) Opacity 0.048   0.784-   0.216-    0.565   1          
(6) Media Penetration 0.122-    0.152    0.171-    0.385   0.503-   1          
(7) Uncertainty Avoidance 0.041-    0.486-   0.535-   0.527   0.066   0.338   1          
(8) Revised Antidirector Rights 0.100-    0.113    0.055-   0.120    0.487-   0.417    0.131    1          
(9) Turnover 0.162    0.057   0.215    0.202-   0.037-   0.059   0.061-    0.254-   1          
(10) GDP Growth 0.047-   0.283-   0.011-   0.180    0.629   0.455-   0.371-    0.401-    0.203-   1          
(11) Market Capitalisation 0.075-   0.250   0.329   0.091-    0.457-   0.128    0.379-   0.303   0.078-   0.019    1          
(12) IPO Activity 0.006-   0.059-   0.266-   0.104    0.088   0.005-   0.070   0.058-   0.077-   0.179    0.044-   1          
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Panel B of Table 2.2 presents Pearson correlations for the country-level variables. Withdrawn 
is associated in the predicted direction with country-level information asymmetry proxies, i.e., 
CIFAR (-0.018), Opacity (0.048), and Media Penetration (-0.122). However, contrary to predictions, 
Withdrawn is positively correlated with Disclosure Requirements (0.048) and LNW (-0.057), and 
negatively correlated with Uncertainty Avoidance (-0.041). Some of the country-level information 
asymmetry proxies are highly correlated. To address potential multicollinearity, I orthogonalise 
CIFAR, Disclosure Requirements, LNW, and Opacity. 
Table 2.3 reports the correlation coefficients of the firm-level variables. Withdrawn is 
positively and significantly correlated with Use of Proceeds for General Purposes (0.136), in line with 
expectations. It is positively and significantly associated with Number of Underwriters (0.062) and 
Offer Size (0.071). The correlations between the independent variables (at the exception of the 
country-level information asymmetry proxies which are run one at a time) are not high enough to 
raise the issue of multicollinearity. This is substantiated by Variance Inflationary Factor (VIF) tests 
which show a maximum VIF of 1.90 (see Appendix F).37 
 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 2.4 provides results from univariate t-test (for equality of means) and z-test38 (for 
equality of medians) of difference in country- and firm-level determinants between completed and 
withdrawn IPOs.  The difference is significant at the 1% level for most factors examined.  
 
 
                                                 
37 To detect potential problems of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the explanatory factors are 
estimated. The variances of the estimated coefficients are overstated when multicollinearity is present, and VIF 
measures how much the variance is inflated. For instance, a VIF of 3 means that the standard errors are larger by a 
factor of 3 than would otherwise be the case if there were no inter-correlations between the explanatory factor of 
interest and the remaining independent variables included in the regression models. A common rule of thumb is that 
if VIF is greater than 5 then multicollinearity is high.  
38 Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of firm-level variables 
 
Note: This table reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between firm-level variables. Definitions and data 
sources for all variables are outlined in Appendix E. Statistical significance at the 1% level in bold. 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for firm-level variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Withdrawn 0.23          0 0.42          0 1               
Technology 0.15          0 0.35          0 1               
Number of Underwriters 1.31          1 0.83          1 14             
Offer Size 1.23          1.29 1.03          -3 4.34          
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt 0.01          0 0.09          0 1               
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes 0.71          1 0.46          0 1               
Number of Uses for the Proceeds 2.48          2 1.68          1 12             
VC Backing 0.12          0 0.32          0 1               
Underwriter Reputation 0.24          0 0.43          0 1               
Panel B: Pearson correlations of firm-level variables
Withdrawn Offer Size 
Number of 
Underwriters
Number of 
Uses for the 
Proceeds 
Withdrawn 1
Offer Size 0.071 1
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes 0.136 0.216 1
Number of Underwriters 0.062 0.355 0.071 1
Number of Uses for the Proceeds -0.194 0.126 -0.026 0.052
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons between completed and 
withdrawn IPOs 
 
Note: Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. All variables are defined in Appendix E. 
 
 
  
Mean Mean 
CIFAR 73.734               73.426               1.896 * -0.338
(0.058) (0.735)
Disclosure Requirements 0.816                 0.838                 -5.724 *** -14.679 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
LNW 0.384                 0.350                 5.931 *** -0.592
(0.000) (0.554)
Opacity 27.170               28.312               -5.551 *** -4.211 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Media Penetration 210.506             173.276             13.171 *** 4.227 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Uncertainty Avoidance 53.582               51.469               4.788 *** 5.596 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Offer Size 1.197                 1.393                 -7.940 *** -14.478 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Technology 0.162                 0.096                 9.311 *** 9.282 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes 0.671                 0.818                 -16.092 *** -15.943 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation 0.228                 0.281                 -6.165 *** -6.156 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of Underwriters 1.285                 1.407                 -7.290 *** -9.643 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
VC Backing 0.139                 0.019                 15.770 *** 15.612 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights 3.619                 3.324                 11.822 *** 15.366 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Turnover 121.243             147.008             -18.909 *** -12.208 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 4.430                 4.035                 5.463 *** 5.276 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Market Capitalisation 117.692             105.168             8.612 *** 10.845 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
IPO Activity 0.163                 0.162                 0.736 4.477 ***
(0.462) (0.000)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds 2.662                 1.893                 23.203 *** 24.354 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt 0.008                 0.004                 2.308 ** 2.308 **
(0.021) (0.021)
completed vs. 
withdrawn
completed vs. 
withdrawn
Completed IPOs Withdrawn IPOs t-test z-test
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In line with expectations, offerings in countries with lower CIFAR and Media Penetration, and 
higher Opacity are more likely to be withdrawn, providing preliminary support for the country-level 
information asymmetry hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b). However, IPO withdrawal is more likely to 
occur for firms in countries with higher Disclosure Requirements and lower LNW. Contrary to 
expectations, issuing firms in countries characterised by lower Uncertainty Avoidance are more likely 
to withdraw their IPO.  
Issuing firms in countries with strong investor protection, as measured by Revised Antidirector 
Rights, are also less likely to be withdrawn, suggesting lower ex-ante valuation uncertainty. 
Completed offerings are associated with higher GDP Growth, suggesting that IPOs issued in rapidly 
developing economies are more likely to succeed. The mean Market Capitalisation for completed 
IPOs is 117.7, compared to 105.2 for withdrawn IPOs, with the difference being statistically 
significant. This suggests that IPOs in smaller stock markets are more likely to be withdrawn. 
Other significant market-specific control variables include Turnover (as a proxy for stock market 
liquidity). The results show that if an issuing firm were to belong to a country with higher Turnover, 
it is more likely to withdraw. However, there is no significant difference between average IPO 
Activity for completed and withdrawn IPOs. The univariate tests thus provide preliminary evidence 
that several country-level information asymmetry, cultural, and other characteristics are significant 
in differentiating between completed and withdrawn IPOs. 
All the firm-specific variables are significant. IPOs with a higher Number of Underwriters (lower 
information asymmetry) are more likely to be completed, in line with Hypothesis 1a. A higher 
percentage of VC backed firms (at the 1% level) are completed (mean of 13.9%) than withdrawn 
(1.9%). The finding is consistent with VC backing acting as certification for the IPO, which in turn 
lessens the information asymmetry between issuers and potential investors. IPO withdrawal is 
more common for issuers who are less specific about the use of proceeds (implying higher 
information asymmetry), in line with expectations. However, contrary to expectations, withdrawn 
IPOs have a higher average Offer Size, are more likely to brought forward by reputable underwriters, 
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and are less likely to be in the technology sector (p<0.01) compared to completed IPOs. Firms 
with more detailed listing of uses of IPO proceeds and more frequent use of proceeds to repay 
debt (suggesting alternative access to sources of capital) have on average a higher chance of listing 
successfully.  
 
2.5.2 Logistic regression results 
Results from logistic regressions are reported in Table 2.5. In estimating the model, country-
level information asymmetry proxies (i.e., CIFAR, Disclosure Requirements, LNW and Opacity) are 
tested one at a time to alleviate potential multicollinearity problem. The coefficients of most 
country-level information asymmetry proxies (except Disclosure Requirements) are negative and 
statistically significant. Specifically, CIFAR is significantly negative (at p<0.01), and LNW and 
Opacity are significantly negative (at p<0.01), supporting Hypothesis 1b. Media Penetration has a 
significantly negative coefficient (at p<0.01), further supporting Hypothesis 1b. Therefore, IPOs 
issued in countries with lower information asymmetry are less likely to be withdrawn.  
The results show the Hofstede’s culture dimension of uncertainty avoidance also explains 
some of the variability in IPO outcomes. Contrary to expectations, Uncertainty Avoidance has a 
significant negative coefficient (at p<0.05 or better) in all four specifications (Hypothesis 2). A 
possible explanation is that in high uncertainty avoidance countries, there is demand for rules and 
formality to structure life in order to reduce the level of “anxiety” and ambiguity. For example, in 
Japan (a high uncertainty avoiding culture) considerable time and work are devoted to feasibility 
studies (e.g., viability of the IPO plan) and all the risks need to be determined before any venture 
can begin. Managers demand specifics and figures when considering any decision (Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov, 2010). The establishment of rules and formality as a coping mechanism to 
reduce ambiguity and uncertainty can possibly lead to a lower likelihood of IPO withdrawal.  
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Table 2.5: Logistic regressions of IPO withdrawal  
 
Note: This table reports logistic regression results of the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The dependent variable is 
Withdrawn, which takes a value of 1 for withdrawn IPOs and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
E. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
 
  
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR - -0.082 ***
(0.000)
Disclosure Requirements - 1.747 ***
(0.003)
LNW + 0.988 ***
(0.001)
Opacity + 0.043 ***
(0.000)
Media Penetration - -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.009 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Uncertainty Avoidance + -0.042 *** -0.032 *** -0.050 *** -0.007 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040)
Offer Size - -0.136 *** -0.099 ** -0.154 *** -0.219 ***
(0.002) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)
Technology + -0.094 -0.135 -0.224 -0.439 ***
(0.575) (0.420) (0.189) (0.002)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes + 0.769 *** 0.777 *** 0.764 *** 0.552 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation - -0.014 0.008 0.038 0.232 **
(0.921) (0.955) (0.788) (0.035)
Number of Underwriters - -0.109 * -0.106 * -0.100 * 0.123 ***
(0.058) (0.065) (0.081) (0.009)
VC Backing - -1.464 *** -1.442 *** -1.475 *** -1.692 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights - -0.450 *** -0.499 *** -0.593 *** 0.096 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018)
Turnover + 0.009 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth +/- -0.011 0.095 *** 0.043 -0.102 ***
(0.732) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000)
Market Capitalisation +/- 0.005 ** -0.006 *** -0.001 0.003 **
(0.042) (0.007) (0.731) (0.037)
IPO Activity + -0.906 -0.031 -0.451 -4.956 ***
(0.309) (0.973) (0.609) (0.000)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds +/- -0.639 *** -0.653 *** -0.651 *** -0.565 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt + 0.857 * 0.805 0.864 * 0.828 *
(0.084) (0.104) (0.086) (0.075)
Intercept 8.242 *** 1.280 3.649 *** -2.932 ***
(0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.284 0.286 0.212
No. of observations 7,509              7,509              7,410              9,101              
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Focusing on the firm-level information asymmetry variables, there is strong evidence 
showing that the firm size (Offer Size) matters to the likelihood of IPO withdrawal. Similar to the 
findings in Chen, Guo and Lin (2010) and Hao (2011), I find a negative and significant coefficient 
for Offer Size in all four specifications at the 1% level or better. This result supports Hypothesis 1a, 
implying that the richer information environment of larger firms results in lower information 
asymmetry and thus lower ex-ante uncertainty about their value. 
Contrary to the predictions, the coefficient of Technology is negative but only significant in 
specification 4. A possible interpretation of this result is that withdrawal cost can be particularly 
high for technology firms whose employees and suppliers have job-specific skills and capital, and 
whose customers may find it difficult to find alternative servicing for their relatively unique product 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988). Therefore, it is likely that issuers in the high-tech sector take more 
care in ensuring a successful IPO.  
The probability of withdrawal is significantly positively related to the Use of Proceeds for General 
Purposes in all four specifications of Table 2.5 (1% level). This finding indicates that ambiguity and 
uncertainty with regards to IPO proceeds induces information asymmetries and valuation 
uncertainties, leading to the withdrawal of the offering. An explanation for this finding is found in 
Beatty and Ritter (1986). They argue that disclosure of proprietary information and exposure to 
legal liability may push issuers to remain vague about the use of proceeds. These IPOs are thus 
more difficult to value and are more prone to a withdrawal.   
Contrary to prediction, the coefficient of Underwriter Reputation is positive in three out of four 
specifications but only significant in specification 4, providing some evidence that IPOs associated 
with more prestigious underwriters are more likely to withdraw. Boeh and Southam (2011) offer 
arguments for the mixed findings here and in the literature (Busaba, Benveniste and Guo, 2001; 
Dunbar and Foerster, 2008). They argue that to preserve reputational capital, prestigious 
underwriters may withdraw an offering in the midst of uncertainty, while offerings marketed by 
low prestige investment banks may not make the grade.  
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Number of Underwriters has a significantly negative coefficient in three specifications, in line 
with the view that having more underwriters leads to greater information production, thus 
reducing information asymmetries. This finding suggests that having more investment banks 
involved in the IPO increases information spillovers and helps reach a wider client base 
(Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhem and Yu, 2003; Corwin and Schultz, 2005). The resulting lower 
information asymmetry and pre-IPO valuation uncertainty increases the odds of success for the 
float. VC Backing is significantly negative in all the specifications. Thus, IPOs with VC-backing 
have a significantly higher chance of success. Venture capitalists have established relationships 
with institutional investors. Along with reputational concerns and a motivation to cash out, venture 
capitalists are motivated to produce more information to ensure the success of the IPO.  
In sum, IPOs that are larger, involve a venture capitalist, have greater specificity on the use 
of proceeds, and a higher number of underwriters experience a lower likelihood of IPO 
withdrawals. Collectively, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1a that information 
asymmetries between issuers and potential investors influence the likelihood of IPO withdrawals. 
This result is in line with Boeh and Southam (2011) who find that signals of lower information 
asymmetry (as measured by the number of underwriters and word count of the prospectus) are 
significantly related to IPO withdrawal.  
With regards to country-level controls, the coefficient of Revised Antidirector Rights is 
significantly negative (at p<0.05 or better) in most specifications. Therefore, IPOs issued in high 
investor protection countries are associated with a lower likelihood of withdrawal. Weaker legal 
institutions not only amplify valuation uncertainty but also investment risk (Chiou, Lee and Lee, 
2010; Engelen and Essen, 2010; Hail and Leuz, 2006). Turnover is significant and positive (at 
p<0.01) in all specifications, suggesting that IPOs are more likely to be withdrawn during more 
active and liquid markets, presumably due to the limited pool of available capital (i.e., greater 
competition for funds). There are mixed results concerning the effect of GDP Growth and Market 
Capitalisation, and IPO Activity on the propensity of IPO withdrawal.  
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A number of firm-level control variables are significant as well. Number of Uses for the Proceeds 
is negative and highly significant (p<0.01), suggesting IPO firms that reveal a higher number of 
uses are less likely to be withdrawn; presumably the more detailed information on how the funds 
would be used decreases uncertainty about the IPO. Finally, Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt is positive 
and significant (p<0.10) in three specifications, consistent with the view that issuers that raise 
funds in order to retire debt have access to alternative sources of capital and are thus more likely 
to withdraw their offering.  
In sum, analysis of a global sample of IPOs over the period 2003-2010, shows that issuing 
firms in countries with low information asymmetries (as measured by CIFAR, LNW, Opacity, and 
Media Penetration) experience a lower likelihood of IPO withdrawals. Firm-level information 
asymmetry, as proxied by Offer Size, Number of Underwriters, VC Backing, and Use of Proceeds for General 
Purposes, is also significant in explaining the likelihood of IPO withdrawal. With respect to national 
culture, Uncertainty Avoidance is positively related to the propensity of IPO withdrawals.  
 
2.6 Robustness checks 
2.6.1 Additional country-level characteristics: political connections, trust and litigation 
For additional robustness, I include additional country-level control variables in the tests.  
First, political connections may well impact on IPO outcomes. Politically connected firms enjoy 
preferential treatment by governments. For instance, Faccio (2006) shows that politically 
connected companies are significantly more likely to be bailed out in financial distress than 
unconnected companies. Potential investors may view politically connected issuing firms as less 
risky and are thus more likely to subscribe to their IPO. I would, therefore, expect a lower 
incidence of IPO withdrawals for politically connected IPOs. Political connection is proxied by the  
number of connected firms as percentage of market capitalisation (Faccio, 2006). Faccio (2006, p. 
369) describes that a firm is categorised as politically connected if “at least one of its large shareholders 
(anyone controlling at least 10% of voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, 
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or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party.” The number 
of connected firms as percentage of market capitalisation ranges from zero (e.g., Argentina) to 
86.75 (Russia).   
The second country-level variable is trust. Sapienza and Zingales (2011, p. 17) note “that 
financing is nothing but an exchange of a sum of money today for a promise to return more money in the future. 
Whether such an exchange can take place depends not only on the legal enforceability of contracts but also on the 
extent to which the financier trusts the financee.” Funding through an IPO typically entails somewhat 
limited hard information (e.g., mandatory disclosures) and high uncertainty. Consequently, 
investors are more likely to also rely on soft information such as trust (i.e., informal institutions) 
in their investment decisions.  
Trust is an essential catalyst of many types of exchanges, simply because in uncertain settings 
such as in the IPO market, trust alleviates uncertainty and the associated perceived risk. Nobel 
Prize-winning economist North (1990, p. 3) reports institutions are the “rules of the game in a society” 
and encompass both formal and informal rules. While trust is essential for each and every 
investment decision, it is especially critical in IPOs where people invest funds in often early-stage 
companies without any track record in return for potential profits. As Nanda and Wysocki (2011) 
note, in public corporations, capital market participants (investors and creditors) entrust managers 
with their invested capital and rely on them to create value by deploying these assets in the most 
productive manner available. According to Nobel Prize winner Arrow (1972, p. 357), trust is 
critical for efficient transactions: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, 
certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”  
In high-trust countries, investors have more faith in the credibility of firm disclosures, 
whether they are voluntary or mandatory, as well as in the legal framework. Thus, in high-trust 
countries, financiers treat financial disclosures and legal contracts as more credible, which in turn 
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reduce the uncertainty about firm value, and consequently shape the IPO outcome (completion or 
withdrawal).  
Previous research shows that a lack of trust affects financing and investment decisions and 
that higher trust is conducive to economic growth.39 More specifically, the significance of trust in 
stock market dealings is stressed by a number of authors.40 Nanda and Wysocki (2011) find the 
degree of trust in an economy impacts capital market participants’ subjective beliefs concerning 
the integrity of accounting information. They state that trust is complementary to high quality 
accounting disclosure. Similarly, strong legal systems can be an effective safeguard when trust 
among agents is low. Trust may be viewed as a complement to legal contracts (Olsen, 2008) in this 
regard. In the literature, definitions of trust assume that commercial transactions comprise an  
element  of  uncertainty,  which  is  impacted by the relative trust between economic agents (Nanda 
and Wysocki, 2011).41 Olsen (2008, p. 2194) notes that “research has shown trust to be an attribute of 
perceived risk and that perceived risk, as well as expected return, is a primary driver of investment value. Even more 
important, in the real financial world characterized by irreducible uncertainty, trust in others comprises the 90% of 
the “risk iceberg” that is below the “waterline.” That is, trust in financial advisors, corporate managers, and 
regulatory officials, is the faith that encourages most current investment...” 
                                                 
39 Based on a 29-country sample, Knack and Keefer (1997) confirm that trust (proxied by a measure based on data 
from the WVS and civic cooperation have an effect on aggregate economic activity. Zak and Knack (2001) extend the 
work of Knack and Keefer by adding 12 countries to their sample and find similar results. More recently, Dincer and 
Uslaner (2010), using data from US states, find a link between trust and economic growth irrespective of the economic 
growth measure employed. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) show that lower bilateral trust between two countries 
is associated with less trade and less FDI (foreign direct investment) between the nations. Finally and consistent with 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), Bottazzi, Rin and Hellmann (2011) find a positive effect of trust among countries 
on the investment decisions of venture capital firms. Overall, the above studies indicate that a commitment to higher 
trust benefits economies. 
40 Using Dutch and Italian micro data, as well as cross-country data, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) look into 
trust to explain variations in stock market involvement across individuals and across countries. They document that 
trust plays an important function in investment decisions when financiers are not acquainted with the stock market or 
lack information to evaluate it.  As they note, “when lack of trust is deeply rooted, investors may be doubtful about any information 
they obtain and disregard it in revising their priors” (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008, p. 2258). They report that less 
trustworthy people are less inclined to purchase stocks, and when they go for it, they purchase less of it. The authors 
propose that deficiency of individual trust in the equity market could to some extent make a case for the “participation 
puzzle.” They also find a positive and significant effect of trust on stock market participation across countries, 
controlling for the quality of legal enforcement and legal origin. Thus, previous research shows that differences in 
trust across individuals and nations can explain dissimilarities in financing and investments activities. 
41 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008, p. 2557) define trust as “the subjective probability individuals attribute to the possibility 
of being cheated.”  
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I argue that country-level trust also plays an important role in determining IPO outcomes 
across countries. I conjecture that in lower trust countries, there is a higher likelihood of IPO 
withdrawals. Olsen (2008) argues that trust has both cognitive (e.g., distributions of return, beta) 
and affective characteristics that render it a major determinant of perceived investment risk. If 
investors have a high level of trust in a particular investment, the perceived risk would be relatively 
low (Buchholtz and Ryan, 2001). IPOs that are more difficult to value because of high information 
asymmetry and thus greater ex-ante uncertainty will be appraised more on the trustworthiness (i.e., 
the reputation effect) of their promoter. The underlying logic is that a high level of trust in an 
economy can decrease the perceived risk about the value of the firm. Therefore, holding all else 
constant, issuers in high trust nations are more likely to succeed and thus less likely to withdraw 
their IPO. Trust is based on data tabulated from surveys of interpersonal trust question of 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people?” The data are from the 2005-2008 World Values Survey (WVS).  
The final additional country-level variable is litigation since there is another reason why legal 
regimes can influence the propensity of IPO withdrawal. Readily available legal means are likely to 
raise litigation risk and subject issuers and investment banks to substantial punitive damages on 
the basis of overstatement (understatement) of gain (loss) potential in the IPO prospectus. For 
example, Lowry and Shu (2002) estimate almost 6% of all firms floated in the US between 1988 
and 1995 were accused of infractions concerning the IPO, with average damage awarded to 
plaintiffs corresponding to over 13% of IPO proceeds. Hao (2011) studies a sample of 594 
withdrawn and 2,284 completed industrial US IPOs from 1996 to 2005. She documents that firms 
with a higher probability of IPO withdrawal face higher litigation risk (arising from false or 
misleading information about the issuer’s business disclosed in connection with IPO) if they 
complete the offer, consistent with the notion that withdrawal reflects the riskiness of an IPO.42 
                                                 
42 Litigation risk is measured by the lawsuit dummy which equals one if the issuing firm has been sued under the 
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 within three years following the IPO, and zero 
otherwise. 
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These firms are more likely to withdraw the offering as a means of reducing the indirect costs (e.g., 
lost management time and damaged reputation) as well as potential legal liabilities associated with 
lawsuits from investors.  Litigation risk is proxied by the Liability Standard index from La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006). This index represents the degree of procedural difficulty 
experienced by investors in recouping damages from IPO issuers and its directors, distributors, 
and accountants due to distorted statements in the prospectus. A higher value for the index 
indicates a lower level of procedural difficulty in recouping damages in losses resulting from 
misleading information in the prospectus.  
Thus, I repeat the analysis controlling for Societal Trust, Political Connections, and Liability 
Standard. The results are reported in Table 2.6. In line with my prediction, Political Connections has a 
significant negative coefficient (at p<0.01) in all models. As expected, the coefficient of Societal 
Trust and Liability Standard are respectively significantly negative and positive across all cases (at 
p<0.01). Importantly, including these additional variables in the tests does not affect the overall 
conclusions of this thesis. The results for country-level measures of information asymmetry, in 
particular CIFAR, Opacity, and Uncertainty Avoidance remain intact. So are the results for firm-level 
information asymmetry proxies.  
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Table 2.6:  Logistic regressions of IPO withdrawal (additional controls) 
 
Note: This table reports logistic regression results of the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The dependent variable is 
Withdrawn, which takes a value of 1 for withdrawn IPOs, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
E. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR - -0.046 ***
(0.007)
Disclosure Requirements - -0.108
(0.863)
LNW + 0.420
(0.458)
Opacity + 0.029 **
(0.026)
Media Penetration - -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.001
(0.307) (0.068) (0.026) (0.538)
Uncertainty Avoidance + -0.041 *** -0.045 *** -0.043 *** -0.039 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Offer Size - -0.100 ** -0.091 ** -0.099 ** -0.105 **
(0.024) (0.041) (0.025) (0.017)
Technology + -0.116 -0.132 -0.183 -0.181
(0.497) (0.440) (0.292) (0.298)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes + 0.716 *** 0.740 *** 0.758 *** 0.741 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation - -0.105 -0.103 -0.082 -0.092
(0.454) (0.466) (0.564) (0.514)
Number of Underwriters - -0.114 * -0.110 * -0.114 * -0.113 *
(0.051) (0.061) (0.051) (0.053)
VC Backing - -1.471 *** -1.446 *** -1.508 *** -1.534 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Political Connections - -0.029 *** -0.041 *** -0.038 *** -0.040 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Societal Trust - -0.025 *** -0.029 *** -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liability Standard + 1.440 *** 1.584 *** 1.592 *** 1.464 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights - -0.399 *** -0.398 *** -0.365 *** -0.361 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Turnover + 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth +/- -0.012 0.016 0.012 -0.003
(0.739) (0.622) (0.723) (0.925)
Market Capitalisation +/- -0.006 ** -0.011 *** -0.010 *** -0.008 ***
(0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
IPO Activity + -0.458 -0.081 0.028 -0.318
(0.607) (0.928) (0.975) (0.725)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds +/- -0.659 *** -0.667 *** -0.671 *** -0.664 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt + 0.787 0.780 0.838 * 0.874 *
(0.117) (0.120) (0.095) (0.084)
Intercept 6.837 *** 4.503 *** 3.675 ** 2.408 *
(0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.067)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.296 0.295 0.296 0.297
No. of observations 7,509              7,509              7,410              7,350              
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2.6.2 Additional culture dimensions 
The second robustness tests relate to the addition of the remaining four Hofstede’s culture 
dimensions (i.e., power distance, individualism, performance orientation, and long-term 
orientation).  
Power distance reflects the degree to which the less powerful members of a nation accept 
and expect that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 2001). The citizens of countries that 
score high on this dimension are more tolerant to inequalities and more readily to accept a 
hierarchical order in which everybody has a place. Given that Confucius insisted the stability of 
society is based on unequal relations between people, it is not surprising that countries influenced 
by his ideas have relatively high power distance values, e.g., China, Malaysia, and Russia. In 
contrast, low power distance countries, e.g., Denmark, Israel, and New Zealand, emphasise shared 
power, egalitarianism, and opportunity for everyone, and view imbalance in power and wealth as 
something that should be curtailed. An effect of high power distance is a general distrust of other 
individuals, given that power is usually perceived as coercive (Hofstede, 2001).43 Inequalities 
among people in relation to prestige, wealth, and power resulting from high power distance could 
induce lower trust. Bjornskov (2008) examines the importance of fractionalization for the 
generation of social trust.44 He argues that fractionalization, in terms of income inequality and 
political diversity, detrimentally impacts on social trust. Mihet (2013) argues that firms in countries 
with low power distance tend to take on more risk because they are more trusting. She reasons (p. 
113) that “power distance deals with issues of equality and ultimately with trust … in low power distance countries, 
there is a latent harmony between the powerful and the powerless: People at various power levels feel less threatened 
and are more prepared to trust each other.” 
                                                 
43 Gray’s (1988) theory also indicates that information sharing is low in high power distance cultures, which could 
exacerbate the information asymmetry phenomenon. In her empirical study, Zarzeski (1996) find that high power 
distance societies have a tendency to establish organisations that dissuade extensive sharing of information.  
44 A lowering of trust would raise the transaction costs which arise from the coordination of exchange among market 
actors. They include for example, the cost of obtaining and processing information, and enforcing contracts (North, 
1990). 
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The above arguments thus suggest that in countries with higher power distance, there is a 
lower degree of trust between issuers and outside investors. Since a higher level of trust, which 
implies a reduction in the perceived risk and thus the ex-ante uncertainty about the IPO value, 
reduces the probability of IPO withdrawal, IPOs listed in countries with higher power distance are 
less likely to be withdrawn.  
Individualism indicates the extent to which people stand up for themselves and choose their 
own affiliations (Hofstede, 2001). This is contrasted with collectivism where people act 
predominantly as a member of a life-long group or organization. Nations with a high score for 
collectivism, e.g., Indonesia, Taiwan, and South Korea, stress group interests and 
responsibility. People from individualist cultures such as in the US, the UK, and Australia, are 
more likely to be overconfident and subject to self-attribution bias. Markus and Kitayama (1991) 
argue that in individualistic societies, individuals tend to be positive and look at their own personal 
abilities. Heine, Lehman, Markus and Kitayama (1999, p. 769-770) contend that children in 
individualistic cultures “are encouraged to think about themselves positively as stars, as winners, as above average 
and as the repositories of special qualities,” and thus are more likely to overrate their own capabilities. 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) contend that individualism can be associated with overconfidence, 
i.e., in more individualistic cultures, more decisions are made by individuals and the decisions are 
likely to be influenced by overconfidence. People from individualistic cultures are also 
overconfident about the expected return on a stock or an investment project (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005). Overconfident investors have long been argued to give rise to high trading volume, 
excess volatility, and momentum effects (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998).  
There is also a relation between individualistic societies and self-attribution bias, described 
as the tendency for people to boost or preserve their self-esteem by denying responsibility for 
failure and taking credit for success (Zuckerman, 1979). In this regard, individuals ascribe their 
accomplishments to internal or personal factors but attribute their failures to external or situational 
factors. Markus and Kitayama (1991) advocate that the propensity to preserve and promote self-
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esteem in individualistic nations is due to widespread self-attribution bias in addition to 
overconfidence.  
Following the arguments in Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) that financiers from distinct 
countries diverge in how they interpret information and are subject to different psychological 
biases, I propose that in individualist societies, IPOs are more likely to succeed as a result of the 
confidence of investors about their ability to select an IPO and about the precision of the 
parameters they use in valuing the offering. The latter reduces the ex-ante uncertainty about the 
value of the IPO. By the same token, overconfident issuers in individualistic countries are less 
likely to withdraw their offering.  
Performance orientation refers to the extent to which a society emphasises achievement.45 
Individuals in performance-oriented cultures are essentially performance-driven. In performance-
oriented societies, e.g., in China, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK, people value 
competitiveness, assertiveness, ambition, and the accumulation of wealth and material 
possessions.46 Cooperation-oriented cultures, e.g., Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden, however stand for a preference for helping others, modesty, and caring for the quality of 
life and the weak. Issuers in nations that score high on the performance orientation emphasise 
performance and visible achievement. As issuers strive for performance and success in high 
achieving nations, I posit that the performance orientation dimension is negatively related to the 
probability of IPO withdrawal.  
Another cultural dimension that may affect IPO withdrawals is the long-term orientation 
dimension (Hofstede, 2001), defined as the extent to which a country exhibits a future orientated 
                                                 
45 Roberts and Salter (1999) relabel Hofstede’s (2001) masculinity concept as “achievement orientation,” which is a 
better description of this culture dimension. As noted by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010, p. 144), “masculinity-
femininity has been the most controversial of the five dimensions of national cultures. This is a matter not only of labelling (users are free to 
adapt labels to their taste – for instance, performance-oriented versus cooperation-oriented) but also on the value issues related to this 
dimension.” Following Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010), I label “masculinity/femininity” as 
“performance/cooperation orientation.” 
46 Failing in college is a tragedy in performance-oriented societies and may lead to suicide (Hofstede, 1994). In Japan, 
individuals deny credit for success, attributing it instead to outside causes like the efforts of others or luck. Failure, 
however, is assigned to internal, personal mistakes like insufficient effort or capabilities. 
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perspective rather than a focus on the present.47 Values found in countries with a long-term 
orientation such as in China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are persistence (i.e., 
perseverance in achieving results), ordering relations by status, thrift (i.e., strong propensity to save 
and invest), and having a sense of shame. In contrast, nations with a short-term orientation such 
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, exhibit a rather small tendency to save 
for the future, an emphasis on the “bottom line,” and realising fast results.48 
Long-term orientation involves investment in the future. Investment possibilities are usually 
assessed by considering their capacity to generate long-term value. For instance, De Mooij (1998) 
finds that mutual fund investment tends to be short-term oriented whereas the reverse holds true 
for real estate investment. Cultures with long-term outlooks display less myopic tendencies in the 
equity markets. Issuers in short-term oriented societies are quick to abandon the IPO if they do 
not expect to have immediate benefits. Based on these arguments, I predict that the long- versus 
short-term orientation dimension plays a role in relation to IPO withdrawals.  
Consistent with expectations, the coefficient of Power Distance (Long-term Orientation) is 
significant and positive in 2 (4) models in Table 2.7. Contrary to expectations, Performance Orientation 
is significant and positive in 3 models. Why would an issuer in a high performance country not 
continue with its proposed IPO is puzzling. The results on the impact of Individualism are mixed. 
Most importantly, the addition of these four variables does not affect the results regarding the 
uncertainty avoidance and information asymmetry hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
47 The long-term orientation was initially called Confucian dynamism. Confucianism emphasises scholarship, thrift, 
and perseverance. Cultures shaped by the philosophies of Confucius (551-478 B.C.) include China, Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan (Yeung and Tung, 1996). 
48 As noted by Mamman and Saffu (1998), Western managers have been criticised for their fixation on profit 
maximization, their focus on short-term results, control of the work process and rashness in embracing then walking 
away from new ideas. 
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2.6.3 Alternative estimation method 
To address unequal sample size across countries and to ensure that the results are not driven 
by a particular country, I replicate the primary analysis using country-weighted logistic models. The 
results, which are reported in Table 2.8, reveal virtually the same inferences about the importance 
of firm- and country-level information asymmetries and national culture in determining the 
likelihood of IPO withdrawals. 
 
2.6.4 Alternative samples 
The US has by far the largest percentage of withdrawn IPOs (17.3%). Japan is often 
considered as an atypical nation in terms of the homogeneity of its people and its scores on each 
of the Hofstede's five cultural dimensions (Yee, Ostsuka, James and Leung, 2008). To assess 
whether the results are driven by one or both of these countries, I repeat the main analysis by first 
excluding firms from the US, then from Japan, and then from both countries. The results are 
reported in Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 respectively. I find all of the results hold for the reduced 
sample, except for the information asymmetry hypothesis where some of the information 
asymmetry proxies lose significance when the US or both the US and Japan are excluded. Thus, 
information asymmetry matters most in non-US countries. 
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Table 2.7: Logistic regressions of IPO withdrawal (additional cultural variables) 
 
 
Note: This table reports logistic regression results of the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The dependent variable is Withdrawn, 
which takes a value of 1 for withdrawn IPOs, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix E. Coefficient 
estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 
5 and 1% levels. 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR - -0.123 ***
(0.000)
Disclosure Requirements - 2.021 ***
(0.001)
LNW + 2.115 ***
(0.010)
Opacity + 0.090 ***
(0.000)
Media Penetration - 0.004 *** -0.002 -0.002 0.006 ***
(0.004) (0.111) (0.141) (0.000)
Uncertainty Avoidance + -0.034 *** -0.017 ** -0.035 *** -0.020 ***
(0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000)
Power Distance + 0.043 *** 0.001 0.009 0.028 ***
(0.000) (0.898) (0.303) (0.000)
Individualism - 0.018 * -0.025 *** 0.002 0.022 ***
(0.060) (0.004) (0.864) (0.009)
Performance Orientation - 0.027 *** 0.024 *** 0.020 *** 0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.207)
Long-term Orientation - -0.031 *** -0.024 *** -0.033 *** -0.044 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Offer Size - -0.180 *** -0.127 *** -0.194 *** -0.228 ***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Technology + -0.118 -0.150 -0.256 -0.424 ***
(0.492) (0.381) (0.139) (0.004)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes + 0.744 *** 0.786 *** 0.765 *** 0.551 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation - 0.004 -0.006 0.039 0.350 ***
(0.975) (0.966) (0.778) (0.002)
Number of Underwriters - -0.108 * -0.096 * -0.080 0.035
(0.061) (0.098) (0.164) (0.473)
VC Backing - -1.629 *** -1.482 *** -1.474 *** -1.628 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights - -0.288 *** -0.446 *** -0.391 *** -0.090 *
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051)
Turnover + 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.005 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth +/- -0.041 0.074 ** 0.087 *** 0.046 *
(0.258) (0.017) (0.005) (0.080)
Market Capitalisation +/- 0.000 -0.010 *** -0.005 * -0.003 *
(0.957) (0.000) (0.071) (0.073)
IPO Activity + -0.499 0.255 -0.456 -4.633 ***
(0.583) (0.778) (0.612) (0.000)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds +/- -0.666 *** -0.674 *** -0.664 *** -0.646 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt + 0.889 * 0.870 * 0.881 * 0.906 *
(0.077) (0.083) (0.082) (0.053)
Intercept 5.738 *** 1.273 0.723 -5.427 ***
(0.000) (0.309) (0.619) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.298 0.289 0.290 0.245
No. of observations 7,509              7,509              7,410              9,101              
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Table 2.8: Country-weighted logistic regressions of IPO withdrawal 
 
 
Note: This table reports country-weighted logistic regression results of the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The 
dependent variable is Withdrawn, which takes a value of 1 for withdrawn IPOs, and 0 otherwise. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix E. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The 
symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR - -0.056 *
(0.054)
Disclosure Requirements - 1.217
(0.349)
LNW + 1.839 ***
(0.000)
Opacity + 0.084 ***
(0.000)
Media Penetration - -0.004 -0.006 * -0.007 *** 0.000
(0.112) (0.052) (0.000) (0.699)
Uncertainty Avoidance + -0.062 *** -0.056 ** -0.073 *** -0.001
(0.001) (0.031) (0.000) (0.805)
Offer Size - -0.490 *** -0.488 *** -0.505 *** -0.530 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Technology + 0.014 -0.002 -0.037 -0.267 *
(0.946) (0.992) (0.857) (0.078)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes + 0.713 *** 0.709 *** 0.673 *** 0.603 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation - -0.185 -0.183 -0.176 0.270 **
(0.303) (0.311) (0.328) (0.047)
Number of Underwriters - -0.255 *** -0.258 *** -0.251 *** 0.013
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.843)
VC Backing - -1.915 *** -1.906 *** -1.907 *** -2.019 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights - -1.017 *** -1.033 *** -1.096 *** -0.180 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021)
Turnover + 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth +/- 0.132 *** 0.200 *** 0.103 ** -0.220 ***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000)
Market Capitalisation +/- -0.007 -0.013 *** -0.009 *** 0.009 ***
(0.145) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
IPO Activity + 0.853 0.694 0.297 -6.465 ***
(0.510) (0.597) (0.813) (0.000)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds +/- -0.544 *** -0.550 *** -0.547 *** -0.511 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt + 0.210 0.202 0.197 0.595
(0.767) (0.776) (0.783) (0.347)
Intercept 10.428 *** 5.657 7.453 *** -3.319 ***
(0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.382 0.381 0.383 0.285
No. of observations 7,509              7,509              7,410              9,101              
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Table 2.9: Logistic regressions of IPO withdrawal (without the US) 
 
 
Note: This table reports logistic regression results of the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The dependent variable is 
Withdrawn, which takes a value of 1 for withdrawn IPOs, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
E. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR - -0.046 ***
(0.001)
Disclosure Requirements - 2.483 ***
(0.000)
LNW + -0.037
(0.913)
Opacity + -0.004
(0.693)
Media Penetration - -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.005 *** -0.002 **
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023)
Uncertainty Avoidance + -0.025 *** -0.009 -0.024 *** -0.008 **
(0.000) (0.142) (0.000) (0.030)
Offer Size - 0.510 *** 0.586 *** 0.506 *** 0.299 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Technology + -0.337 -0.335 -0.476 * -0.679 ***
(0.181) (0.183) (0.071) (0.001)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes + 0.632 *** 0.667 *** 0.689 *** 0.467 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation - 0.110 0.212 0.170 0.494 ***
(0.541) (0.238) (0.347) (0.000)
Number of Underwriters - -0.026 -0.037 -0.005 0.119 **
(0.703) (0.590) (0.946) (0.032)
VC Backing - -1.078 *** -1.140 *** -1.115 *** -1.367 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights - -0.071 -0.011 -0.109 0.282 ***
(0.504) (0.922) (0.321) (0.000)
Turnover + 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 **
(0.556) (0.245) (0.778) (0.015)
GDP Growth +/- -0.001 0.053 * 0.059 * 0.075 ***
(0.986) (0.065) (0.066) (0.005)
Market Capitalisation +/- 0.003 -0.006 ** -0.002 -0.005 ***
(0.291) (0.012) (0.364) (0.007)
IPO Activity + -2.874 *** -1.412 -2.263 ** -2.926 ***
(0.005) (0.180) (0.025) (0.000)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds +/- -0.799 *** -0.817 *** -0.810 *** -0.825 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt + 0.802 0.720 0.791 0.922 *
(0.158) (0.205) (0.164) (0.076)
Intercept 3.328 *** -2.559 ** 0.364 -2.018 ***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.652) (0.002)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.228 0.231 0.227 0.211
No. of observations 5,712              5,712              5,613              7,304              
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Table 2.10: Logistic regressions of IPO withdrawal (without Japan) 
 
 
Note: This table reports logistic regression results of the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The dependent variable is 
Withdrawn, which takes a value of 1 for withdrawn IPOs, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
E. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR - -0.069 ***
(0.000)
Disclosure Requirements - 0.778
(0.191)
LNW + 0.874 ***
(0.004)
Opacity + 0.039 ***
(0.000)
Media Penetration - -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.010 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Uncertainty Avoidance + -0.051 *** -0.048 *** -0.058 *** -0.008 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017)
Offer Size - -0.133 *** -0.116 *** -0.152 *** -0.219 ***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000)
Technology + -0.073 -0.104 -0.190 -0.427 ***
(0.669) (0.539) (0.271) (0.002)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes + 0.802 *** 0.820 *** 0.802 *** 0.561 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation - -0.029 -0.008 0.018 0.220 **
(0.835) (0.955) (0.900) (0.046)
Number of Underwriters - -0.109 * -0.102 * -0.103 * 0.128 ***
(0.059) (0.076) (0.073) (0.007)
VC Backing - -1.513 *** -1.487 *** -1.539 *** -1.635 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights - -0.525 *** -0.615 *** -0.645 *** 0.095 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021)
Turnover + 0.009 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth +/- -0.014 0.072 *** 0.029 -0.106 ***
(0.671) (0.008) (0.338) (0.000)
Market Capitalisation +/- 0.003 -0.005 ** -0.001 0.003 **
(0.246) (0.024) (0.485) (0.047)
IPO Activity + -0.375 0.162 -0.005 -4.861 ***
(0.679) (0.859) (0.995) (0.000)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds +/- -0.654 *** -0.665 *** -0.667 *** -0.569 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt + 0.888 * 0.851 * 0.912 * 0.841 *
(0.074) (0.087) (0.070) (0.071)
Intercept 8.482 *** 3.722 *** 4.663 *** -2.605 ***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.283 0.279 0.282 0.202
No. of observations 7,117              7,117              7,018              8,709              
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Table 2.11: Logistic regressions of IPO withdrawal (without Japan and the US) 
 
 
Note: This table reports logistic regression results of the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The dependent variable is 
Withdrawn, which takes a value of 1 for withdrawn IPOs, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
E. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR - -0.039 ***
(0.006)
Disclosure Requirements - 1.931 ***
(0.002)
LNW + -0.128
(0.703)
Opacity + -0.012
(0.290)
Media Penetration - -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.007 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Uncertainty Avoidance + -0.034 *** -0.020 *** -0.034 *** -0.011 ***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.008)
Offer Size - 0.531 *** 0.587 *** 0.529 *** 0.306 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Technology + -0.300 -0.297 -0.426 -0.659 ***
(0.238) (0.240) (0.109) (0.001)
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes + 0.669 *** 0.688 *** 0.747 *** 0.486 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Reputation - 0.103 0.180 0.166 0.478 ***
(0.573) (0.322) (0.363) (0.000)
Number of Underwriters - -0.026 -0.032 -0.012 0.127 **
(0.701) (0.644) (0.859) (0.023)
VC Backing - -1.095 *** -1.110 *** -1.159 *** -1.320 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights - -0.183 * -0.123 -0.239 ** 0.280 ***
(0.096) (0.298) (0.035) (0.000)
Turnover + 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 **
(0.370) (0.581) (0.702) (0.013)
GDP Growth +/- -0.011 0.037 0.040 0.072 ***
(0.756) (0.211) (0.225) (0.007)
Market Capitalisation +/- 0.002 -0.005 ** -0.002 -0.006 ***
(0.389) (0.048) (0.539) (0.004)
IPO Activity + -2.216 ** -1.145 -1.595 -2.758 ***
(0.033) (0.281) (0.123) (0.000)
Number of Uses for the Proceeds +/- -0.815 *** -0.827 *** -0.830 *** -0.832 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt + 0.832 0.758 0.842 0.941 *
(0.144) (0.183) (0.140) (0.070)
Intercept 3.921 *** -0.982 1.635 * -1.438 **
(0.001) (0.395) (0.056) (0.045)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.221 0.220 0.201
No. of observations 5,320              5,320              5,221              6,912              
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2.7 Conclusion 
The study aims to examine the propensity of IPO withdrawals in an international setting. 
The research proposes a number of determinants based on firm- and country-level measures of 
information asymmetries and national culture. Examining a sample of IPOs across 31 countries 
from 2003 to 2010, the empirical findings confirm that issuing firms in countries with low 
information asymmetry have a lower likelihood of withdrawing their IPO. This result is in line 
with the information asymmetry theory and its mitigation impact on ex-ante valuation uncertainty. 
When both issuers and investors fail to converge on the offer price as a result of valuation 
uncertainty driven by information asymmetry, this triggers a higher propensity of IPO withdrawal. 
At the firm level, the probability of IPO withdrawal is significantly negatively related to firm size, 
VC backing, and the number of underwriters involved in the IPO, and positively associated with 
the use of proceeds for general purposes. At the country level, the likelihood of IPO withdrawal 
is significantly negatively related to accounting disclosure (CIFAR) and media penetration, and 
positively associated with measures of opacity and earnings management.  
With respect to national culture, uncertainty avoidance is negatively related to the likelihood 
of IPO withdrawals, in contradiction to Hypothesis 2. I offer an explanation for this finding based 
on the development of formal institutions as a way of coping with uncertainty in high uncertainty 
avoidance culture. I argue that the establishment of rules and formality results in a lower likelihood 
of IPO withdrawals in these nations. This finding contributes to the growing literature that shows 
culture matters to a large range of finance phenomena.  
Insofar as the decision to go public may not be random, the above tests may suffer from 
potential endogeneity and self-selection problems. Endogeneity is prevalent in international 
business research (Reeb, Sakakibara and Mahmood, 2012). Take the stock exchange standards as 
an example. Firms that are unlikely to meet the exchange standards are unlikely to file for an IPO, 
and as such will not appear in the sample of IPOs in this study. This selection bias suggests that 
the withdrawal rate is likely to be understated, and may falsely lead to the conclusion that there is 
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no relation between stock exchange reputation and IPO withdrawals. While this issue can be 
addressed using Heckman’s (1979) model, this would require international data on private firms 
which are currently limited.49
                                                 
49 Some notable exceptions are Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), who examine a sample of 69 Italian companies 
using a proprietary database supplied by a consortium of Italian banks, and Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004), who 
investigate the timing of the going public decision using a sample of 330 German companies.  
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APPENDIX A: Summary of prior literature on IPO withdrawals 
 
 
Dunbar 
(1998)
Busaba, 
Benveniste 
and Guo 
(2001)
Benveniste, 
Ljungqvist, 
Wilhelm and 
Yu (2003)
Dunbar and 
Foerster 
(2008)
Chen, Guo 
and Lin 
(2010)
Latham and 
Braun (2010)
Hao (2011)
Boeh and 
Southam 
(2011)
Country US US US US US US US US
Period 1979-1982 1990-1992 1985-2000 1985-2000 1990-1992 2000-2002 1996-2005 1999-2004
BE: 86/179
FC: 138/343  
Industry Various Various Various Various Various Internet Industrials Various
Withdrawn (%) BE: 32 FC: 
29
27 23 20 26 65 26 35
Litigation risk √
CEO ownership √
Size of the board of directors √
Average board member tenure √
Board independence √
Institutional ownership √
Senior manager and director ownership apart from the 
CEO
√
Investor prestige √
CEO duality √ √
CEO’s base compensation √
Top management team size √
Board experience √
Information disclosure √
Firm age √
Revenue √ √ √
Assets √ √
IPO proceeds √ √ √ √ √ √
Proceeds revisions (contemporaries) √
Offer price √ √
Average offer price revision √
Offering number of shares √
Technology firm √ √ √
Utility firm √
VC-backing √ √ √ √
VC prestige √
VC activity level √
Sample size (withdrawn/completed) 113/423 
(FC)
1473/7442 110/420 
(FC)
81/43 594/22841422/6141 584/1071
Legend: √ = variables included in the study. BE = Best-efforts; FC = Firm-commitment. 
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
 
Dunbar 
(1998)
Busaba, 
Benveniste 
and Guo 
(2001)
Benveniste, 
Ljungqvist, 
Wilhelm and 
Yu (2003)
Dunbar and 
Foerster 
(2008)
Chen, Guo 
and Lin 
(2010)
Latham and 
Braun (2010)
Hao (2011)
Boeh and 
Southam 
(2011)
Auditor prestige √
Auditor activity level √
Underwriter prestige √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Underwriter activity level √
Number of underwriters √
VC activity level √
Company counsel prestige and underwriters' counsel 
prestige
√
Company counsel prestige and Underwriters' activity level √
Pre-filing debt √
Debt ratio √ √
Uses of proceeds for debt √ √ √ √
The proportion of offering shares sold by existing 
shareholders
√
The proportion of offering shares retained by existing 
shareholders
√ √
Bank market share √ √
Bank industry market share √
Number of IPO fillings √ √ √ √ √ √
Ratio of withdrawn IPOs to total IPOs √ √
Number of industry fillings √
Contemporary underpricing √
Average  underpricing √
Bank excess underpricing √
Industry returns √ √
Industry daily return volatility √
Return on NASDAQ Composite Index √ √
Number of filings two months after filing √
Number of industry filings two months after filing √
Change in BAA-AAA yield spread two month after filing √
Change in ten-year Treasury yield two months after filing √
Return on Nasdaq Composite Index over two months 
after filing
√
Change in industry BM over year of filing √
Number of filings two months after filing √
Number of industry filings two months after filing √
Change in BAA-AAA yield spread two month after filing √
Change in ten-year Treasury yield two months after filing √
Return on Nasdaq Composite Index over two months 
after filing
√
Change in industry BM over year of filing √
Change in BAA-AAA yield spread √
Change in AAA-10 year Treasury yield spread √
Legend: √ = variables included in the study. BE = Best-efforts; FC = Firm-commitment. 
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APPENDIX B: Culture and finance 
 
 
An expanding body of research on national culture has recently started to appear in the finance 
literature, suggesting that culture matters to a wide range of important economic and capital market 
phenomena, including corporate debt maturity, capital structure, dividend policy, cash holdings, the 
financial reporting environment, the financing environment, and the functioning of the stock 
market.50  
Kwok and Tadesse (2006) study the relation between national culture and financial systems in 
a sample of 41 countries. They show that countries with higher (lower) uncertainty avoidance are 
more likely to have a bank-based financial system (market-based financial system). Aggarwal and 
Goodell (2009) extend their work by examining 30 countries over the period 1996-2003. They show 
that nations characterised by greater uncertainty avoidance opt for bank-based systems. In a sample 
of 20,893 mergers from 52 different countries from 1991 to 2008, Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi 
(2012) point out that cultural differences, in particular cultural distance (defined as the absolute 
difference between two countries for each of three cultural  dimensions: trust, hierarchy, and 
individualism) impacts merger activities around world. They report that the volume and gains of 
cross-border mergers diminish as the cultural distance between bidders and targets increases.  
National culture has been shown to also impact on stock market functioning.  For example, 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) show that high individualism is associated with large trading volume, 
high volatility, and more momentum profits.  
Using data from 49 countries, Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that cultural differences (as 
measured by religion) influence cross country variation in investor protection rights. Specifically, 
they ascertain that creditor rights are stronger in countries where the main religion is Protestant 
rather than Catholic. Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2005) examine the relation between investor 
                                                 
50 For reviews of this literature, see Breuer and Quinten (2009) and Reuter (2009). 
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rights and national cultural dimensions. They show corporate governance-related laws relate 
systematically to national culture. 
Culture influences on corporate financial policies has been investigated by a number of studies. 
Chui, Llyod and Kwok (2002) examine the link between Schwartz’s cultural dimensions and capital 
structure in a sample of 5,591 firms in 22 nations. They show that firms in countries that score high 
on conservatism (emphasising harmonious working relation, security, conformity, and tradition) 
have less debt in their capital structure. Likewise, managers in countries with high scores on mastery 
(emphasising control and individual success) have lower corporate debt ratios. Using a hierarchical 
linear model differentiating firm-level from country-level variables on a sample of 8,187 foreign joint 
ventures in China from 32 countries in 2002, Li, Griffin, Yue and Zhao (2011) find that mastery has 
a negative and significant impact on foreign joint ventures’ leverage and short-term debt decisions, 
and a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of foreign joint ventures having long-term 
debt. Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami and Kwok (2012) apply Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions (i.e., 
uncertainty avoidance, collectivism/individualism, power distance, and masculinity/ femininity) to a 
sample of 114,723 firm-year observations from 40 countries between 1991 to 2006 to study the 
impact of national culture on debt maturity choice. They find firms in nations with high uncertainty 
avoidance, collectivism, individualism, power distance, and masculinity scores issue debt with shorter 
maturity.  
Several studies examine the impact of national culture on corporate dividend policy. Using 
three of Hofstede’s (2001) cultural  dimensions, namely individualism,  power distance, and 
uncertainty avoidance, Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) show countries that score high on individualism, 
and score low on power distance and uncertainty avoidance have significantly higher dividend 
payouts based  on a sample of 5,797 firms across 41 countries. They further report that legal 
institutions and culture as a social institution are important complementary determinants of payout 
policies across nations. Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2010) find that national culture is related to 
dividend payouts. Using Schwartz’s (1994) national culture dimensions i.e., conservatism and 
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mastery, they find conservatism is positively related and mastery negatively related to corporate 
dividend payouts for a sample of 27,462 firm-years from 21 countries between 1995 and 2007. 
Empirical evidence reveals that companies in more uncertainty-avoiding nations maintain 
higher levels of cash to hedge against unpredictable adverse future events. Using a sample of over 
120,000 firm-years across 49 countries from 1990 to 2004, Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) report the 
level of corporate cash holdings is impacted by the national cultural background. Specifically, 
countries that score high on uncertainty avoidance retain more cash to hedge against unforeseen 
negative situations. However, the multinationality of a firm can temper the cultural impact on 
corporate cash holding. Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) substantiate that corporations hold larger 
cash and liquid balances in nations where people have a tendency to avoid uncertainty, are culturally 
more masculine, and have a longer-term orientation. Their sample includes over 75,000 firm-year 
observations in 45 countries during the period 1995-2004.  
Examining the role of culture in corporate risk-taking for a sample of 7,250 firm-level 
observations in 35 countries from 1997 to 2006, Li, Griffin, Yue and Zhao (2013) find a negative 
relation between uncertainty avoidance and risk-taking, implying that managers from high 
uncertainty avoidance countries are more risk averse. Chui and Kwok (2008) use Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions to analyse consumption patterns of life insurance products in 41 countries during the 
period 1976-2001. They show that life insurance consumption in a country is positively associated 
with individualism and negatively associated with power distance and masculinity. Park and Lemaire 
(2011) find Hofstede’s fifth cultural dimension (i.e., long-term  orientation)  has  a  strong  positive  
effect  on  life insurance  demand in a sample  233  country-year observations from 27 countries 
over the 2000-2008 period.    
Finally, Hope (2003) finds legal origin and national culture are important determinants of  
corporate accounting disclosure levels for a sample of 1,851 firms across 39 countries over the period 
1997-2006.  
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APPENDIX C: Country and firm level hypotheses 
 
 
 
  
Proxies (expected effect on probability of 
withdrawal)
H1a
There is a positive association between firm-
level information asymmetry and the 
likelihood of IPO withdrawal
Number of Underwriters (-); Offer Size (-); 
Technology (+); Use of Proceeds for General 
Purposes (+); VC Backing (-); Underwriter 
Reputation (-)
H1b
There is a positive association between 
country-level information asymmetry and the 
likelihood of IPO withdrawal
CIFAR (-); Disclosure Requirements(-); LNW 
(+); Opacity (+); Media Penetration (-)
H2
There is a positive association between the 
uncertainty avoidance dimension of national 
culture and the likelihood of IPO withdrawal
Uncertainty Avoidance (+)
Hypotheses
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APPENDIX D: Sample coverage by country and year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Grand Total
Australia 97            181          182          198          268          79            51            140          1,196                 
Belgium 2              2              8              18            18            12            4              14            78                      
Brazil 5              9              28            82            12            16            36            188                    
Canada 44            128          134          197          294          207          79            171          1,254                 
China 100          172          76            165          223          178          224          521          1,659                 
Denmark 1              1              2              13            21            5              3              8              54                      
France 10            33            33            88            77            30            24            35            330                    
Germany 8              15            24            62            59            19            8              33            228                    
Greece 17            12            9              7              9              5              4              5              68                      
Hong Kong 53            49            53            45            56            37            37            45            375                    
India 15            31            59            85            134          92            44            126          586                    
Indonesia 7              15            13            9              12            26            17            64            163                    
Israel 15            19            11            22            3              4              12            86                      
Italy 9              14            19            31            57            12            5              23            170                    
Japan 125          174          157          192          124          52            20            23            867                    
Malaysia 63            80            80            43            28            24            12            38            368                    
Netherlands 1              7              7              18            16            4              1              11            65                      
New Zealand 9              22            6              7              11            1              3              7              66                      
Norway 2              11            28            24            26            6              24            121                    
Poland 8              12            16            35            83            56            19            135          364                    
Russia 5              4              8              19            34            18            9              42            139                    
Singapore 45            59            40            29            27            29            20            34            283                    
South Korea 92            68            104          80            87            61            70            96            658                    
Spain 5              9              2              12            18            5              2              21            74                      
Sweden 4              5              5              15            20            9              2              40            100                    
Switzerland 6              11            12            13            6              1              3              52                      
Taiwan 100          96            59            41            57            53            41            54            501                    
Thailand 32            52            51            17            11            25            23            35            246                    
Turkey 4              6              3              8              13            3              5              44            86                      
United Kingdom 98            241          173          168          147          32            18            65            942                    
United States 138          355          328          307          431          164          201          460          2,384                 
All countries 1,094       1,880       1,718       1,984       2,478       1,265       967          2,365       13,751               
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APPENDIX E: Variable definition and data sources 
 
 
Variable Description Data source
Dependent variable
Withdrawn A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm withdraws the
IPO and 0 if the firm continues with the intended IPO.  
ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Country-level variables
CIFAR This index is created by the Center for Financial Analysis and Research 
based on firms' 1995 annual reports. It counts the inclusion or
omission of 90 items that fall into seven broad categories.
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith 
(2004) 
Disclosure Requirements An index measure of the strength of a country’s prospectus disclosure
regulation (i.e., scope of disclosure). The index of disclosure equals the
arithmetic mean of (1) prospectus; (2) compensation; (3) shareholders;
(4) inside ownership; (5) contracts irregular; and (6) transactions. The
higher the rating, the more stringent the disclosure regulation. The
disclosure ratings are measured on a 100-point scale.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2006)
LNW The updated earnings management and opacity index is based on Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki (2003) and is computed from 1996 to 2005. The
earnings management and opacity score is made up of four different
metrics determining the extent to which firm’s reported earnings cloud
performance because of the use of reporting discretion and earnings
smoothing.
Leuz (2010)
Opacity A measure of five components: corruption, legal system inadequacies,
economic enforcement policies, accounting standards and corporate
governance, and regulation. The index ranges from 1 to 100 with
higher numbers indicating higher opacity.
Kurtzman, Yago and 
Phumiwasana (2004)
Media Penetration Daily newspapers refer to those published at least four times a week
and calculated as average circulation (or copies printed) per 1,000
people.
World Development 
Indicators
Revised Antidirector Rights This index of anti-director rights is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders
are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general
shareholders’ meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional
representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) shareholders have pre-
emptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting; and
(6) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder
to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal
to 10% (the sample median); This index ranges from 0 to 6.
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008)
Uncertainty Avoidance “The uncertainty avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which
the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and
ambiguity.” The index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher numbers
indicate higher uncertainty avoidance.
geert-hofstede.com
Individualism versus 
Collectivism
“The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of
interdependence a society maintains among its members. It has to do
with whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “We.” In
Individualist societies people are supposed to look after themselves
and their direct family only. In collectivist societies people belong to
“in groups” that take care of them in exchange for loyalty.” The index
ranges from 0 to 100 with higher numbers indicating higher
collectivism.
geert-hofstede.com
Performance versus 
Cooperation Orientation
“The masculinity side of this dimension represents a preference in
society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material reward
for success. Society at large is more competitive. Its opposite,
femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for
the weak and quality of life.” The index ranges from 0 to 100 with
higher numbers indicating higher performance-orientation.
geert-hofstede.com
Power Distance “Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful
members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and
accept that power is distributed unequally.” The index ranges from 0
to 100 with higher numbers indicating higher power distance.
geert-hofstede.com
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APPENDIX E (Continued) 
 
 
Variable Description Data source
Long-term versus Short-term 
Orientation 
“Every society has to maintain some links with its own past while
dealing with the challenges of the present and the future. Societies
prioritize these two existential goals differently.” The index ranges
from 0 to 100 with higher numbers indicating higher long-term
orientation.
geert-hofstede.com
Market Capitalisation Market capitalisation (also known as market value) is the share price
times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies
are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's
stock exchanges at the end of the year. Market capitalization shows
the overall size of the stock market in U.S. dollars and as a percentage
of GDP.
World Development 
Indicators
Turnover Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded divided by the
average market capitalisation for each year and each country. Average
market capitalisation is calculated as the average of the end-of-period
values for the current period and the previous period.
World Development 
Indicators
IPO Activity The ratio of the number of IPOs in a particular year over the total
number of IPOs during the period of 2003-2010 for each country.
ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 US
dollars.
World Development 
Indicators
Firm-level variables
Number of Underwriters The number of underwriters involved in the IPO. ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Offer Size The log of the proceeds from the offer. ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Technology A dummy variable that equals 1 for the IPOs of technological firms
and 0 otherwise. 
ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Use of Proceeds for General 
Purposes 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the primary use of proceeds is for
general purposes and 0 otherwise.
ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Underwriter Reputation An indicator variable to tag offerings underwritten by the top 25
investment banks in terms of offering proceeds. Underwriter
reputation is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO is underwritten
by an investment bank listed in the top 25 for each year of the sample
period and 0 otherwise.
ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
VC Backing A dummy variable that equals 1 for venture-backed IPOs and 0
otherwise.
ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Number of Uses for the 
Proceeds
The number of uses of IPO proceeds. ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Use of Proceeds to Repay 
Debt
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the primary use of
proceeds is debt payment and 0 otherwise.
ThomsonONE.com 
Investment Banking
Year Dummies Year dummies, with 2003 excluded as the base case.
Variables for robustness 
tests
Liability Standard Index Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the issuing
firm in a civil liability case due to misleading statement in the
prospectus. The index measures how easily investors can hold officers
and directors liable in court for their actions. The index of liability
standards equals the arithmetic mean of (1) liability standard for the
issuer and its directors; (2) liability standard for distributors; and (3)
liability standard for accountants. It ranges from 0 to 1.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2006)
Political Connections Connected firms as a percentage of market Capitalisation. Faccio (2006)
Societal Trust The percentage of individuals in each country who believe that others
can be trusted. Based on data tabulated from surveys of interpersonal
trust question of “Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?”
2005-2008 World Values 
Survey and Latinbarometro
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APPENDIX F: Variance inflation factors of independent variables 
 
 
Note: This table presents the variance inflation factor for each independent variable.  
The VIF values are used to check for multicollinearity. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
CIFAR 2.00
Disclosure Requirements 2.07
LNW 1.96
Opacity 3.97
Media Penetration 1.55 1.58 1.81 2.15
Uncertainty Avoidance 2.24 2.40 2.63 2.13
Offer Size 1.72 1.82 1.72 1.81
Technology 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06
Use of Proceeds for General Purposes 1.23 1.24 1.30 1.23
Underwriter Reputation 1.75 1.75 1.76 1.68
Number of Underwriters 1.53 1.50 1.52 1.44
VC Backing 1.57 1.62 1.58 1.50
Revised Antidirector Rights 1.65 1.69 1.73 2.27
Turnover 1.69 1.82 1.74 1.66
GDP Growth 2.49 2.00 2.37 4.37
Market Capitalisation 1.81 1.70 1.66 1.84
IPO Activity 1.18 1.31 1.18 1.11
Number of Uses for the Proceeds 1.19 1.20 1.19 1.15
Use of Proceeds to Retire Debt 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
Mean VIF 1.61 1.61 1.64 1.90
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CHAPTER 3  
IPO DELISTINGS AROUND THE WORLD 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Involuntary delisting from the stock exchange is a significant and distressing corporate event 
because of the long term detrimental effects it can have on the companies, investors, and other 
stakeholders (Sanger and Peterson, 1990, Baker and Kennedy, 2002; Macey, O’Hara and Pompilio, 
2008). Macey, O’Hara and Pompilio (2008) find that when stocks are delisted from the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and subsequently trade on pink sheets (i.e., the over-the-counter stock 
market), on average their share price falls by about half, the percentage spread triples, and stock price 
volatility nearly doubles.  
Research of delisting goes as far back as the early 1990s (Hensler, Rutherford and Springer, 
1997; Sanger and Peterson, 1990; Schultz, 1993; Seguin and Smoller, 1997) and is mostly confined to 
the US market. There is now a resurgence of research interest on firm delistings, with evidence 
showing that firm characteristics such as audit quality, governance quality, product innovation, pre-
IPO earnings, human capital, and firm size are important determinants of the probability of delisting 
(e.g., Carpentier and Suret, 2011; Demers and Joos, 2007; Fama and French, 2004; Howton, 2006; Jain 
and Marin, 2005; Peristiani and Hong, 2004; Williams, 2013). Only a few studies have examined the 
impact of country-level formal mechanisms, such as regulatory environment and legal system, on 
delistings (Dahiya and Klapper, 2007; Thomsen and Vinten, 2007). For example, comparing delistings 
in seven major developed countries  from 1993 to 2003, Dahiya and Klapper (2007) report a higher 
incidence of delistings in nations with stronger shareholder rights. The average annual delisting rate 
in strong investor protection countries such as the UK and the US is 5.65% and 6.78% respectively; 
these figures are about six times that in Japan (1.05%), which has weaker investor protection rights. 
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Australia and Canada sit somewhere in the middle, with a delisting rate of 3.4%. Dahiya and Klapper 
(2007) argue that stronger shareholder rights in a country would likely speed up the resolution of 
financial distress and thus minimise damage to the firm.  
I extend this line of research by focussing on the impact of culture on involuntary delistings 
around the world. I define involuntary delistings as delistings from the exchange due to negative 
reasons such as bankruptcy, in administration, in liquidation, or inability to meet listing requirements. 
Delisting in this context is thus post-IPO failure.51  
Hofstede (2001, p. 9) defines national culture as a “collective programming of the mind which distinguishes 
the member of one human group from another.” Recent developments in the corporate finance literature 
indicate that national culture is important in explaining a broad range of economic and capital market 
phenomena that formal institutions, which themselves are a product of national culture, alone are not 
able to explain (Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009; Hofstede, 2001). For example, national culture is found 
to be important in explaining corporate choices of capital structure (Chui, Lloyd and Kwok, 2002), 
market financing (Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009), cash holdings (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009), risk-
taking (Griffin, Li, Yue and Zhao, 2009), dividend policy (Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010; Shao, Kwok and 
Guedhami, 2010), investment strategies (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2010), and debt maturity (Zheng, El 
Ghoul and Guedhami, 2012). To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to show how national 
culture, as a form of informal institution, is related to firm delistings. 
Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions provide a widely-cited and rigorously validated typology 
of cross-country differences in culture. Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson (2006, p. 308) note that “researchers 
have used Hofstede’s framework successfully to select countries that are culturally different in order to increase variance 
... overall, Hofstede’s values are clearly relevant for additional cross-cultural research.” I therefore argue that the 
                                                 
51 The terms failure, involuntary delisting, delisting for negative reasons, distress delisting, and negative delistings are used 
interchangeably in this essay. 
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conceptualisation of Hofstede’s cultural theory offers a window for addressing post-IPO failure. An 
important facet of national culture, which this study focuses on, is the way individuals perceive time. 
The two time orientation dimensions are the long-term orientation (LTO) and future orientation (FO), 
derived from the national culture models of Hofstede and Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research project respectively.52 I hypothesise that the likelihood of 
involuntary delisting is lower in countries with a future time perspective, as measured by Hofstede’s 
LTO and the GLOBE’s FO. 
The empirical results presented in the chapter are broadly in line with expectations. Both LTO 
and FO are negatively related to the likelihood of post-IPO failure, suggesting that societies with a 
long-term orientation and future outlook where thrift, persistence, and planning are valued have a 
lower delisting rate. The results are invariant to several robustness checks.  
I provide a number of key contributions to the literature. First, I add to the thin literature on 
post-IPO failure outside the US, and specifically on a global level. I am only aware of two cross-
country studies on delistings, i.e., Dahiya and Klapper (2007) and Thomsen and Vinten (2007). 
Second, this is the first study that examines national culture in relation to delisting, thus contributing 
to the growing body of research documenting the importance of national culture in finance. Third, 
unlike other studies that provide only an estimate of the probability of failure, I also examine the time-
to-failure. The primary benefit of using survival analysis such as the Cox proportional hazards model 
over logistic models lies in its ability to account for censoring, to compare survival rates between 
groups, and to assess the relationships between covariates and survival duration.  
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows. Prior literature on delistings is presented in 
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the data and research 
                                                 
52 The two dimensions of time orientation are not interchangeable as they measure different aspects of cultures with regard 
to time orientation (Venaik, Zhu and Brewer, 2013).  
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methodology. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 discuss the empirical results and robustness checks respectively. 
Section 3.7 summarises and concludes this essay.  
  
3.2 Literature review 
This section synthesises the extant body of knowledge on the reasons for and consequences of 
involuntary delistings, as well as the strategies firms have taken to minimise this risk of failure. 
Compared to the aftermarket performance of IPOs, involuntary delistings have received little attention 
in the literature despite the significantly adverse consequences it may have on investors and the 
economy. As far as I am aware, the empirical literature dedicated to the delisting of newly listed firms 
is limited to 23 papers, as summarised in Table 3.1. As shown, the delisting rate varies considerably 
over time and across countries. For example, the delisting rate five years after the IPO ranges from 
9.2% to 47.2%. Differences in methodology, sample size and period, and definition of involuntary 
delisting make comparisons between studies challenging and limit our ability to draw strong 
conclusions. For instance, some studies categorise mergers and acquisitions as censored survivors 
(e.g., Jain and Kini, 2000) or exclude them from their sample (e.g., Hensler, Rutherford and Springer, 
1997), while others categorise them as non-survivors (e.g., Carpentier and Suret, 2011). Van der Goot, 
van Giersbergen and Botman (2009) classify non-survivors as firms that are delisted for negative 
reasons, including those that moved to other exchanges. 
Firms delist for two major reasons: poor quality and violation of stock exchange rules. The 
literature shows that information at the time of the IPO relating to the deal, the issuing firm, and 
country-level factors can explain a firm’s expected survival time. These studies are discussed below. 
Appendix A provides an overview of the characteristics of firms, issues, market, and country examined 
by prior studies on delistings. 
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Seguin and Smoller (1997) provide one of the earliest studies on the mortality of newly listed 
NASDAQ stocks. Using a sample of 5,896 firms from 1974 to 1988, they establish that firm 
performance, as proxied by share price, is the most important determinant of IPO failure. Specifically, 
lower priced stocks have a higher mortality rate and are nearly three times more likely than higher-
priced shares to exit NASDAQ for adverse reasons.  
According to the signaling theory, high-quality IPO issuers “leave money on the table” to signal 
their quality to potential investors who cannot readily differentiate between good and bad issues  
(Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). Since quality firms are less likely to fail, a negative 
association between first-day IPO returns and firm failure is expected. Yang and Sheu (2006), Kooli 
and Meknassi (2007), and Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2012) provide support for this 
association. However, Schultz (1993), Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997), and Chou, Cheng and 
Chien (2013) show a higher probability of failure for IPOs that are more underpriced. 
Other studies show that “hot issue” markets, characterised by excessive demand for new 
offerings and high levels of initial returns, draw low quality firms (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Ritter, 
1984) which are more likely to fail as they are less able to withstand subsequent economic downturns. 
The evidence is however inconclusive, with some studies supporting a positive association between 
IPOs issued during the hot markets and the propensity of them surviving (Hensler, Rutherford and 
Springer, 1997;  Demers and Joos, 2007 for high-tech IPOs; van der Goot, van Giersbergen and 
Botman, 2009; Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed, 2012), while others find the reverse 
(Bhattacharya, Demers and Joos, 2010 (for non-tech IPOs); Demers and Joos, 2010; Carpentier and 
Suret, 2011).  
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Table 3.1: Previous studies on IPO delistings 
 
 
Note: (1) Share IPOs; (2) Unit IPOs; (3) Penny stocks; (4) Non-penny stocks; (5) Non-survivors percentage derived from their trading status at the end of 1996; (6) Non-tech; (7) High-tech; 
(8) Internet; (9) High-tech; (10) NASDAQ; (*) Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, US; (11) Delisted from 1998 up to 2010. 
Authors Country Sample Study Year Methodology 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years
Schultz (1993) US
630 share IPOs vs 167 unit IPOs 
(NASDAQ)
1986−1988 Logistic model
1.7% (1) 
6.6% (2)
11.1% (1) 
41.2% (2)
Hensler, Rutherford and 
Springer (1997)
US IPOs (NASDAQ) 1975−1984 Accelerated failure time (AFT) model 55.10%
Seguin and Smoller (1997) US
741 penny stocks vs non-penny stocks 
(NASDAQ)
1974−1988 Logistic model
47.2% (3) 
17.4% (4)
Jain and Kini (2000) US 877 IPOs 1977−1990 AFT model 2.20% 14.70% 28.20%
Baker and Kennedy (2002) US 7,455 IPOs (AMEX and NYSE) 1963−1995 Descriptive statistics 5.00% 39.40%
Fama and French (2004) US NASDAQ 1973−1991 Descriptive statistics 37.50%
Audretsch and Lehmann 
(2005)
Germany 341 IPOS (Neuer Markt) 1997−2002 Weibull proportional hazards  model
Jain and Martin (2005) US 3,836 IPOs 1980−1990 Cox proportional hazards model 13.25% (5)
Howton (2006) US 290 IPOs 1997 Logistic model 20.0%
Li, Zhang and Zhou (2006) US 3,898 IPOs 1980−1999 Probit and Cox proportional hazards model 16.90%
Yang and Sheu (2006) Taiwan 560 IPOs (Taiwan Stock Exchange) 1992−2000 AFT model and Cox proportional hazards model 7.30%
Dahiya and Klapper (2007) (*) 16,104 IPOs from 7 countries 1982−2000 Logistic model 4.20%
Demers and Joos (2007) US 3,973 IPOs 1980−2000 Logistic and Cox proportional hazards model
16.7% (6)  
9.2% (7) 
Kooli and Meknassi (2007) US 6,235 IPOs 1982−2000 Multinomial logistic and log-logistic AFT model 20.20%
Jain and Kini (2008) US 3,837 IPOs 1980−1997 Cox proportional hazards model and AFT model 66%
Bhattacharya, Demers and 
Joos (2010)
US 356 internet IPOs 1982−2000 Logistic model
24.2% (8) 
14.3% (9) 
18.2% (10)
van der Goot, van 
Giersbergen and Botman 
(2009)
US 326 NASDAQ internet IPOs 1996−2001
Cox proportional hazards model and log-logistic survival 
model
37.40%
Carpentier and Suret (2011) Canada 2,373 penny stocks IPOs 1986−2003 Cox proportional hazards model 11.60% 28.30%
Amini and Keasey (2013) UK
721 Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
IPOs
1995−2004 Cox proportional hazards model 28% 46.80%
Espenlaub, Khurshed and 
Mohamed (2012)
UK 896 AIM IPOs 1995−2004 AFT model and Cox proportional hazards model 6% 26% 41%
Chou, Cheng and Chien 
(2013)
US 2,893 IPOs 1980−2003 Logistic and Cox proportional hazards model 11%
Liu, Lister and Pang (2013) China 1,777 IPOs 1998−2010 Cox proportional hazards model 2.98% (11)
Williams (2013) US 157 biopharmaceutical firms 1996−2007
Logistic, Cox proportional hazards model, and 
multinomial logistic
24.80%
Reported Delisting Rates
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In a similar vein, Fama and French (2004) study the 10-year post-issue survival rates of newly 
listed US firms between 1973 and 1991. They find the characteristics of companies going public have 
changed considerably over time, with more recently listed firms having lower profitability and higher 
growth, and thus lower survival rates. They suggest that changes in the attributes of newly listed stocks 
result from a decline in the cost of equity which makes it possible for weaker firms and firms with 
more remote projected payoffs to issue shares. To the same extent, Peristiani and Hong (2004) find 
that pre-IPO profitability is a good predictor of aftermarket survival; firms with negative pre-IPO 
earnings are three times more likely to be removed from an exchange than are profitable issuing 
companies, all else equal. A negative association between profitability and failure risk is also reported 
by Jain and Kini (2008), and Chou, Cheng and Chien (2013). 
The quality of the IPO can also be signalled through specialised intermediaries such as the 
investment bank, venture capitalist, and auditor involved in the issue. In the case of the investment 
bank, Booth and Smith (1986) argue that by accepting to take a firm public, the underwriter certifies 
the quality of the offering. Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) argue that the screening ability of high-
standard investment banks may explain the superior performance of IPOs taken public by them. 
Therefore, offerings screened and certified by a reputable investment bank have a lower risk of failure. 
Schultz (1993), Jain and Kini (2000), Demers and Joos (2007), Jain and Kini (2008), Bhattacharya, 
Demers and Joos (2010), van der Goot, van Giersbergen and Botman (2009), Carpentier and Suret 
(2011), Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2012), and Chou, Cheng and Chien (2013) confirm this 
negative association empirically.  
Venture capitalists also add value to the IPO by offering screening, monitoring, and decision-
support functions, all of which improve the survival rate of IPO issuers (Jain and Kini, 2000). Venture 
capital-backed IPOs can more easily attract reputable analysts, institutional investors, and underwriters 
to guarantee their success, both before and after the IPO. Chou, Cheng and Chien (2013), Kooli and 
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Meknassi (2007), and Jain and Kini (2000) find that VC-backed IPO firms have a higher survival rate. 
However, others report inconclusive evidence (Demers and Joos, 2007; Jain and Kini, 2008; 
Carpentier and Suret, 2011; Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed, 2012; Williams, 2013). 
According to Jain and Martin (2005), high-quality firms hire reputable auditors to signal their 
quality. Low-quality firms do not emulate high-quality firms in appointing reputable auditors as this is 
likely to subject the low-quality firms to severe monitoring by the auditors. The scrutiny that comes 
with hiring external auditors may deter firms from using earnings management techniques to boost 
earnings and increase the IPO valuation. Both Jain and Martin (2005) and Demers and Joos (2007) 
find issuing firms that employ a reputable auditor at the IPO are associated with a higher post-IPO 
survival rate.  
All else constant, larger firms have greater control over their operating environment and thus 
lower uncertainty concerning their future prospects. As larger firms are thus better equipped to survive 
during periods of high turbulence or costly investment mistakes, larger firms are less likely to delist 
due to negative reasons. The association between firm size and delisting is empirically confirmed by 
Schultz (1993), Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997), Seguin and Smoller (1997), Kooli and 
Meknassi (2007), Jain and Kini (2008), Carpentier and Suret (2011), Espenlaub, Khurshed and 
Mohamed (2012), and Chou, Cheng and Chien (2013). 
Li, Zhang and Zhou (2006) study a sample of 3,898 US IPOs from 1980 to 1999, and find the 
level of earnings management as a proxy for firm quality has a significant predictive power of firm 
failure. Firms that are associated with aggressive earnings management have a greater propensity to 
delist, and delist earlier. IPO firms with conservative earnings management, on the other hand, have 
a greater propensity to be acquired or merged, and generate more positive abnormal returns. 
Although there is a growing body of research on how corporate governance mechanisms impact 
on IPO performance (Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven, 2011; Love, 2011), less research has focused 
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on the same for delistings.53 The main objective of corporate governance is to minimise the 
opportunistic behaviour of insiders so that long-term shareholder value can be realised (Love, 2011). 
Thus, better governed firms are expected to perform better and are less likely to delist involuntarily. 
Audretsch and Lehmann (2005) examine the ramifications of ownership and its engendered incentives 
on survival for a sample of 341 (of which 74 have been delisted) young and high-tech German 
companies in the Neuer Market from 1997 to 2002. They find CEO ownership has no impact on firm 
survival, controlling for intellectual property rights (i.e., patents) and human capital (i.e., number of 
director either doctor or professor).  
Based on a sample of 292 US firms going public in 1997, Howton (2006) examines the 
association between governance characteristics and the firm’s post-IPO states: survival, acquisition, 
and failure. He finds that firms survive more often than they are acquired when they are venture-
backed, and have a CEO who is the original founder, and an outside blockholder.54 Howton also 
shows the presence of outside directors does not augment the likelihood of survival, and firms that 
are more likely to survive include those with longer board tenure. 
Based on agency theory, Yang and Sheu (2006) show how managerial stock ownership affects 
the survival of IPO firms. A sample of 560 IPOs that went public between 1992 and 2000 in Taiwan 
is examined. Yang and Sheu find that the survival time of offerings first decreases and then increases 
with the proportion of insider shareholding at the time of IPO, forming a U-shaped association.55 
Moreover, there is a positive association between survival time and the officer-to-insider holding ratio.  
                                                 
53 Leland and Pyle (1977) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) report that the IPO process is associated with complex information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors as well as between managers (agents) and investors (principles). 
This provides room for opportunistic behaviour, with adverse consequence on the long term corporate performance. 
54 To be categorised as a blockholder, the stockholder has to own more than 5% of total stocks outstanding and must be 
an outside shareholder.   
55 The Securities and Exchange Law of Taiwan defines insider as stakeholders holding more than 10% of total shares 
outstanding. 
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Human capital theory generally advances that more and better quality human capital contributes 
to better firm performance. Williams (2103) studies a sample of 153 US biopharmaceutical IPOs from 
1996 to 2007, and finds human capital has limited predictive power for firm delistings. 
Another major reason for involuntary IPO delistings examined in the literature is failure to meet 
the stock exchange’s minimum listing standards. Sanger and Peterson (1990) study a sample of 520 
firm delistings from AMEX and NYSE from 1962 to 1985, and report that most firms were delisted 
due to failure to achieve the minimum market value of shares outstanding, number of shareholders, 
and net income. Chen and Schoderbek (1999) study the process of involuntary delisting for a sample 
of 150 delistings from AMEX from 1981 to 1992. They find that 45.7% of delisted firms infringed 
accounting standards, with 31% having recurrent violations of accounting guidelines in the five years 
prior to delisting. About 21.7% of delistings occurred within one year after their first violation. Using 
logistic regression, Chen and Schoderbek (1999) find that Chapter 11 filings are the most important 
reason for delistings, followed by shareholder lawsuits and SEC investigations. Going concern audit 
opinions and violations of AMEX numerical accounting guidelines also increase the probability of 
delisting.  
In addition to the above firm and offer characteristics, various country-level factors have also 
been found to explain the likelihood of post-IPO failure. In particular, the probability of involuntary 
delisting is lower in countries with better quality institutions, i.e., better legal system. In these countries, 
well-performing firms are less likely to be capital- and cash-rationed, and symptoms of poor 
performance are more likely to be promptly detected and acted upon earlier (Thomsen and Vinten, 
2007). There is however a converse argument to this, as provided by Dahiya and Klapper (2007). In 
countries with better shareholder protection, the likelihood of delisting is expected to be higher as 
there are more active shareholders present to ensure a speedier resolution of financial distress.  
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Involuntary delisted stocks, compared to those that are voluntarily delisted, are often 
characterised by a decline in market value. Therefore, for shareholders, involuntary delistings have a 
detrimental consequence on their wealth. Baker and Kennedy (2002) show that distress delistings 
underperform the market by an average of 57% in the period from 10 years to one year before delisting 
for a sample of 7,455 firms on the NYSE and AMEX between 1963 and 1995. Sanger and Peterson 
(1990) examine a sample of 520 firms that were delisted from either the NYSE or AMEX (that 
subsequently traded in the over-the-counter (OTC)), and find that the reduction in liquidity which 
comes with delisting is likely to occasion a reduction in the market value of the firm. They report that 
for firms with an earlier notice of delisting, stock values drop by an average of 8.51% on the date of 
delisting announcement.  
Harris, Panchapagesan and Werner (2008) test whether firm quality deteriorates significantly 
subsequent to involuntary delisting from Nasdaq and subsequently trading in pink sheets and/or the 
OTC Bulletin Board. They find this to be the case for a sample of 1,098 firms for the period 1999- 
2002. Specifically, effective spreads increase (over three times) from 3.3% to 9.9%; share volume drops 
by two-thirds; quoted spreads nearly triple from 12.1% to 33.9%; and volatility more than triples from 
4.4% to 14.3%. Deterioration in quality is substantially greater for firms with more serious violations, 
e.g., bankruptcy, than for firms with smaller infringements, e.g., minimum bid price. Serrano (2010) 
confirms the considerable decrease in volume of exchange (trading volume) and share price and the 
considerable increase in volatility for a small sample of 39 and 195 firms that were involuntarily delisted 
from the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the NYSE respectively between 2002 and 2009.  
In sum, the literature on IPO delistings is rather thin, and tends to focus on the US and the UK 
markets. The various determinants of delistings can be grouped into those that are specific to the 
offering, the issuing firm, the market condition at the time of the IPO, and country characteristics. By 
stretching the scope of the research to include countries outside the US and the UK, the cross-country 
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analysis provided by this essay helps to further our knowledge of factors that affect delistings around 
the world.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
In this section, I develop my main hypothesis which predicts an association between involuntary 
delistings and the time orientation dimension of culture, defined as the extent to which a country 
exhibits a future-orientated perspective rather than a focus on the present or past. 
Williamson (2000) suggests the existence of four levels of social analysis. The first level refers 
to social “embeddedness,” including informal institutions (culture), customs, traditions, norms, and 
religions. According to Williamson (2000, p. 596-597), ‘‘institutions at this level change very slowly - on the 
order of centuries or millennia … and have a lasting grip on the way society conducts itself.” Hofstede (2001) also 
asserts that national cultures are stable over time.  
The second level refers to the formal features of the institutional environment, such as 
constitutions, laws, and property rights. At this level, “cumulative change of a progressive kind is very difficult 
to orchestrate” (Williamson 2000, p. 598) although it may occasionally materialise in extreme cases such 
as civil war, military coup, or financial crisis.  
The third and fourth levels refer to the institutions of governance, and resource allocation and 
employment (e.g., economic outcomes) respectively. The levels are connected in that the higher level 
imposes constraints on the level directly below. Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2005) argue that 
the content of formal legal rules partly reflects the prevailing cultural orientations in a society. Similarly, 
Hofstede (2001, p. 34) notes that institutions “are products of the dominant cultural value systems.” In the 
context of this study, national culture has an indirect bearing on delisting rates (level 4) owing to 
formal institutions, i.e., government regulations (level 2). 
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National culture is thought to influence economic outcomes directly since formal institutions 
alone cannot fully address incomplete contracting in a world of information asymmetry (Aggarwal and 
Goodell, 2009). Even identical formal institutions can perform differently in different settings (e.g., 
countries) and yield different economic outcomes (North, 1990) due to differences in informal 
institutions, such as culture (Tabellini, 2010). Several studies attest the prominent role of national 
culture in impacting financial outcomes such as momentum profits (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2010); 
earning quality of banks (Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo, 2011); corporate debt maturity (Zheng, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami and Kwok, 2012); venture capital activity (Li and Zahra, 2012); corporate 
investment (Shao, Kwok and Zhang, 2013); and firm risk taking (Mihet, 2013).  
Different cultures have different perceptions of time, as first pointed out by Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck (1961),56 who argue that individuals base their decisions on past, present, and future 
traditions or events. While past-oriented cultures place emphasis on the maintenance or restoration 
of past traditions, future-oriented cultures have a strong focus on planning for a better future. Present-
oriented cultures, in comparison, focus on what is happening now and are thus “timeless, traditionless, 
(and) future-ignoring” (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961, p. 14).  
This essay centres on Hofstede’s long-term orientation (LTO),57 which is the most widely used 
framework in cross-country studies, and on the future orientation (FO) dimension of the GLOBE 
research project. Long-term versus short-term orientation, a national value dimension first developed 
by Bond (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987) based on the Chinese Value Survey of students in 23 
countries, is Hofstede’s (1991) fifth dimension of national cultures.58 Long-term oriented nations 
                                                 
56 According to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), all countries vary across six value-orientation dimensions (i.e., 
relationship to the environment, orientation to time, relationship between people, activity orientation, focus on 
responsibility, and space orientation). 
57 The LTO dimension was updated based on the World Value Survey (WVS) and now includes 93 countries (Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov, 2010). 
58 The first four dimensions of Hofstede’s national culture are power distance; uncertainty avoidance; individualism versus 
collectivism; and masculinity versus femininity.  
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attribute more weight and thus value the future over immediate or short-term gains. Pragmatic values 
such as persistence and thrift are considered important. Short-term orientation in contrast is more 
concerned with the present and in preserving the past. Personal steadiness and stability, respect for 
tradition, and fulfilment of current social obligations are important.  
A summary of traits found in countries with long-term orientation vis-à-vis those with short-
term orientation is shown in Table 3.2. Values found in countries rank higher on LTO, e.g. South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, are perseverance in achieving results, a strong propensity to save and invest, 
and thriftiness. Minkov and Hofstede (2012) show the LTO trait is positively associated with national 
educational achievements and economic growth, amongst others. In contrast, countries rank lower on 
LTO, e.g., Australia and the US, exhibit a smaller tendency to save and emphasise on the “bottom 
line” and the realisation of fast results. Figure 3.1 displays the LTO index values for selected nations. 
By mapping them to IPO delisting rates for seven countries in Dahiya and Klapper (2007), Figure 3.2 
shows the nations with a lower LTO score such as the US and the UK have a higher rate of delisting 
than countries with a higher LTO score, notably Japan.   
 
Table 3.2: Some key differences between short- and long-term orientation 
 
 
Source: Hofstede (2001) 
Long-term Orientation Short-term Orientation
Emphasis is on persistence. Emphasis is on quick results.
Relationships are ordered by status. Status is not a factor in relationships.
Personal adaptability is important. Personal steadfastness and stability is important.
Leisure time is not very important. Leisure time is of prime importance.
“Save” and “be thrifty” is a common agenda. Spending is a way of life.
Investment in real estate is popular. Investment in mutual funds is commonplace.
Relationship, “business goodwill,” and market position is 
important.
Bottom line is a key performance indicator.
88 
 
Figure 3.1: Long-term orientation index values for selected countries 
 
 
Source: Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) 
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Figure 3.2: Long-term orientation index values and delisting rates for selected countries 
 
Source: Dahiya and Klapper (2007). Bar heights show LTO scores (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010). Line points 
show the annual delisting rates (1994-2003). 
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The latest research on national culture is by House, Hanges, Mansour, Dorfman and Gupta 
(2004) as part of the GLOBE program, which involved 170 researchers collecting data from about 
17,000 middle managers in 951 organisations from 62 countries. Among the outcomes of the GLOBE 
study is the construction of nine dimensions of national culture: performance orientation; future 
orientation; gender egalitarianism; assertiveness; institutional collectivism; in-group collectivism; 
power distance; humane orientation; and uncertainty avoidance.59 The cultural dimensions are 
measured both as practices (“as is”) and values (“as should be”). Of particular interest to this research 
is the time orientation dimension of the GLOBE study – future orientation, defined as “the extent to 
which members of a society or an organization believe that their current actions will influence their future, focus on 
investment in their future, believe that they will have a future that matters, believe in planning for developing their future, 
and look far into the future for assessing the effects of their current actions” (House, Hanges, Mansour, Dorfman 
and Gupta, 2004, p. 285). 
Viewing matters from a long-term perspective as opposed to a short-term perspective has been 
found to significantly impact on strategies and decision-making, thus legitimising the application of 
Hofstede’s LTO culture dimension (and to a lower extent, Globe’s dimension of future orientation) 
in institutions and organisations. Beldona, Inkpen and Phatak (1998) find Japanese managers have a 
longer time horizon than US managers, and this results in differences in decision making styles. Hence, 
Japanese managers more often centre on client satisfaction and product quality as opposed to profit-
                                                 
59 Performance orientation is the degree to which a collective encourages and rewards group members for performance 
improvement and excellence. Future orientation is the extent to which people engage in future-oriented behaviors such as 
delayed gratification, planning, and investing in the future. Gender egalitarianism is the degree to which a collective minimises 
gender inequality. Assertiveness is the degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their 
relationships with others. Institutional collectivism is the degree to which organisational and societal institutional practices 
encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action. In-group collectivism is the degree to which 
individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organisations or families. Power distance is the degree to which 
members of a collective expect power to be distributed equally. Humane orientation is the degree to which a collective 
encourages and rewards people for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others. Uncertainty avoidance is the 
extent to which a society, organisation, or groups relies on social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate unpredictability 
of future events.  
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based performance. Van Everdingen and Waarts (2003) highlight that LTO has a significant positive 
impact on countries’ adoption rate of innovations.60  
A growing body of literature in cultural finance investigates how LTO impacts on financial 
decisions. Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) examine a sample of more than 75,000 firm-year 
observations in 45 countries from 1995 to 2004. They find companies hold larger amounts of cash 
and other liquid balances in nations where people have stronger preferences for LTO. The authors 
argue that the values of persistence, thrift, and having a sense of shame (in case of bankruptcy) in 
countries with higher LTO lead companies in those nations to hold larger cash balances. Park and 
Lemaire (2011) document that LTO displays a strong positive influence on life insurance demand 
because many life insurance contracts are long term. They use a data set of 233 country-year 
observations in 27 countries during 2000–2008. Bae, Chang and Kang (2012) study the impact of 
Hofestede’s cultural dimensions on dividend policies for a sample of more than 112,000 firm-year 
observations in 33 countries between 1993 and 2005. They report that managers in firms from high 
LTO countries pay lower dividends (as they are short-term by nature) and instead use earnings to 
invest in long-term projects. Costa, Crawford and Jakob (2013) show that IPO underpricing is 
positively and significantly related to LTO for a sample of 39 countries. Issuers tolerate higher levels 
of underpricing provided they can get the funds to help accomplish their long-run goal. Moreover, 
initial investors in long-term oriented societies are not keen in selling shares for short-term profits.  
Managerial myopia or alternatively short-termism describes the attitude of managers and 
decision makers wherein short-term goals, such as a positive bottom line, are given importance over 
investments for the future that will ensure sustainability of the company. Laverty (2004) defines short-
                                                 
60 There are many other studies in business that applied the long-term orientation dimension. See, for example, Tsui and 
Windsor (2001), Nevins, Bearden and Money (2007), Sanyal and Guvenli (2009), Seleim and Bontis (2009), and Buck, Liu 
and Ott (2010), among others.  
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termism as the pursuit of short-term gains, such as seeking to maximise quarterly profits at the expense 
of long term strategies, e.g., investing in research and development. Short-term oriented firms are thus 
more concerned with beating forecasts or targets. This is in perfect alignment with short-termism, as 
characterised by a decision-making process that is geared toward the goal of positive bottom lines and 
impressive quarterly and annual performance reports. Long-term oriented firms, in comparison, invest 
more heavily on research and development and tend to endure long scorches better. Longevity, 
improved market position, and brand image are characteristics of the goals of management that is not 
suffering from managerial myopia.  
A survey of 401 senior US financial executives illustrates the prevalence of short-termism 
(Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2006). Eighty percent say they would decrease discretionary spending 
(e.g., research and development, maintenance, and advertising), while 55.3% would delay the launch 
of a new project just to meet their short-term earnings targets. Furthermore, 59% of financial 
executives say they would reject a positive NPV project to deliver expected short-term earnings.  
Hofstede (2001) relates short-termism in the US to short-term values. Not surprisingly, the LTO 
score for the US is relatively low at 40 points compared to Japan at 88 points. As pointed out by 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, p. 128): “time  horizon significantly affects how we do business. It 
is obvious that the relatively long-term vision of the Japanese contrasts with the ‘quarterly thinking’ of the Americans.” 
To a firm, failing to invest in the future may mean failing to shield from future shocks such as 
obsolescence or emergence of a new technology, which may affect its very own survival. Laverty              
(2004, p. 949) notes “one of the most important concerns regarding time involves balancing concerns for long term 
positioning, growth and change with concerns for short-term performance, profitability and survival.”   
In summary, whilst most cultural frameworks do not explicitly discuss the problem of short-
termism, they indicate that a culture that promotes qualities like perseverance, thrift, and planning has 
an impact on the long-term and short-term behaviours of companies. Indeed, Minkov and Hofstede 
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(2012, p. 10-11) maintain that “LTO is a valid and extremely important dimension of national culture … 
underpinned by concepts that are meaningful across the world.” 
Based on the above, I argue that there is an association between involuntary delistings and the 
time orientation dimension of culture, defined as the extent to which a country exhibits a future-
orientated perspective rather than a focus on the present. There are a number of reasons for this 
prediction. Thrift, a characteristic of long-term oriented countries, leads to more savings. Both Venaik, 
Zhu and Brewer (2013) and Shoham and Malul (2013) find a significant positive association between 
the marginal propensity to save and LTO. The availability of capital for reinvestment results in greater 
prosperity (Shoham and Malul, 2013). Indeed, LTO has been found to be the most influential cultural 
dimension through its strong link with a nation’s predisposition to save, invest, and thus per capita 
income growth (Hofstede, 2001; Minkov and Hofstede, 2012),61 and has been attributed by Hofstede 
(2001, p. 351) to the massive expansion of the East Asian countries in the latter part of last century. 
By emphasising on market share and long-term thinking, long-term financial success becomes more 
probable.  
Since long-term orientation involves investment in the future,62 national cultures with long-term 
outlooks are less likely to display myopic tendencies in the equity markets. Committing to investing in 
value-enhancing projects and developing solid market positions at the expense of instant gain and 
success is considered to be a feature of societies that are classified as long-term oriented. As a result, 
firms in long-term oriented societies are expected to have a higher likelihood of surviving. In countries 
that are short-term oriented however the “bottom line” is a major concern, and companies are 
                                                 
61 The LTO was initially called Confucian dynamism. Confucianism emphasises scholarship, thrift, and perseverance. Cultures 
shaped by the philosophies of Confucius (551-478 B.C.) include nations such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan (Yeung and Tung, 1996). 
62 As Porter (1992, p. 8) argues “financial control and capital budgeting are practiced in Japan and Germany, but investments are heavily 
driven by technical considerations and the desire to ensure the firm’s long-term position in the business. German companies are particularly 
oriented toward attaining technical leadership. Japanese companies place special value on market share, new product development, technological 
position, and participation in businesses and technologies that will be crucial in the next decade.” 
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constantly pressured by shareholders to deliver short term profit—all these come at the cost of 
forgoing long-term investment projects and hence future outputs (Davies, Haldane, Nielsen and 
Pezzini, 2013). Hofstede, Van Deusen, Mueller and Charles (2002) report that businesspersons in 
Anglo Latin American and Latin European countries are viewed by MBA students from those 
countries as centred more on “this year’s profits.” In comparison, businesspersons in India, China, 
and Hong Kong are viewed as having a propensity to place more emphasis on “profits ten years from 
now.”63  
Another aspect of long-term oriented societies is persistence, defined as the sustained efforts 
toward slow results. Persistence or tenacity in the pursuit of one’s goals is an important facet for newly 
listed firms and their success, i.e., the continued listing of the stock. 
The LTO dimension not only influences the firms but also the investors. A reason for successful 
IPOs is the presence of long-term investors (Pollock, Porac and Wade, 2004). Investors in societies 
with long-term orientation are more willing to delay immediate gains in anticipation of future returns. 
Stock prices often go through a series of ups and downs, and those who have the appetite to sit 
through it for the long haul are rewarded, as finance theory suggests. The dynamic in the stock market 
is thus compatible with the values of perseverance, delayed gratification, and discipline, all of which 
are prevalent in societies with long-term orientation. In countries where long-term orientation is high, 
greater stability in the stock market is observed as there are likely to be fewer transient investors and 
speculators whose focal point is current earnings instead of long-term earnings (Bushee, 2004; Porter, 
                                                 
63 Barton (2011, p. 70) advocates a “fight against the tyranny of short-termism” and argues that “myopia plagues Western institutions in 
every sectors. In business, the mania over quarterly earnings consumes extraordinary amounts of senior-executive time and attention … lost in 
frenzy is the notion that long-term thinking is essential for long-term success.” Barton (2011, p. 86) adds: “In my view, the most striking 
difference between East and West is the time frame leaders consider when making major decisions. Asians typically think in terms of at least 
10 to 15 years. For example, in my discussion with the South Korea president Lee Myung-bak shortly after his election in 2008, he asked us 
to help come up with a 60-year view of his country’s future (though we settled for producing a study called National Vision 2020). In the U.S. 
and Europe, nearsightedness is the norm. I believe that a long-term perspective is the competitive advantage of many Asian economies and 
businesses today.” 
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1992).64 Short-term oriented investors, on the other hand, have the tendency to cash out stocks. If the 
majority of stockholders share this behaviour, it could spell disaster for the firm, particularly for a 
fledgling firm that has just gone public.65 In cultures that are short-term oriented, not meeting the 
earnings target may result in (short-term) investors dumping the stock. This puts the IPO firm in a 
precarious position (e.g., share price decreases) as it increases the likelihood of delisting. All these 
arguments suggest that IPO firms in countries that are long-term oriented are less likely to be 
involuntary delisted. 
The country-level dimension of planning may also explain the likelihood of involuntary delisting. 
Companies in countries with a high FO emphasise planning for the long run. They are more patient 
and predisposed not to rush things. By being more ready to plunge into public listing, these firms have 
a better chance of surviving since well-laid plans and back-ups have been set up even before problems 
actually crop up as a result of careful planning. That is, “cultures with high FO have a strong capability and 
willingness to imagine future contingencies, formulate future goal states, and seek to achieve goals and develop strategies 
for meeting future aspirations” (House, Hanges, Mansour, Dorfman and Gupta, 2004, p. 285). On the 
other hand, companies that are haphazard in their preparations for the IPO may find themselves in a 
mess of legal (legal liability), compliance (listing requirements), and market-related (hotness/timing of 
entry) problems as they struggle to survive in the competitive equities market.  
In sum, I argue that the long-term (high future) versus short-term (low future) orientation 
dimension has an impact on post-IPO failure risk: 
H1: Firms located in long-term oriented countries are less likely to suffer involuntary 
delisting from the stock exchange. 
                                                 
64 As Porter (1992) note, Japan and Germany have systems based on dedicated capital where the funds of major owners 
stay invested in firms over extended periods of time. Both Japan and Germany score high on the LTO index. 
65 As Rappaport (2005, p. 66) notes, in the US “the average holding period until the mid-1960s was about 7 years. Today the average 
holding period in professionally managed funds is less than a year.” 
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H2: The time to involuntary delisting is longer for firms located in long-term oriented 
countries.  
 
3.4 Data and research method 
3.4.1 Data 
The initial sample of 26,733 IPO listings from around the world is compiled for the period 
1999-2008 from the Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Osiris database. To test the relation between national 
culture and IPO failure, the sample is restricted to nations with data on cultural dimensions supplied 
by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and House, Hanges, Mansour, Dorfman and Gupta (2004). 
Each firm’s listing status is tracked up to 15 August 2014 using the BvD Osiris database. Companies 
that are delisted from the stock exchange due to at least one of the following negative reasons are 
considered as failures (i.e., non-survivors): (i) bankruptcy; (ii) in administration; (iii) in liquidation; (iv) 
no longer meeting listing conditions; (v) in receivership; and (vi) winding up. IPOs with missing 
delisting dates or reasons for delisting are excluded. So are delistings due to M&A’s as these are not 
delistings for negative reasons.66 Data on firm-specific characteristics (e.g., revenue and current ratio) 
are also obtained from the BvD Osiris database. Country-level macroeconomic data are sourced from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI), and data on the legal environment are obtained from 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). Applying these filters, the final sample consists of 16,308 IPO 
firms from 36 countries over the period 1999-2008.  
 
                                                 
66 Delisting due to M&As are generally not failed firms and are excluded from the sample consistent with prior studies on 
delistings (e.g., Hensler, Rutherford and Springer, 1997; Jain and Martin, 2005). Furthermore, Li et al. (2012) argue M&As 
are mostly good news for investors since after an M&A, the share price generally rises. Specifically, they find the price 
trends for bankruptcy and delisting to be quite similar as they both fall until they exit the exchange. On the other hand, 
the price tendency for stocks undergoing M&A surges. 
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3.4.2 Model 
Both the logistic and Cox proportional hazards models (known as event-history analysis or 
survival analysis) are used in testing the relation between national culture and involuntary delistings. 
The logistic model, with a binary dependent variable, tests the determinants of the propensity of equity 
delisting for negative reasons and takes the following form: 
Delisting = β0 + β1Time Orientation + β2Controls + Year Dummies + ε          (1) 
where Delisting is a dummy that equals one if the firm delists within five years of the IPO and zero 
otherwise; Controls is a vector of control variables; Year Dummies capture any unobserved heterogeneity 
over time; and ε is the error term. The test variables, which are discussed in the next subsection, are 
summarised in Appendix B. 
Survival analysis using the Cox hazards model allows a test of the duration to failure, and thus 
does not require a tracking window to be specified as in the logistic model. Survival analysis has the 
advantage of recognising that the odds of the firm becoming delisted may differ with time,67 and does 
not make any assumption regarding the distribution of the baseline hazard function (i.e., semi 
parametric model). The Cox proportional hazards model is specified as: 
Time to Failure = β0 + β1Time Orientation + β2Controls + Year Dummies + ε                (2) 
where Time to Failure (i.e., survival time) is measured as the number of days an IPO survives from the 
date of listing to the delisting date or 15 August 2014. It is right-censored for firms that delist for 
reasons other than failure (e.g., mergers and acquisitions) or that survive until 15 August 2014; Time 
Orientation is either Long-term Orientation or Future Orientation. The hazard rate, hi(t), for firm i at time t 
(i.e., the probability of delisting at time t conditional on continuous listing) is as follows:  
hi(t) = h0(t) exp(Time Orientation, Controls, Year Dummies)                         (3) 
                                                 
67 Even though initially intended for the purposes of examining clinical data, survival analysis is employed more and more 
in non-medical studies, such as in examining the time to default of bank loans (Flynn, 2012). 
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where h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t. 
 
3.4.3   Measurement of independent variables 
Time orientation dimension of national culture 
Following Chui and Kwok (2008) and Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) among others, I use the 
widely accepted cultural dimensions from Hofstede’s (2001). In particular, the variable of focus is the 
long-term orientation dimension. Based on a study of students’ values in 23 countries around the 
world on Bond’s Chinese Values Survey (CVS) (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987), Hofstede added 
a fifth dimension in 1991 to his previous four IBM-based dimensions of national cultural: long-term 
versus short-term orientation. The addition of this cultural dimension, which reflects a society’s time 
horizon and is characterised by values oriented towards future where the virtues of persistence and 
thrift are deemed important, is due in part to its high correlation with economic growth (Hofstede 
and Minkov, 2010). On the opposite side of the spectrum is the short-term orientation where values 
related to the past and present are of prime importance such as personal steadiness and stability and 
respect for tradition. The original LTO dimension is available for only 23 countries (Hofstede,  
Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2012). 
Minkov (2007) analyses WVS data which permit the calculation of a new version based on a 
much larger number of countries – 93 compared to 23 for the Chinese Values Survey. Sourced from 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010), the new LTO index is based on WVS data and ranges from 
0 (Puerto Rico) to 100 (South Korea).68 To distinguish between the old and new LTO index, I label 
the original measure based on the Chinese Value Survey as Long-term Orientation (CVS) and the new 
measure based on the World Value Survey as Long-term Orientation (WVS). I also use the time 
                                                 
68 As Shoham and Malul (2013, p. 180) argue “culture is actually an exogenous variable because it does not change in accordance with 
short-term shocks to the economy. Neglecting culture in economic/financial research can lead to defective explanations.” They add that the 
LTO dimension is an exogenous cultural dimension that is not polluted with economic variables. 
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orientation measure from GLOBE, i.e. future orientation, defined as the extent to which individuals 
engage in future-oriented behaviours such as planning for and investing in the future (House, Hanges, 
Mansour, Dorfman and Gupta, 2004).  
 
Control variables: Firm- and country-level factors 
Based on past studies and data availability, the following firm characteristics are controlled for 
in the tests: firm size, age, profitability and liquidity ratios, and whether the firm belongs to the high-
tech industry. Larger and more mature firms are often viewed as less risky than smaller and younger 
firms who lack a long track record of past performance (Demers and Joos, 2007) as well as the financial 
or human resources and organisational structure (Carpentier and Suret, 2011). Larger firms have 
greater control over their operating environment and thus have lower uncertainty concerning their 
future prospects. Since larger firms are better equipped to survive during periods of high turbulence 
or costly investment mistakes, they are thus less likely to delist due to negative reasons (Bhattacharya, 
Demers and Joos, 2010; Demers and Joos, 2007; Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed, 2012; Schultz, 
1993). Following Demers and Joos (2007), Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus 
revenues for the year prior to IPO. Firms that are older have a longer track record and thus are less 
likely to fail. Prior studies find firms’ age is negatively related to distress delisting (Amini and Keasey, 
2013; Demers and Joos, 2007;  Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed, 2012; Schultz, 1993). Thus, the 
propensity of post-IPO failure is postulated to be higher for younger firms. Following  Demers and 
Joos (2007), Age is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years from the date 
of incorporation to the date of the offering.  
Highly profitable firms are more likely to survive. Fama and French (2004) find less profitable 
firms have a lower survival rate. Peristiani and Hong (2004) report that pre-IPO profitability is a good 
predictor of aftermarket survival; firms with negative pre-IPO earnings are three times more prone to 
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be eradicated from an exchange than are profitable issuers. A negative association between profitability 
and failure risk is also reported by Amini and Keasey (2013) and Chou, Cheng and Chien (2013) 
among others. Profitability is measured by Return on Assets in the year preceding the IPO (Hagel III, 
Brown and Lang, 2010). 
Liquidity, as proxied by the current ratio in the year preceding the IPO, measures whether a firm 
has enough short-term assets to cover its short-term obligations. A low current ratio, measured by 
current assets to current liabilities, indicates a firm may have problems meeting its short-term liabilities 
and is thus more likely to fail. Technology equals one if the firm is in the high-tech industry and zero 
otherwise. High technology IPO firms are more risky and thus have a higher failure rate than firms in 
other industries (Chou, Cheng and Chien, 2013).  
Country-level control variables which can potentially affect post-IPO performance are investor 
protection, creditor protection, stock market conditions, and economic and stock market 
developments. Firms in nations with stronger legal protection of investor rights, where company 
regulation is held with utmost importance, are more likely to succeed. Thomsen and Vinten (2007) 
find the adoption of governance codes that provide greater investor protection reduces the probability 
of corporate bankruptcy and liquidation in Europe. In countries where investors enjoy greater 
protection, well-performing companies are less likely to be capital and cash rationed,69 and bad 
performers are more likely to be noticed and improved before they fail. There is however a counter 
argument − stronger shareholder rights in a country are likely to speed up the resolution of financial 
distress. This argument has support in Dahiya and Klapper (2007), who find a higher incidence of 
delistings in nations with stronger shareholder rights. No direction is thus predicted for the relation 
between investor protection and delistings. I proxy investor protection by the Revised Antidirector Rights 
                                                 
69 Several studies show that the higher investor countries have for example more developed stock markets (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), higher valuation of firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
2002), and greater ownership dispersion in listed firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
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index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), which is an aggregation of six 
different aspects of shareholder rights:  (i)  votes  by  mail;  (ii)  shares  not  deposited;  (iii) cumulative 
voting; (iv) oppressed minorities; (v) pre-emptive rights; and (vi) capital required to call  a  meeting. 
This index ranges between one and five with a higher value implying greater shareholder protection.  
The Creditor Rights index is developed by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) to quantify four 
powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy: (i) whether there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, 
when a debtor files for reorganisation; (ii) whether secured creditors are able to seize collateral after 
the petition for reorganisation is approved; (iii) whether secured creditors are paid first out of the 
proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (iv) whether an administrator and not management is 
responsible for running the business during the reorganisation. The index varies between zero and 
four, with a higher score implying stronger creditor rights. Claessens, Djankov and Klapper (2003) 
find bankruptcy filings are higher in countries with stronger creditor rights. Dahiya and Klapper (2007) 
find no significant relation between creditor rights and delisting, and Claessens and Klapper (2005) 
find the index of creditor rights is negative but insignificantly associated with the occurrence of 
bankruptcies. Therefore, as with investor protection, no sign is predicted for Creditor Rights.  
Stock market conditions are captured by country-level Market Capitalisation, Turnover, and IPO 
Activity. Market Capitalisation represents the overall size of the stock market, and is measured as total 
market capitalisation of listed firms as a percentage of the country’s GDP. Claessens and Klapper 
(2005) find that greater overall development leads to a higher use of bankruptcy. I expect the 
coefficient of Market Capitalisation to be positive because more developed economies have more 
efficient delisting mechanisms. Turnover ratio, the total value of shares traded divided by average market 
capitalisation for the year, is a measure of liquidity. More liquid markets enhance the allocation of 
capital and thus long-term economic growth. I expect a negative association between the probability 
of firm failure and Turnover. IPO Activity aims to capture the hot issue market since past studies show 
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that IPOs listed during the hot period are more likely to fail (Ritter, 1991; Kooli and Meknassi, 2007). 
It is proxied by the number of IPOs in a year divided by the total number of IPOs during the period 
of 1999-2008 for each country (Banerjee, Dai and Shrestha, 2011).70 
The business environment, in particular deficiencies in the main procedural and administrative 
blockages in the bankruptcy process, is also controlled for in the tests. Insolvency is measured by the 
number of years from the filing for insolvency in court to the resolution of distressed assets. The 
longer the time it takes to resolve insolvency, the lower the delisting rate. GDP Growth measures the 
annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Firms in high growth economy are less likely to be delisted as 
they are more likely to be profitable. Finally, I control for time variation in the delisting rate using Year 
Dummies.  
 
3.4.4 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3.3 presents the frequency distribution of failed IPO firms by country (Panel A), year of 
filing (Panel B), and industry sector (Panel C). Panel A exhibits sizeable variations in the number of 
firms across countries. As expected, a large proportion of the sample comes from the US, with a total 
of 2,434 IPOs (14.9%), in contrast to Mexico, Morocco, and Spain, which are the least represented 
nations. There are also substantial differences in delisting rates across the countries. For example, 
Ireland (32.56%), the US (30.31%), and France (19.50%) are amongst the nations with the highest 
delisting rates.  
Panel B indicates sizeable fluctuations in delisting rates across the sample years. Firms going 
public in 1999 and 2000 have the highest delisting rates (13.79% and 11.02% respectively), coinciding 
with the internet-led high tech bubble. 
                                                 
70 During high volume periods, low-quality firms are drawn into the market (“windows of opportunity”) and underperform 
in the long-run  (Ritter, 1991). 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of failed IPO firms 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of delisted IPOs by year
Year  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted 
1999 1,325   2          1,327   0.15     1,302   25        1,327   1.88     1,230   97        1,327   7.31     1,144   183      1,327   13.79   
2000 2,438   13        2,451   0.53     2,404   47        2,451   1.92     2,259   192      2,451   7.83     2,181   270      2,451   11.02   
2001 1,881   6          1,887   0.32     1,864   23        1,887   1.22     1,761   126      1,887   6.68     1,720   167      1,887   8.85     
2002 1,141   4          1,145   0.35     1,127   18        1,145   1.57     1,053   92        1,145   8.03     1,033   112      1,145   9.78     
2003 1,100   3          1,103   0.27     1,086   17        1,103   1.54     1,016   87        1,103   7.89     1,008   95        1,103   8.61     
2004 1,631   22        1,653   1.33     1,585   68        1,653   4.11     1,495   158      1,653   9.56     1,490   163      1,653   9.86     
2005 1,656   20        1,676   1.19     1,574   102      1,676   6.09     1,496   180      1,676   10.74   1,496   180      1,676   10.74   
2006 1,886   38        1,924   1.98     1,840   84        1,924   4.37     1,783   141      1,924   7.33     1,783   141      1,924   7.33     
2007 2,047   44        2,091   2.10     2,009   82        2,091   3.92     1,987   104      2,091   4.97     1,987   104      2,091   4.97     
2008 1,035   16        1,051   1.52     1,019   32        1,051   3.04     1,009   42        1,051   4.00     1,009   42        1,051   4.00     
Total 16,140  168      16,308 1.03     15,810  498      16,308 3.05     15,089 1,219    16,308 7.47     14,851  1,457   16,308 8.93     
 Firms delisted within 3 years after 
IPO 
 Firms delisted within 5 years after 
IPO 
 Firms delisted within 10 years after 
IPO 
 Firms delisted from IPO date until 
August 15, 2014 
Panel C: Distribution of delistings by industry
Year  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted  Listed 
 
Delisted  Total 
 % 
Delisted 
Consumer Discretionary 2,387   32        2,419   1.32     2,330   89        2,419   3.68     2,185   234      2,419   9.67     2,141   278      2,419   11.49   
Consumer Staples 722      3          725      0.41     711      14        725      1.93     679      46        725      6.34     675      50        725      6.90     
Energy 866      8          874      0.92     848      26        874      2.97     812      62        874      7.09     800      74        874      8.47     
Financials 2,555   68        2,623   2.59     2,478   145      2,623   5.53     2,316   307      2,623   11.70   2,292   331      2,623   12.62   
Health Care 1,126   9          1,135   0.79     1,108   27        1,135   2.38     1,055   80        1,135   7.05     1,026   109      1,135   9.60     
Industrials 2,422   20        2,442   0.82     2,378   64        2,442   2.62     2,303   139      2,442   5.69     2,278   164      2,442   6.72     
Information Technology 3,030   18        3,048   0.59     2,958   90        3,048   2.95     2,805   243      3,048   7.97     2,723   325      3,048   10.66   
Materials 2,357   2          2,359   0.08     2,336   23        2,359   0.97     2,299   60        2,359   2.54     2,289   70        2,359   2.97     
Telecommunication Services 197      7          204      3.43     189      15        204      7.35     170      34        204      16.67   162      42        204      20.59   
Utilities 308      308      -       305      3          308      0.97     299      9          308      2.92     299      9          308      2.92     
Grand Total 15,970 167      16,137  1.03     15,810  498      16,308 3.05     15,089 1,219    16,308 7.47     14,685 1,452   16,137  9.00     
 Firms delisted within 3 years after 
IPO 
 Firms delisted within 5 years after 
IPO 
 Firms delisted within 10 years after 
IPO 
 Firms delisted from IPO date until 
August 15, 2014 
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Panel C shows that firms from the information technology, financials, consumer discretionary, 
and materials sectors are the most represented in the sample. Telecommunication services stand out 
as the sector with the highest delisting rate (20.6%) followed by financials (12.6%) and consumer 
discretionary (11.5%).  
Table 3.4 reports the distribution of failed IPOs by reasons of delisting. Almost half (47.9%) of 
the involuntary delistings are due to the inability to meet one or more of the exchange listing 
requirements. Liquidation is the second most common reason, representing 26% of the failed IPOs, 
followed by “in administration.” Receivership and winding up are the least common reasons, with 
only 2.7% of the delistings falling under these categories.   
Table 3.5 summarises the key country-level variables. South Korea (100.00), Taiwan (92.95), 
Japan (87.91), China (87.41), and Germany (82.87) rank as the most long-term oriented societies, while 
Morocco (14.11), Australia (21.16), Mexico (24.18), Ireland (24.43), and the US (25.69) are the least 
long-term oriented nations, as indicated by Long-term Orientation (WVS). Long-term Orientation (CVS) is 
highest in the Asian countries (China (118), Hong Kong (96), Taiwan (87) and Japan (80)) and lowest 
in New Zealand (30), the US (29), the UK (25), and Canada (23).  
Revised Antidirector Rights is highest in Brazil, India, and the UK, and lowest in China. The Creditor 
Rights index is highest in Hong Kong, New Zealand, and the UK, and lowest in France and Mexico. 
There is a fair amount of variation in general stock market and economic conditions across the sample 
countries: GDP Growth is highest at 10.03% in China, and lowest in Japan at 1.34%.  
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Table 3.4: Distribution of failed IPOs by reason for involuntary delisting  
 
 
 
Delisting reason  Total  %  Total  %  Total  %  Total  % 
Bankruptcy 14        8.3     41        8.2     116      9.5     137      9.4     
In Administration 22        13.1   67        13.5   155      12.7   204      14.0   
In Liquidation 72        42.9   186      37.3   351      28.8   379      26.0   
In Receivership -      -     5          1.0     10        0.8     10        0.7     
No Longer Meeting 
Listing Conditions 56        33.3   184      36.9   558      45.8   698      47.9   
Winding up 4          2.4     15        3.0     29        2.4     29        2.0     
Total 168      100.0 498     100.0 1,219   100.0 1,457   100.0 
 Firms delisted 
within 3 years 
after IPO 
 Firms delisted 
within 5 years 
after IPO 
 Firms delisted 
within 10 years 
after IPO 
 Firms delisted 
from IPO date 
until August 15, 
2014 
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Table 3.5: Summary of key country-level variables 
 
 
Country 
 Long-term 
Orientation 
(wvs) 
 Long-term 
Orientation 
(cvs) 
 Future 
Orientation 
 Revised 
Antidirector 
Rights  Creditor Rights 
 Market 
Capitalisation  Turnover  IPO Activity  Insolvency  GDP Growth 
Australia 21.16               31.00               4.09                 4.00                 3.00 122.05 83.02 12.13 1.00 3.59
Austria 60.45               __ 4.47                 2.50                 3.00 30.92 40.08 14.96 1.10 3.12
Brazil 43.83               65.00               3.90                 5.00                 1.00 68.70 49.48 20.82 5.88 4.50
Canada 36.02               23.00               4.40                 4.00                 1.00 111.73 76.79 10.97 0.80 2.78
China 87.41               118.00             3.68                 1.00                 2.00 64.64 120.80 11.07 2.24 10.03
Denmark 34.76               __ 4.59                 4.00                 3.00 76.55 86.76 22.93 2.65 2.50
Finland 38.29               __ 4.39                 3.50                 1.00 198.63 85.52 19.46 0.90 3.91
France 63.48               __ 3.74                 3.50                 0.00 95.08 98.61 12.59 1.90 2.38
Germany 82.87               31.00               4.41                 3.50                 3.00 58.13 127.14 16.28 1.20 2.46
Greece 45.34               __ 3.53                 2.00                 1.00 92.00 69.38 21.06 2.00 4.06
Hong Kong 60.96               96.00               3.88                 5.00                 4.00 439.31 67.41 13.06 1.10 5.35
India 50.88               61.00               4.04                 5.00                 2.00 44.96 200.34 23.45 4.30 5.65
Indonesia 61.96               __ 3.61                 4.00                 2.00 26.20 49.37 11.94 5.51 4.92
Ireland 24.43               __ 3.93                 5.00                 1.00 66.06 55.32 13.89 0.40 6.79
Israel 37.53               __ 3.82                 4.00                 3.00 93.45 50.64 16.26 3.00 5.75
Italy 61.46               __ 3.34                 2.00                 2.00 53.58 130.80 14.18 1.80 1.89
Japan 87.91               80.00               4.29                 4.50                 2.00 82.24 99.74 10.81 0.60 1.34
Malaysia 40.81               __ 4.39                 5.00                 3.00 139.42 33.04 12.32 2.30 5.81
Mexico 24.18               __ 3.75                 3.00                 0.00 23.14 28.89 12.22 1.80 2.24
Morocco 14.11               __ 3.50                 2.00                 1.00 69.42 29.29 18.47 1.80 4.87
Netherlands 67.00               44.00               4.72                 2.50                 3.00 131.27 134.20 15.51 1.10 3.24
New Zealand 32.75               30.00               3.46                 4.00                 4.00 37.52 43.90 12.76 1.30 3.38
Philippines 27.46               19.00               3.92                 4.00                 1.00 49.80 23.77 13.94 5.70 4.96
Poland 37.78               32.00               3.23                 2.00                 1.00 33.27 41.91 16.81 3.00 5.30
Portugal 28.21               __ 3.77                 2.50                 1.00 46.04 80.60 14.24 2.00 2.35
Republic of Korea 100.00             75.00               3.90                 4.50                 3.00 57.81 277.23 10.99 1.50 5.92
Russian Federation 81.36               __ 3.06                 4.00                 2.00 71.83 51.68 15.41 2.00 6.90
Singapore 71.54               48.00               4.88                 5.00                 3.00 191.91 59.52 11.41 0.80 6.69
Spain 47.61               __ 3.52                 5.00                 2.00 104.26 180.66 19.31 1.50 3.69
Sweden 52.90               33.00               4.37                 3.50                 1.00 121.40 128.83 14.35 2.00 3.33
Switzerland 73.55               __ 4.80                 3.00                 1.00 251.37 91.77 12.90 3.00 2.24
Taiwan 92.95               87.00               3.65                 3.00                 2.00 __ __ 13.19 __ __
Thailand 31.74               56.00               3.27                 4.00                 2.00 65.19 89.60 16.25 2.70 5.27
Turkey 45.59               __ 3.74                 3.00                 2.00 29.91 164.43 18.45 3.30 6.02
United Kingdom 51.13               25.00               4.31                 5.00                 4.00 139.63 133.15 11.83 1.00 3.00
United States 25.69               29.00               4.13                 3.00                 1.00 135.40 178.24 11.02 1.50 2.94
Average 55.62               51.18                4.06                 3.82                 2.04 98.93 130.52 13.65 1.85 4.17
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Table 3.6 presents the Pearson correlations between the test variables. Delisting is significantly 
associated with most firm- and country-level independent variables, providing assurance that the 
variables identified are important in explaining IPO firm failure. More relevant to this study is the 
significant negative correlation between Hofstede’s LTO cultural dimension and Delisting, suggesting 
that IPOs in countries with a long-term orientation (as measured by WVS and CVS) survive longer. 
Delisting is significantly and positively correlated with the Revised Antidirector Rights; thus nations with 
better legal protection have a higher delisting rate in line with the finding of Dahiya and Klapper 
(2007). The correlation between Delisting and most of the firm-level variables is significant and in the 
predicted direction. As expected, Delisting is negatively and significantly correlated with Age, Revenues, 
and Return on Assets. Delisting is negatively and significantly correlated with IPO Activity, Insolvency, and 
GDP Growth, and positively and significantly correlated with Market Capitalisation. 
The correlations between the independent variables (with the exception of the country-level 
time orientation measures which are orthogonalised in the regressions) are not high enough to warrant 
concerns of multicollinearity. This is supported by the maximum value of VIF, which is reported in 
Appendix C as 1.78.  
 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 3.7 provides results from univariate t-test (difference in means) and z-test (Wilcoxon rank 
sum test) of differences in country- and firm-level covariates between surviving and failed IPOs firms. 
Importantly, the surviving group has a significantly higher score for both measures of long-term 
orientation, providing preliminary support for the hypothesis that firms in nations with a long-term 
orientation have on average a lower probability of failure.  
109 
 
Table 3.6: Pearson correlation matrix 
 
 
Note: This table reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between selected country-level variables. Definitions and data sources for all variables are outlined in 
Appendix B. Statistical significance at the 1% level in bold. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Delisting 1         
(2) Long-term Orientation (WVS) 0.054- 1         
(3) Long-term Orientation (CVS) 0.128-  0.784 1         
(4) Future Orientation 0.082 0.236- 0.554- 1         
(5) Age 0.110-  0.245 0.279 0.219-  1         
(6) Firm  Size 0.125-  0.311  0.296 0.129-  0.212  1         
(7) Return on Assets 0.095- 0.320 0.328 0.110-  0.147  0.402 1         
(8) Current Ratio 0.005 0.092- 0.108-  0.087 0.068- 0.258- 0.120-  1         
(9) Revised Antidirector Rights 0.070 0.075- 0.326- 0.411  0.021 0.034- 0.009- 0.097 1         
(10) Corrected Antidirector Rights 0.053 0.578 0.442 0.084- 0.118  0.226 0.221  0.010 0.519  1         
(11) Creditor Rights 0.082 0.256 0.057 0.136  0.122-  0.088 0.098 0.003- 0.429 0.471  1         
(12) Market Capitalisation 0.091  0.313-  0.412-  0.437 0.279- 0.064- 0.082- 0.009- 0.032 0.228- 0.039 1         
(13) Turnover 0.009- 0.133  0.141  0.041-  0.070 0.114-  0.078- 0.003- 0.067 0.247- 0.033 0.254- 1         
(14) IPO Activity 0.023- 0.027- 0.060 0.104-  0.175  0.032- 0.012- 0.004 0.170 0.057 0.007 0.208- 0.267 1         
(15) Insolvency 0.095- 0.019- 0.292 0.366- 0.302 0.066 0.120  0.008 0.095 0.044- 0.123-  0.428- 0.176  0.410  1         
(16) GDP Growth 0.079- 0.256 0.541  0.375- 0.106  0.150  0.187  0.054- 0.226- 0.014- 0.126  0.053- 0.026- 0.097 0.353 1         
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Table 3.7: Univariate tests of differences between surviving and failed IPOs 
 
 
Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and 
*** Indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Mean Obs Mean
Long-term Orientation (WVS) 56.464     1,457  47.038     13.475 *** 9.605 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) 52.977     1,301  33.610     23.703 *** 25.955 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Future Orientation 4.049       1,457  4.189       -14.587 *** -17.387 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Age 1.935       1,316  1.407       15.390 *** 15.426 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm  Size 9.786       663     7.124       18.931 *** 18.016 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Return on Assets 3.411       549     12.251-     15.272 *** 14.837 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Current Ratio 3.009       636     2.925       0.327 5.324 ***
(0.743) (0.000)
Technology 0.185       1,452  0.224       -3.569 *** -3.568 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Revised Antidirector Rights 3.805       1,457  4.004       -6.760 *** -4.624 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Creditor Rights 2.020       1,457  2.197       -6.462 *** -2.048 **
(0.000) (0.041)
Market Capitalisation 96.490     1,456  122.117   -17.403 *** -20.567 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Turnover 130.623   1,456  129.538   0.490 -1.737 *
(0.624) (0.082)
IPO Activity 13.799     1,457  12.160     7.917 *** 1.976 **
(0.000) (0.048)
Insolvency 1.917       1,456  1.250       19.385 *** 16.086 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 4.254       1,456  3.373       11.986 *** 10.938 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Survivors vs. 
Delisted
Survivors vs. 
Delisted
Survivors
Delisted due to 
negative reasons t-test z-test
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The level of investor protection also seems to matter to the likelihood of delisting in these 
univariate tests. Firms in countries with a higher level of shareholder protection, as measured by the 
Revised Antidirector Rights index, are more likely to fail, consistent with the speedier resolution of 
financial distress in these countries. Firms are also more likely to fail when they are from a country 
with stronger Creditor Rights. The likelihood of delisting is higher in countries with more developed 
stock markets (as measured by Market Capitalisation) but lower in countries with higher IPO Activity 
and economic growth (GDP Growth), and better bankruptcy processes and distress resolution 
mechanisms (Insolvency). Delisted firms are on average smaller (as measured by Revenues), younger (Age), 
have lower profitability (Return on Assets) and liquidity (Current Ratio), and are more likely to come from 
the technology sector. All these results are consistent with expectations. 
 
3.5.2   Logistic regression results 
Results from logistic regressions are presented in Table 3.8, where the dependent variable takes 
the value of one if the firm is delisted for negative reasons within five years of the IPO date, and zero 
otherwise. The main objective is to determine if the association between time orientation and post-
IPO survival is significant, taking into account other predictors of IPO failure. Specifications 1 to 3 
include firm and country-level variables, and specifications 4 to 6 consist of only country-level 
predictors.  
The estimated coefficients of Long-term Orientation (WVS) and Long-term Orientation (CVS) are 
significantly negative in all specifications, in line with the view that firms in long-term oriented 
countries are less prone to fail (Hypothesis H1). Companies in such societies are less likely to display 
myopic tendencies, and are more committed to investing in value-enhancing projects and to 
developing solid market positions at the expense of short-term gains. Furthermore, the presence of 
long-term  market  participants  in  forward-looking  societies  helps  stabilise  share  price  as  well  as 
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Table 3.8: Logistic regressions of post-IPO failure (5-year cut off) 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for firms that delist for negative reasons within five years of the IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The 
symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term Orientation (WVS) - -0.011 ** __ __ -0.013 *** __ __
(0.027) (0.000)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - __ -0.037 *** __ __ -0.033 *** __
(0.000) (0.000)
Future Orientation - __ __ -0.554 __ __ -0.096
(0.104) (0.646)
Age - -0.314 *** -0.219 ** -0.356 *** __ __ __
(0.000) (0.014) (0.000) __ __ __
Firm  Size - -0.153 *** -0.148 *** -0.165 *** __ __ __
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) __ __ __
Return on Assets - -0.002 0.000 -0.003 __ __ __
(0.578) (0.901) (0.348) __ __ __
Current Ratio - -0.084 *** -0.070 *** -0.083 *** __ __ __
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) __ __ __
Technology + 0.311 0.280 0.253 __ __ __
(0.117) (0.238) (0.200) __ __ __
Revised Antidirector Rights +/- 0.657 *** 0.696 *** 0.577 *** 0.442 *** 0.458 *** 0.257 ***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Creditor Rights +/- -0.146 -0.109 -0.133 0.171 *** 0.162 ** 0.204 ***
(0.161) (0.459) (0.181) (0.004) (0.028) (0.000)
Market Capitalisation + 0.002 0.006 ** 0.003 ** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.006 ***
(0.159) (0.012) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover - -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 ** 0.003 *** 0.001
(0.510) (0.747) (0.511) (0.043) (0.003) (0.160)
IPO Activity + 0.023 -0.011 0.022 0.003 -0.009 0.005
(0.251) (0.705) (0.284) (0.829) (0.579) (0.634)
Insolvency - -0.398 *** -0.405 -0.423 *** -0.377 *** -0.365 ** -0.331 ***
(0.007) (0.119) (0.006) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000)
GDP Growth - -0.291 *** -0.279 *** -0.266 *** -0.273 *** -0.284 *** -0.267 ***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -3.137 *** -2.926 *** -1.018 -4.554 *** -4.622 *** -4.393 ***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.529) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.218 0.170 0.110 0.158 0.104
No. of Observations 5,524       4,542       5,524       15,299     13,009     15,299     
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facilitate funding of value-creating investment projects (that may not have immediate benefits), which 
contribute to the survival of the firms. The coefficient of Future Orientation, which stands for a societal 
predisposition for planning, is negative in specifications 3 and 6 but not statistically significant.  
Results for most of the firm-level variables are in line with the extant literature. As expected, 
both Age and Firm Size have a significantly negative coefficient in all specifications, supporting the 
proposition that older and larger firms have a lower probability of delisting for negative reasons. As 
predicted, Current Ratio is negatively related to the likelihood of delisting at the 1% significance level 
in all specifications. Therefore, the greater a firm’s ability to meet its short-term expenses, the lower 
the likelihood of failure. There is no evidence showing that firms from the technology sector or less 
profitable firms have a higher risk of delisting.  
Looking at the country-level control variables, results show that the Revised Antidirector Rights 
index has a significantly positive (at 1% significance level) coefficient in all specifications. Therefore, 
consistent with Dahiya and Klapper (2007), there is a higher incidence of involuntary delistings in 
nations with stronger investor protection. Dahiya and Klapper (2007) argue that countries with better 
shareholder rights, and thus better distress resolution mechanisms, provide faster resolution of 
financial distress. Creditor Rights has a negative coefficient in all specifications, suggesting a lower 
probability of involuntary delisting in societies with stronger credit rights. However, the coefficients 
are insignificant. 
The likelihood of involuntary delisting is lower in countries with higher GDP Growth and in 
countries with a more developed stock market, as proxied by Market Capitalisation. The coefficient of 
Insolvency is negative and significant, suggesting a lower rate of involuntary delisting in countries with 
a longer time duration from the filing for insolvency to the resolution of distressed assets. Neither 
Turnover nor IPO Activity has an impact on the likelihood of post-IPO failure. 
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3.5.3   Cox proportional hazards regression results 
Table 3.9 presents the results for the Cox proportional hazards regression model of “time to 
failure” for the international sample of IPO firms. The overall model chi-square value is highly 
significant for all specifications.71 A negative coefficient in the Cox proportional hazard implies the 
related variable lowers the hazard rate (i.e., decreases the likelihood of failure). The column named 
HR presents the effects on the hazard ratio (rate) given a unit change in the explanatory variable. 
Exponentiated individual coefficients have the interpretation of the ratio of the hazards for a 1-unit 
change in the corresponding covariate. For continuous covariates, 100 * (Hazard Ratio – 1) gives the 
estimated percent change in the hazard rate for each unit increase in the covariate. For dummy 
variables, the hazard ratio represents the ratio of the estimated hazard for those with value of one to 
the estimated hazard for those with value of zero.72 A hazard ratio greater than one means delisting is 
more likely to happen (i.e., shorter time to failure), and the reverse (i.e., longer time to failure) holds 
true if the ratio is smaller than one.   
The results are mostly comparable to those from logistic regressions, with the exceptions of FO 
and Return on Assets, both which are now significant and in the predicted direction. Long-term Orientation 
(WVS) and Long-term Orientation (CVS) have a negative coefficient that is significant in all specifications 
in the Cox’s model, corroborating the above finding that firms operating in long-term oriented 
countries survive longer after the IPOs. The hazard ratio of 0.987 and 0.973 for Long-term Orientation 
(WVS) and Long-term Orientation (CVS) implies that every additional unit increase in Long-term 
Orientation (WVS) and Long-term Orientation (CVS) reduces the risk of failure by 1.30% and 2.66% 
                                                 
71 See Appendix D for the graphical test to assess the proportional hazards assumption. − ln{ − ln(survival)} curves for 
categorical variables are plotted versus ln(analysis time). 
72 For example in Model 3 (Table 3.9), if the coefficient on variable Future Orientation (a continuous variable) is -0.623, then 
a 1-unit increase in the Future Orientation index decreases the hazard by 46.3% because exp(-0.623)=0.536. In Model 3, the 
coefficient on variable Revised Antidirector Rights is 0.209, then a 1 unit increase in the Revised Antidirector Rights index increases 
the hazard by 23.2% because exp(-0.209)=1.232. In Model 1, the coefficient on variable Technology (an indicator variable) 
is 0.209, then technology firms face a hazard 23.3% higher than non-high tech firms as exp(0.209)=1.233. 
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respectively. Future Orientation has a much stronger economic impact on failure risk, with a hazard ratio 
of 0.536 (specification 3). Therefore, for every additional unit increase in Future Orientation, the risk of 
IPO failure reduces by 46.39%. FO, which was not significant in the logistic regression model, is now 
significant, illustrating the main benefit of the Cox regression model. Logistic regressions do not take 
into account the actual failure time nor model the incidence or non-incidence of delisting; the Cox 
proportional hazards model in contrast quantifies the time to delisting. 
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Table 3.9: Cox proportional hazards regressions of post-IPO failure 
 
 
Note: The time to failure is the number of days between IPO date and the day in which the IPO is delisted. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates are provided 
in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Coef and HR represent Coefficient and Hazard Ratio respectively.  
Sign
Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR
Long-term Orientation (WVS) - -0.013 *** 0.987 __ __ __ __ -0.013 *** 0.988 __ __ __ __
(0.000) (0.000)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - __ __ -0.027 *** 0.973 __ __ __ __ -0.026 *** 0.974 __ __
(0.000) (0.000)
Future Orientation - __ __ __ __ -0.623 *** 0.536 __ __ __ __ -0.376 *** 0.687
(0.002) (0.001)
Age - -0.119 *** 0.888 -0.077 0.926 -0.156 *** 0.856 __ __ __ __ __ __
(0.009) (0.114) (0.001) __ __ __
Firm  Size - -0.110 *** 0.896 -0.098 *** 0.907 -0.124 *** 0.883 __ __ __ __ __ __
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) __ __ __
Return on Assets - -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.005 *** 0.995 __ __ __ __ __ __
(0.020) (0.015) (0.002) __ __ __
Current Ratio - -0.042 *** 0.959 -0.035 *** 0.965 -0.040 *** 0.961 __ __ __ __ __ __
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) __ __ __
Technology + 0.209 * 1.233 0.199 1.220 0.137 1.147 __ __ __ __ __ __
(0.066) (0.116) (0.224) __ __ __
Revised Antidirector Rights +/- 0.238 *** 1.269 0.119 1.127 0.209 ** 1.233 0.137 *** 1.147 0.039 1.0403 0.047 1.048
(0.008) (0.357) (0.011) (0.007) (0.540) (0.300)
Creditor Rights +/- -0.124 ** 0.883 -0.060 0.942 -0.162 *** 0.850 0.122 *** 1.130 0.169 *** 1.184 0.079 ** 1.083
(0.033) (0.433) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
Market Capitalisation + 0.002 * 1.002 0.005 *** 1.005 0.004 *** 1.004 0.005 *** 1.005 0.007 *** 1.007 0.007 *** 1.007
(0.061) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover - -0.001 0.999 0.001 1.001 0.000 1.000 0.005 *** 1.005 0.007 *** 1.007 0.004 *** 1.004
(0.494) (0.274) (0.786) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IPO Activity + 0.006 1.006 -0.009 0.991 0.003 1.003 -0.010 0.990 -0.011 0.989 -0.014 ** 0.986
(0.598) (0.577) (0.782) (0.118) (0.166) (0.025)
Insolvency - -0.531 *** 0.588 -0.613 *** 0.542 -0.578 *** 0.561 -0.687 *** 0.503 -0.755 *** 0.470 -0.640 *** 0.527
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth - -0.199 *** 0.820 -0.146 *** 0.864 -0.186 *** 0.830 -0.111 *** 0.895 -0.091 *** 0.913 -0.134 *** 0.875
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi-square 436.52 *** 435.74 *** 423.73 *** 1004.16 *** 1177.23 *** 916.94 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Observations 5,524        4,542        5,524        15,299      13,009      15,299      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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GLOBE’s future orientation seems to be a better predictor of involuntary delisting than 
Hofestede’s long-term orientation. Future orientation and long-term orientation measure different 
country-level temporal aspects. Venaik, Zhu and Brewer (2013) argue that the Hofstede long-term 
orientation dimension reflects the perseverance and thrift facets of future orientation (the perseverance 
and thrift as opposed to the past or present), while the GLOBE future orientation captures the planning 
element of future orientation (planning for the future versus emphasising the present). 
As for firm-level control variables, the results show that older, larger, more profitable, and more 
liquid firms tend to survive longer, as expected. For instance, the hazard ratio for Age is 0.888 in 
specification 1, implying that for every additional unit increase in Age, the risk of delisting for negative 
reasons is reduced by 11.18%. A unit increase in Firm Size is associated with a 10.39% lower hazard 
rate (i.e., increase in the survival likelihood). Failure risk is also lower for firms with a higher Return on 
Assets and Current Ratio with each percent increase in these factors decreasing the hazard rate by 0.40% 
and 4.10% respectively. These results suggest that better performing firms tend to survive longer after 
going public. As expected, firms in the technology sector have a 23.31% higher risk of failure but the 
relation is significant only in specification 1.  
Consistent with the logistic regression results, firms in countries with greater shareholder 
protection tend to delist sooner after their IPO but this relation is significant in only three 
specifications. The hazard ratio for Revised Antidirector Rights shows that the risk of failure is increased 
by as high as 26.9% for each unit increase in the index (specification 1). In contrast to the logistic 
results, mixed results are found for Creditor Rights yield in the survival analysis. Dahiya and Klapper 
(2007), and Claessens and Klapper (2005) find creditor rights are not significant in predicting delistings 
and bankruptcies respectively. 
Country-level controls for stock market development and economic conditions, in particular 
Market Capitalisation, Insolvency, and GDP Growth, remain significant determinants of involuntary 
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delisting. Specifically, results show a lower hazard of failure for firms in countries with stronger 
economic growth and where the bankruptcy of defaulted firms takes longer to resolve. In economic 
terms, the hazard ratios for Insolvency and GDP Growth indicate that each additional year to resolve 
insolvency and each additional percent increase in GDP Growth reduce the risk of delisting by 41.22% 
and 18.01% respectively, as shown in specification 1. IPO Activity has no impact on delisting for 
negative reasons while the coefficient of Turnover is positive and significant in the country-level 
regressions in specifications 4 to 6.  
 
3.5.4  Plots of Kaplan-Meir survival function and hazard function 
To assess the effect of Long-term Orientation (WVS) on the likelihood of failure over time, I 
construct the Kaplan-Meier survival curve as depicted in Figure 3.3. The Kaplan-Meier survival 
function is used to estimate the time-defined probabilities of delisting or alternatively the likelihood 
of survival over time. The Kaplan-Meier estimator is defined as:   
?̂?(𝑡) = ∏  
𝑛𝑗 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑗 | 𝑡𝑗≤𝑡 
  
where nj is the number of firms at risk at time tj, and dj is the number of firms that actually fail at time 
tj. The product is the overall observed failure times less than or equal to t.  
Figure 3.3 shows the likelihood of survival is high in the first two and half years after the IPO, 
and then starts to decline. Consistent with the empirical results discussed so far, firms in the low LTO 
group (using the median value as the cut-off) are less likely to survive than those in the high LTO 
group. The survival function of the high LTO group is for the most part above that of the lower LTO 
group over time. In fact, the divergence in survival rates between a firm in the high LTO group and a 
firm in the high LTO group becomes more apparent after 10 years of listing. For example, the 
probability that a firm in the high LTO group survives longer than 15 years post-IPO is 90.51% 
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compared to 81.17% for the low LTO group. The log-rank and Wilcoxon (Breslow) tests for equality 
of survivor function across the two groups shows a significant difference exists between the two 
groups.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 depicts the smoothed hazard rate for the evolution of firms’ failure risk. The hazard 
function of the high LTO group remains under that of the low LTO group. For the low LTO group, 
it increases in the first 10 years and then decreases. For the high LTO group, it quickly increases in 
the first four years and then decreases. 
 
0
.8
0
0
.8
5
0
.9
0
0
.9
5
1
.0
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Time (days)
LTO-WVS < Median LTO-WVS > Median
Figure 3.3: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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3.6    Robustness checks 
To alleviate concerns that previous inferences about the role of time orientation on involuntary 
delisting may be driven by uneven sample composition or estimation procedures, I rerun the logistic 
regression models but with the dependent variable taking the value of one if the firm is delisted for 
negative reasons within 10 years (instead of 5 years) of the IPO date, and zero otherwise. Table 3.10 
shows Future Orientation is now significant at the 1% level, with the rest of the results remain intact.  
To address concerns about potential biases stemming from uneven distribution of sample firms 
across different nations, I re-estimate the models using country-weighted logistic regressions. Table 
3.11 shows the results are robust and not driven by uneven sample composition. Third, to ensure that 
the results are robust to the choice of different survival estimation models, I rerun the tests using 
parametric exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz regression models. Table 3.12 confirms the 
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Figure 3.4: Smoothed hazard estimates
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robustness of the results with these alternative models generating virtually similar results as those 
reported above.  
The fourth robustness analysis relates to the inclusion of information asymmetry proxies, i.e., 
CIFAR and Disclosure Requirements. A reduction in uncertainties about future earnings as a result of 
increased levels of disclosure in a country is likely to impact on involuntary delistings. Table 3.13 
shows that both CIFAR and Disclosure Requirements are negative and statistically significant in four 
models, suggesting that firms in countries with higher information asymmetry have a higher risk of 
delisting. Most importantly, controlling for information asymmetry does not generally affect the 
inferences drawn on the role of LTO and FO on delistings. 
Finally, I control for four additional dimensions of national culture, namely Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Power Distance, Performance Orientation, and Individualism.73 Uncertainty Avoidance 
indicates the degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. High uncertainty avoidance implies 
more formal structures and rules in a country, leading to a higher propensity for delisting. In addition, 
uncertainty in a society may lead to short-term behaviours (as the future is too obscure) which I expect 
to have a negative influence on firm survival. Power Distance implies that individuals in countries are 
not equal. More opportunistic behaviours and the use of bribes to bypass the regulations are more 
likely to happen in high power distance societies thus leading to a lower probability of delisting. Higher 
performance orientation in a society implies greater competition and achievement. I expect a negative 
coefficient on Performance Orientation. Individualism refers to the degree to which individuals are 
assimilated into groups. In individualist societies, the relations between people are loose. Shao, Kwok 
and Zhang (2013) show that individualism is associated with risk taking. They argue that firms in 
                                                 
73 Performance Orientation refers to Hofstede’s masculinity dimension. I renamed it as this dimension has nothing to do with 
gender differences. 
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individualistic countries invest more in long-term projects to pursue higher expected returns. I thus 
expect a positive coefficient on Individualism.  
As shown in Table 3.14, Performance Orientation (Individualism) are significantly negative (positive) 
in three specifications. Therefore, firms in countries that display a low level of individualism and that 
are performance-oriented have a lower propensity to be delisted for negative reasons. Uncertainty 
Avoidance and Power Distance are weak determinants of involuntary delisting.  More relevant to this 
study, the results in Models 4 and 6 show that firms operating in long-term oriented countries survive 
longer after the IPO. The Long-term Orientation variables in Models 1, 2, 3 and 5 are not significant, 
most likely on account of multicollinearity problems associated with Individualism, Power Distance, and 
Long-term Orientation (CVS) (Appendix C).” 
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Table 3.10: Logistic regressions of post-IPO failure (10-year cut off) 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for firms that delist for negative reasons within ten years of the IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The 
symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term Orientation (WVS) - -0.011 *** __ __ -0.012 *** __ __
(0.000) (0.000)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - __ -0.029 *** __ __ -0.027 *** __
(0.000) (0.000)
Future Orientation - __ __ -0.635 *** __ __ -0.419 ***
(0.005) (0.002)
Age - -0.146 *** -0.104 * -0.178 *** __ __ __
(0.006) (0.068) (0.001) __ __ __
Firm  Size - -0.133 *** -0.116 *** -0.146 *** __ __ __
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) __ __ __
Return on Assets - -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.005 ** __ __ __
(0.071) (0.078) (0.014) __ __ __
Current Ratio - -0.068 *** -0.060 *** -0.066 *** __ __ __
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) __ __ __
Technology + 0.228 * 0.232 0.169 __ __ __
(0.089) (0.129) (0.205) __ __ __
Revised Antidirector Rights +/- 0.269 *** 0.240 0.248 *** 0.181 *** 0.128 * 0.096 *
(0.009) (0.114) (0.010) (0.003) (0.095) (0.086)
Creditor Rights +/- -0.118 * -0.063 -0.136 ** 0.158 *** 0.201 *** 0.134 ***
(0.072) (0.480) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Capitalisation + 0.002 0.004 ** 0.004 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 ***
(0.141) (0.040) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover - -0.002 * 0.000 -0.001 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.002 ***
(0.100) (0.874) (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IPO Activity + 0.008 -0.018 0.006 -0.015 * -0.024 ** -0.016 **
(0.545) (0.344) (0.677) (0.065) (0.017) (0.036)
Insolvency - -0.511 *** -0.583 *** -0.553 *** -0.561 *** -0.547 *** -0.538 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth - -0.239 *** -0.189 *** -0.230 *** -0.184 *** -0.181 *** -0.199 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.029 0.142 2.225 ** -2.131 *** -1.970 *** -0.837
(0.956) (0.836) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.151)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.180 0.147 0.105 0.141 0.099
No. of Observations 5,524       4,542       5,524       15,299     13,009     15,299     
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Table 3.11: Weighted logistic regressions of post-IPO failure 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for firms that delist for negative reasons within five years of the IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The 
symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term Orientation (WVS) - -0.018 ** __ __ -0.009 *** __ __
(0.012) (0.003)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - __ -0.038 *** __ __ -0.028 *** __
(0.000) (0.000)
Future Orientation - __ __ -1.363 *** __ __ -0.559
(0.004) (0.147)
Age - -0.307 *** -0.262 *** -0.340 *** __ __ __
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) __ __ __
Firm  Size - -0.164 *** -0.164 *** -0.171 *** __ __ __
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) __ __ __
Return on Assets - 0.000 0.001 -0.001 __ __ __
(0.966) (0.788) (0.852) __ __ __
Current Ratio - -0.091 ** -0.088 ** -0.090 ** __ __ __
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) __ __ __
Technology + 0.010 0.009 -0.070 __ __ __
(0.965) (0.972) (0.768) __ __ __
Revised Antidirector Rights +/- 1.061 *** 0.892 *** 0.836 *** 0.447 *** 0.377 *** 0.351 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.016)
Creditor Rights +/- -0.192 -0.197 -0.159 0.204 *** 0.188 *** 0.205 **
(0.256) (0.219) (0.247) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
Market Capitalisation + 0.008 *** 0.007 * 0.013 *** 0.018 *** 0.015 *** 0.021 ***
(0.002) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover - 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ***
(0.809) (0.448) (0.880) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010)
IPO Activity + 0.005 -0.015 0.016 0.005 0.004 0.012
(0.814) (0.621) (0.494) (0.733) (0.844) (0.390)
Insolvency - -0.565 *** -0.639 *** -0.611 *** -0.388 *** -0.473 *** -0.381 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
GDP Growth - -0.319 *** -0.278 *** -0.287 *** -0.313 *** -0.320 *** -0.313 ***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -4.035 *** -2.692 ** 0.840 -6.577 *** -5.188 *** -4.833 ***
(0.000) (0.013) (0.644) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.205 0.230 0.203 0.135 0.154 0.134
No. of Observations 5,524       4,542       5,524       15,299     13,009     15,299     
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Table 3.12: Other parametric survival models of post-IPO failure 
 
 
Note: The time to failure is the number of days between IPO date and the day in which the IPO is delisted. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates are 
provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
Sign
Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR
Long-term Orientation (WVS) - -0.013 *** 0.987 __ __ __ __ -0.013 *** 0.987 __ __ __ __ -0.013 *** 0.987 __ __ __ __
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - __ __ -0.027 *** 0.973 __ __ __ __ -0.027 *** 0.973 __ __ __ __ -0.026 *** 0.974 __ __
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Future Orientation - __ __ __ __ -0.633 *** 0.531 __ __ __ __ -0.631 *** 0.532 __ __ __ __ -0.622 *** 0.537
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age - -0.118 *** 0.889 -0.076 0.927 -0.155 *** 0.856 -0.116 ** 0.890 -0.075 0.928 -0.153 *** 0.858 -0.115 ** 0.891 -0.074 0.928 -0.152 *** 0.859
(0.010) (0.118) (0.001) (0.011) (0.125) (0.001) (0.011) (0.127) (0.001)
Firm  Size - -0.110 *** 0.896 -0.098 *** 0.907 -0.124 *** 0.883 -0.109 *** 0.897 -0.097 *** 0.907 -0.123 *** 0.884 -0.108 *** 0.898 -0.096 *** 0.908 -0.122 *** 0.885
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return on Assets - -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.005 ** 0.996 -0.006 *** 0.994 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.005 ** 0.995 -0.006 *** 0.994 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.005 *** 0.995
(0.017) (0.013) (0.001) (0.017) (0.013) (0.001) (0.020) (0.015) (0.002)
Current Ratio - -0.042 *** 0.959 -0.036 *** 0.965 -0.040 *** 0.961 -0.041 *** 0.959 -0.035 *** 0.965 -0.040 *** 0.961 -0.041 *** 0.960 -0.035 *** 0.966 -0.039 *** 0.962
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Technology + 0.214 * 1.239 0.203 1.225 0.141 1.151 0.214 * 1.239 0.203 1.225 0.141 1.152 0.209 * 1.233 0.195 1.215 0.138 1.148
(0.060) (0.108) (0.213) (0.060) (0.108) (0.211) (0.066) (0.123) (0.222)
Revised Antidirector Rights +/- 0.241 *** 1.273 0.122 1.130 0.212 *** 1.236 0.239 *** 1.270 0.119 1.126 0.210 ** 1.233 0.233 *** 1.263 0.109 1.115 0.205 ** 1.227
(0.008) (0.344) (0.010) (0.008) (0.358) (0.011) (0.009) (0.397) (0.013)
Corrected Antidirector Rights + __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
Anti-self-dealing + __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
Creditor Rights +/- -0.126 ** 0.882 -0.061 0.940 -0.164 *** 0.848 -0.125 ** 0.883 -0.061 0.941 -0.164 *** 0.849 -0.122 ** 0.885 -0.058 0.944 -0.160 *** 0.852
(0.031) (0.420) (0.003) (0.032) (0.421) (0.003) (0.035) (0.447) (0.004)
Market Capitalisation + 0.002 * 1.002 0.005 *** 1.005 0.004 *** 1.004 0.002 * 1.002 0.005 *** 1.005 0.004 *** 1.004 0.002 * 1.002 0.005 *** 1.005 0.004 *** 1.004
(0.060) (0.001) (0.000) (0.060) (0.001) (0.000) (0.060) (0.001) (0.000)
Turnover - -0.001 0.999 0.001 1.001 0.000 1.000 -0.001 0.999 0.001 1.001 0.000 1.000 -0.001 0.999 0.001 1.001 0.000 1.000
(0.500) (0.267) (0.793) (0.492) (0.274) (0.788) (0.479) (0.286) (0.778)
IPO Activity + 0.006 1.006 -0.009 0.991 0.003 1.003 0.006 1.006 -0.010 0.990 0.003 1.003 0.006 1.006 -0.009 0.991 0.003 1.003
(0.611) (0.558) (0.796) (0.615) (0.549) (0.801) (0.597) (0.575) (0.783)
Insolvency - -0.534 *** 0.587 -0.612 *** 0.542 -0.582 *** 0.559 -0.533 *** 0.587 -0.612 *** 0.542 -0.581 *** 0.559 -0.528 *** 0.590 -0.611 *** 0.543 -0.576 *** 0.562
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth - -0.198 *** 0.821 -0.145 *** 0.865 -0.185 *** 0.831 -0.197 *** 0.821 -0.144 *** 0.866 -0.185 *** 0.831 -0.197 *** 0.821 -0.144 *** 0.866 -0.185 *** 0.831
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi-square 442.52 *** 438.32 *** 429.68 *** 437.66 *** 434.98 *** 424.79 *** 428.25 *** 426.76 *** 415.50 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Observations 5,524  4,542 5,524 5,524      4,542 5,524 5,524        4,542 5,524 
Weibull ExponentialGompertz
(1) (2) (3)(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
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Table 3.13: Cox proportional hazards regressions of post-IPO failure (information asymmetry 
proxies added) 
 
 
Note: The time to failure is the number of days between IPO date and the day in which the IPO is delisted. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Coef and HR represent Coefficient and Hazard Ratio respectively.
Sign
Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR
Long-term Orientation (WVS) - -0.003 0.997 __ __ __ __ -0.014 *** 0.986 __ __ __ __
(0.345) (0.000)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - __ __ -0.018 *** 0.982 __ __ __ __ -0.031 *** 0.970 __ __
(0.002) (0.000)
Future Orientation - __ __ __ __ -0.548 ** 0.578 __ __ __ __ -0.785 *** 0.456
(0.023) (0.000)
CIFAR + 0.107 *** 1.112 0.081 *** 1.085 0.102 *** 1.108 __ __ __ __ __ __
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Disclosure Requirements + __ __ __ __ __ __ -0.133 0.876 0.711 2.036 1.174 ** 3.234
(0.796) (0.378) (0.015)
Age - -0.107 ** 0.899 -0.063 0.939 -0.114 ** 0.892 -0.118 *** 0.889 -0.067 0.935 -0.141 *** 0.869
(0.018) (0.193) (0.011) (0.010) (0.170) (0.002)
Firm  Size - -0.107 *** 0.898 -0.095 *** 0.909 -0.109 *** 0.896 -0.108 *** 0.897 -0.096 *** 0.909 -0.117 *** 0.889
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return on Assets - -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.005 *** 0.995
(0.020) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005)
Current Ratio - -0.038 *** 0.963 -0.034 *** 0.967 -0.037 *** 0.964 -0.042 *** 0.959 -0.035 *** 0.965 -0.040 *** 0.961
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Technology + 0.167 1.182 0.193 1.213 0.149 1.161 0.204 * 1.226 0.204 1.226 0.135 1.144
(0.146) (0.130) (0.190) (0.076) (0.110) (0.235)
Revised Antidirector Rights +/- -0.034 0.966 0.130 1.139 -0.047 0.954 0.289 ** 1.336 0.242 1.2738 0.104 1.109
(0.789) (0.434) (0.674) (0.014) (0.165) (0.301)
Creditor Rights +/- -0.198 *** 0.820 -0.256 *** 0.774 -0.178 *** 0.837 -0.145 ** 0.865 -0.076 0.927 -0.063 0.939
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.038) (0.548) (0.348)
Market Capitalisation + -0.002 0.998 0.002 1.002 0.000 1.000 0.002 * 1.002 0.004 ** 1.004 0.002 ** 1.002
(0.147) (0.461) (0.905) (0.063) (0.048) (0.038)
Turnover - 0.000 1.000 0.001 1.001 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.002 1.002 -0.001 0.999
(0.816) (0.386) (0.827) (0.717) (0.211) (0.139)
IPO Activity + 0.025 * 1.025 0.014 1.014 0.024 * 1.025 0.007 1.007 0.002 1.002 0.012 1.012
(0.069) (0.439) (0.075) (0.602) (0.917) (0.378)
Insolvency - -0.501 *** 0.606 -0.666 *** 0.514 -0.581 *** 0.559 -0.541 *** 0.582 -0.692 *** 0.500 -0.627 *** 0.534
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth - -0.149 *** 0.861 -0.198 *** 0.821 -0.140 *** 0.869 -0.205 *** 0.815 -0.208 *** 0.812 -0.180 *** 0.835
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi-square 412.09 *** 386.16 *** 416.16 *** 357.58 *** 374.41 *** 354.71 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Observations 4,864 3,977 4,864 4,877 3,977 4,877 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 3.14: Cox proportional hazards regressions of post-IPO failure (other cultural variables 
added) 
 
 
Note: The time to failure is the number of days between IPO date and the day in which the IPO is delisted. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Coef and HR represent Coefficient and Hazard Ratio respectively. 
Sign
Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR Coef HR
Long-term Orientation (WVS) - 0.008 1.008 __ __ __ __ -0.012 *** 0.988 __ __ __ __
(0.102) (0.001)
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - __ __ 0.012 1.012 __ __ __ __ 0.004 1.004 __ __
(0.267) (0.677)
Future Orientation - __ __ __ __ -0.234 0.792 __ __ __ __ -1.018 *** 0.361
(0.466) (0.000)
Uncertainty Avoidance - 0.002 1.002 -0.012 0.988 0.004 1.004 0.006 1.006 -0.016 0.985 -0.009 ** 0.991
(0.653) (0.229) (0.506) (0.165) (0.125) (0.027)
Power Distance - 0.023 *** 1.024 -0.034 0.967 0.021 *** 1.021 -0.007 0.993 -0.065 *** 0.937 -0.013 *** 0.987
(0.001) (0.130) (0.004) (0.138) (0.000) (0.003)
Performance Orientation - -0.009 * 0.991 0.002 1.002 -0.010 ** 0.990 -0.009 ** 0.991 0.0134 * 1.013 -0.006 0.994
(0.051) (0.859) (0.031) (0.022) (0.051) (0.122)
Individualism + 0.044 *** 1.045 0.022 * 1.022 0.036 *** 1.037 __ __ __ __ __ __
(0.000) (0.061) (0.000)
Age - -0.116 ** 0.891 -0.072 0.931 -0.112 ** 0.894 -0.127 *** 0.880 -0.075 0.928 -0.127 *** 0.880
(0.011) (0.139) (0.014) (0.005) (0.121) (0.005)
Firm  Size - -0.106 *** 0.900 -0.096 *** 0.908 -0.104 *** 0.902 -0.110 *** 0.896 -0.098 *** 0.906 -0.112 *** 0.894
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return on Assets - -0.003 * 0.997 -0.003 * 0.997 -0.003 * 0.997 -0.004 ** 0.996 -0.003 * 0.997 -0.004 ** 0.996
(0.054) (0.074) (0.060) (0.020) (0.067) (0.022)
Current Ratio - -0.041 *** 0.960 -0.036 *** 0.964 -0.041 *** 0.960 -0.042 *** 0.959 -0.037 *** 0.964 -0.041 *** 0.960
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Technology + 0.194 * 1.214 0.200 1.221 0.208 * 1.231 0.212 * 1.236 0.191 1.210 0.209 * 1.232
(0.091) (0.116) (0.069) (0.064) (0.132) (0.068)
Revised Antidirector Rights +/- 0.272 *** 1.312 0.383 *** 1.467 0.306 *** 1.357 0.304 *** 1.355 0.373 *** 1.452 0.347 *** 1.415
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.000)
Creditor Rights +/- -0.132 * 0.877 -0.257 ** 0.773 -0.094 0.910 -0.116 * 0.890 -0.328 *** 0.721 -0.251 *** 0.778
(0.077) (0.016) (0.174) (0.087) (0.002) (0.000)
Market Capitalisation + 0.002 1.002 0.003 1.003 0.002 1.002 0.003 ** 1.003 0.004 ** 1.004 0.003 *** 1.003
(0.144) (0.208) (0.150) (0.018) (0.021) (0.005)
Turnover - -0.001 0.999 0.000 1.000 -0.001 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.001 1.001 -0.001 0.999
(0.322) (0.735) (0.373) (0.816) (0.525) (0.521)
IPO Activity + 0.016 1.016 0.002 1.002 0.017 1.017 0.001 1.001 -0.004 0.996 0.005 1.005
(0.233) (0.898) (0.214) (0.920) (0.817) (0.697)
Insolvency - -0.651 *** 0.522 -0.649 *** 0.523 -0.685 *** 0.504 -0.509 *** 0.601 -0.465 ** 0.628 -0.582 *** 0.559
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
GDP Growth - -0.068 0.934 -0.055 0.947 -0.104 ** 0.901 -0.188 *** 0.829 -0.034 0.966 -0.208 *** 0.812
(0.169) (0.377) (0.042) (0.000) (0.572) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi-square 510.38 *** 462.59 *** 508.15 *** 444.86 *** 459.11 *** 451.30 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Observations 5,524 4,542 5,524 5,524 4,542 5,524 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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3.7    Conclusion 
The primary research question addressed in this study is whether national culture is an important 
determinant of the probability of involuntary delistings around the world. Specifically, I test whether 
the time dimension of national culture, as represented by long-term and future orientation of a 
country, is negatively related to the risk of post-IPO failure. Using a sample of firms from 36 countries 
over the period 1999-2008, I find evidence consistent with this prediction. That is, firms that go public 
in countries with long-term and future orientations are less likely to delist involuntarily after the IPO. 
These results are robust to additional country-level (i.e., investor protection, creditor protection, and 
capital market and economic development) and firm-level determinants of firm failure, and alternative 
estimation procedures.  
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APPENDIX A: Overview of selected firms, issues, market and country specific factors in empirical studies on delistings 
 
 
Note: (1) Schultz (1993); (2) Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997); (3) Seguin and Smoller (1997); (4) Jain and Kini (2000); (5) Li, Zhang and Zhou (2006); (6) Yang 
and Sheu (2006); (7) Dahiya and Klapper (2007); (8) Thomsen and Vinten (2007); (9) Demers and Joos (2007); (a) Non-tech sample; (b) High-tech sample; (10) Kooli 
and Meknassi (2007); (11) Jain and Kini (2008); (12) Bhattacharya, Demers and Joos (2010); (13) van der Goot, van Giersbergen and Botman (2009); (14) Amini and 
Keasey (2012); (15) Carpentier and Suret (2011); (16) Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2012); (17) Chou, Cheng and Chien (2013); (18) Liu, Lister and Pang (2013); 
(19) Williams (2013); (c) CEO age, CEO with previous CEO experience, number of years of biopharmaceutical experience by the CEO, and CEO as founder are 
statistically significant. *: significant explanatory variable; ‡: non-significant explanatory variable. 
Factors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)(a) (9)(b) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Firm and issue characteristics
Underwriter reputation * * * * * ‡ * ‡ * * * *
Venture capital backing * * ‡ ‡ * ‡ ‡ ‡ * ‡
Auditor reputation ‡ * ‡ * ‡
Offering size * * * ‡ * ‡ * * ‡ * * * * ‡
Public float ‡
Issue share price * * * * *
Number of shares ‡ ‡
Stock price volatility *
Age * * * * * * *
High-tech industry * ‡ * *
Economies of scale *
Industry competition *
Number of risk factors *
Initial returns ‡ * ‡ ‡ * * ‡ ‡ * *
Investor demand (price change) * ‡ *
Insider ownership * ‡ * * * ‡ *
Research coverage by analysts *
Research coverage by lead bank affiliated analysts ‡
Diversification *
Level of initial listing requirements *
Accounting variables
Sales ‡ * * * *
Growth in sales * * *
Leverage * ‡ * * * * * *
Profitability (e.g., ROA and EBIT) * * * * ‡ * ‡ * *
Assets * * *
Firm value *
Fixed assets to total assets ‡
Interest coverage ratio *
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
 
 
Note: (1) Schultz (1993); (2) Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997); (3) Seguin and Smoller (1997); (4) Jain and Kini (2000); (5) Li, Zhang and Zhou (2006); (6) Yang 
and Sheu (2006); (7) Dahiya and Klapper (2007); (8) Thomsen and Vinten (2007); (9) Demers and Joos (2007); (a) Non-tech sample; (b) High-tech sample; (10) Kooli 
and Meknassi (2007); (11) Jain and Kini (2008); (12) Bhattacharya, Demers and Joos (2010); (13) van der Goot, van Giersbergen and Botman (2009); (14) Amini and 
Keasey (2012); (15) Carpentier and Suret (2011); (16) Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2012); (17) Chou, Cheng and Chien (2013); (18) Liu, Lister and Pang (2013); 
(19) Williams (2013); (c) CEO age, CEO with previous CEO experience, number of years of biopharmaceutical experience by the CEO, and CEO as founder are 
statistically significant. *: significant explanatory variable; ‡: non-significant explanatory variable. 
Factors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)(a) (9)(b) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Current ratio *
Free cash flows *
Operating cash flows over liabilities * *
Receivables over total assets
R&D intensity * ‡ * * ‡
Advertising intensity */‡ *
Capital expenditure intensity */‡
SG&A expenses * * *
Accumulated deficit ‡ * *
Market value of equity to book value ‡ *
Z-score *
Market/Risk factors
IPO activity/market level (hot issue market) * ‡ ‡ * * ‡ * ‡ ‡ *
Standard deviation of after-market returns * *
Human capital variables (c)
Ultimate state ownership *
Cash flow rights *
Control rights *
Divergence of two rights *
Duality *
Board size ‡
Board independence *
Ownership concentration *
Country characteristics
Stock liquidity *
M&A frequency *
Private equity investment ratio *
GDP growth *
Creditor rights ‡
Shareholder rights  * *
 131 
 
APPENDIX B: Variable definitions 
 
 
 
  
Variable Definition Source
Dependent variable
Delisting “Delisting” equals 1 if the firm failed within five years and 0 otherwise
(Logistic regression); “Time to Failure” (Cox proportional hazard
model)
Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database
Long-term Orientation (CVS) The original LTO measure which is based on the Chinese Value
Survey (CVS). “The long term orientation dimension stands for the
fostering of virtues oriented toward future rewards–in particular,
perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term orientation,
stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present–in
particular, respect for tradition, preserving of ‘face’, and fulfilling
social obligation.” The index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher
numbers indicating higher long-term orientation.
Hofstede, Hofstede and 
Minkov (2010)
Long-term Orientation (WVS) The updated LTO measure based on the WVS. Hofstede, Hofstede and 
Minkov (2010)
Controls
Firm characteristics
Age The natural log of (one plus the number of years from the company’s
incorporation date to the IPO date).
Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database
Firm Size The natural log of one plus total revenues for the year prior to IPO. Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database
Return on Assets Firm’s return on assets, defined as net income after taxes divided by
total assets for the year prior to IPO.
Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database
Current Ratio Defined as current assets/liabilities. Measures whether a firm has
sufficient short-term assets to over its short-term liabilities.
Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database
Technology Dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the high-tech
industry, and 0 otherwise.
Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database
Country Characteristics
Revised Antidirector Rights This index of anti-director rights is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders
are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general
shareholders’ meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional
representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) shareholders have pre-
emptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting; and
(6) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder
to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal
to 10% (the sample median); This index ranges from 0 to 6.
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008)
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Source
Creditor Rights The creditor rights index measures four powers of secured lenders in
bankruptcy: (1) whether there are restrictions, such as creditor
consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; (2) whether secured
creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition for
reorganization is approved, that is, whether there is no automatic stay
or asset freeze imposed by the court; (3) whether secured creditors are
paid fifor out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4)
whether an administrator, and not management, is responsible for
running the business during the reorganization. A value of one is added 
to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide each of
these powers to secured lenders. The creditor rights index aggregates
the scores and varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong
creditor rights).
Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer (2007) 
Market Capitalisation Market capitalisation (also known as market value) is the share price
times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies
are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's
stock exchanges at the end of the year. Market capitalization shows
the overall size of the stock market in U.S. dollars and as a percentage
of GDP.
World Development 
Indicators
Turnover Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the period
divided by the average market capitalisation for the period. Average
market capitalisation is calculated as the average of the end-of-period
values for the current period and the previous period.
World Development 
Indicators
IPO Activity Ratio of IPO number in a particular year over the total IPO number
during the period of 1999-2008 for each country.
Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database
Insolvency The number of years from the filing for insolvency in court until the
resolution of distressed assets.
World Development 
Indicators
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S.
dollars.
World Development 
Indicators
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APPENDIX C: Variance inflation factors of independent variables 
 
 
Note: This table presents the variance inflation factor for each independent variable. The VIF 
values are used to check for multicollinearity.  
 
 
 
Note: This table presents the variance inflation factor for each independent variable. The VIF 
values are used to check for multicollinearity. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term Orientation (WVS) 1.56 1.41
Long-term Orientation (CVS) 2.38 1.88
Future Orientation 1.71 1.73
Age 1.17 1.19 1.14
Firm  Size 1.38 1.39 1.37
Return on Assets 1.30 1.33 1.26
Current Ratio 1.12 1.12 1.12
Technology 1.03 1.02 1.02
Revised Antidirector Rights 1.81 2.48 1.95 1.60 1.88 1.80
Creditor Rights 1.67 1.76 1.61 1.56 1.60 1.50
Market Capitalisation 1.44 1.77 1.50 1.57 1.77 1.54
Turnover 1.08 1.11 1.08 1.15 1.19 1.14
IPO Activity 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.29 1.40 1.29
Insolvency 2.04 2.58 1.94 1.96 2.35 1.91
GDP Growth 1.98 3.03 1.89 1.62 2.17 1.56
Mean VIF 1.43 1.71 1.43 1.52 1.78 1.56
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term Orientation (WVS) 2.81 2.20
Long-term Orientation (CVS) 10.49 9.62
Future Orientation 2.79 2.47
Uncertainty Avoidance 2.02 4.26 2.90 1.99 2.75 2.33
Power Distance 3.81 33.90 4.31 2.40 11.11 2.05
Performance Orientation 1.23 3.36 1.28 1.18 1.43 1.23
Individualism 5.24 23.10 4.62
Age 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.22 1.21 1.20
Firm  Size 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.39
Return on Assets 1.34 1.37 1.33 1.33 1.37 1.32
Current Ratio 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
Technology 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
Revised Antidirector Rights 2.17 4.64 2.85 2.15 4.63 2.56
Creditor Rights 2.47 3.08 2.49 2.34 2.51 1.97
Market Capitalisation 1.59 2.15 1.66 1.59 2.08 1.62
Turnover 1.14 1.25 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.12
IPO Activity 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.10
Insolvency 2.25 6.84 2.27 2.25 3.49 2.27
GDP Growth 2.74 3.72 3.02 2.57 3.70 2.61
Mean VIF 2.04 6.12 2.15 1.69 3.11 1.71
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APPENDIX D: Graphical assessment of the proportional hazards assumption 
Using the stphplot command in Stata, we can see that the curves are roughly parallel, providing 
evidence in favor of the proportional-hazards assumption for the effect of time orientation. 
 
A: High long-term orientation (WVS) versus low long-term orientation (WVS) 
 
 
 
 
 
B: High long-term orientation (CVS) versus low long-term orientation (CVS) 
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APPENDIX D (Continued) 
 
C: High future-orientation versus low future-orientation 
 
 
 
 
D: Technology versus non- technology firms 
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APPENDIX E: Variables, expected signs, and explanations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable
Expected 
sign
Explanation
Long-term Orientation (CVS) - Thrift, persistence and planning (in contrast to short-termism) may lead
to lower probability failure.
Long-term Orientation (WVS)
Future Orientation
Age - Older firms have less uncertainty given that they are more experienced in
their markets.
Firm Size - Large firms are better equipped to survive during periods of high
turbulence or costly investment mistakes.
Return on Assets - Competent management utilize efficiently company’s assets to generate
net income.
Current Ratio - Firm’s ability to meet its short-term liabilities.
Technology + High technology firms are supposedly more risky than firms in other
industries.
+ Well-performing firms are less likely to be capital- and cash-rationed, and
symptoms of poor performance are more likely to be detected and acted
upon earlier (Thomsen & Vinten, 2007).
- More active shareholders present to ensure a speedier resolution of
financial distress (Dahiya & Klapper, 2007)
- Ill-defined distress resolution mechanisms.
+ Efficient bankruptcy regime in a country.
Market Capitalisation + Larger financial markets may promote stronger listing and delisting
mechanisms.
Turnover - More liquid markets.
IPO Activity + “Hot issue” markets draw low-quality firms.
Insolvency - The longer the time it takes to resolve insolvency, the lower the delisting
rate.
GDP Growth + Firms in high growth economy are less likely to be delisted.
Revised Antidirector Rights
Creditor Rights
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CHAPTER 4 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Given the importance of stock markets to world economies and the rise of globalisation, it is 
surprising that previous literature has paid little attention on how IPO failure is impacted by country-
level characteristics, in particular country-level institutional and cultural factors. This thesis contributes 
to the growing literature on culture and finance by showing that informal institutions, as captured by 
national culture, matter to finance in the context of IPO failures.  
The first essay examines the impact of information asymmetry and national culture on IPO 
withdrawals using a sample of IPO firms from 31 countries over the 2003-2010 period. The results 
show there is a positive relation between firm and country-level measures of information asymmetry 
and the likelihood of IPO withdrawals. Contrary to predictions, countries with high uncertainty 
avoidance have on average a lower likelihood of IPO withdrawals. A possible explanation for this 
finding can be found in Hofstede (2001, p. 148) where high uncertainty avoidance cultures “look for 
structure in their organizations, institutions and relationships, which makes events clearly interpretable and predictable.” 
Additional analysis shows that while political connections and societal trust are negatively associated 
with the likelihood of IPO withdrawals, litigation risk is positively associated with it. 
The second essay investigates whether an informal institution, namely a society’s time horizon, 
has an impact on delistings due to negative reasons for a sample of listed firms originating from 36 
countries over the 2003-2010 period. The empirical findings suggest that firms that go public in 
countries with a forward-looking perspective are less likely to be delisted for negative reasons and tend 
to delist later. Long term-oriented societies have a tendency to delay immediate material, emotional, 
and social gratifications in exchange for a more secure future while short-term oriented societies value 
instant gratification and immediate gains. Cultures that have a long-term oriented mindset generally 
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thrive on perseverance and frugality, the two characteristics that bring about less myopic tendencies 
in equity markets (e.g., forgo value-creating investment to meet short-term earnings). As a result, firms 
in long-term economies are expected to have a lower likelihood of distress delisting and to last longer 
after the IPO.  
The findings presented in this thesis have important implications for researchers and finance 
practitioners. First, taken together, the results of this thesis strengthen the arguments of a developing 
literature on culture and finance that propose that, in addition to formal institutional factors (e.g., 
investor protection), informal constraints (e.g., culture norms) are important to financial practices. 
Second, for investors and issuers, it is important to take into account national culture when making 
decisions related to equity markets. For example, IPOs launched in long-term oriented countries 
would find the market easier to navigate and more stable; IPOs launched in countries with a short-
term orientation (with more transient investors) face a more volatile environment and are thus placed 
in a more precarious position. The results of this research can assist underwriters to identify issuers 
with a higher likelihood of IPO withdrawal, thus lowering their cost of conducting business as 
underwriters gain reputation by successfully bringing firms to the market (Dunbar, 2000). Regulators 
should be concerned about high IPO withdrawal rates or excessive distress delistings as both constrain 
capital market development and thus hamper economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998).  
The findings of this thesis are subject to several limitations that are generally associated with 
cross-country studies. First, Hofstede’s cultural  dimensions have been criticised for reducing culture 
to an overly simplistic five dimensional conceptualisation, which is time-invariant and ignores within-
country cultural heterogeneity (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006). Despite this, his cultural 
dimensions provide a widely cited and rigorously validated typology of cross-country differences in 
culture due to their “clarity, parsimony, and resonance with managers” (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006, 
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p. 286). In his book, Hofstede (2001) reports 140 research studies which have statistically confirmed 
his cultural dimensions.  
Second, the regression models in this cross-country analysis do not possess many firm-level 
control variables compared to those based on single-county analyses. This data limitation is inherent 
in cross-country research that relies on international databases. As the quality of cross-country data 
improves with the passage of time, this provides an opportunity for future research to more vigorously 
explore IPO failures around the world.   
Third, country-level variables tend to be highly correlated, making it challenging to single out 
the separate impact of institutional and informal arrangements on IPO outcomes. Further, insofar as 
the decision to go public may not be random, the results may suffer from potential endogeneity and 
self-selection problems. Endogeneity is widespread in international studies (Reeb, Sakakibara and 
Mahmood, 2012). For instance, firms which are unlikely to meet the exchange listing standards would 
not be likely to go public, and would thus not appear in the sample of IPOs in this study. This suggests 
that there is an under-representation of withdrawn IPOs in the sample. To address this self-selection 
problem, I would require data for private firms and estimate a first-stage going-public regression, 
followed by a second-stage IPO withdrawal regression with an adjustment (i.e., Mills ratio) for the 
sample selection. Unfortunately, private data are currently lacking, and for firm-countries where such 
data are available, the data are often sporadic. The data problem is compounded by the fact that it is 
generally not mandatory for private companies to publicly disclose financial information. Due to this 
data limitation, I cannot estimate the sample selection rule of firm’s decision to file for an IPO or 
remain private. This data limitation also explains why there is a lack of empirical evidence to support 
the theory on the motivations of firms to go public, including vendors cashing out on their investment 
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and establishing a market price for the shares.74  In a similar vein, some of the delisted IPOs should 
have been withdrawn but instead survived the IPO stage. Again, due to data limitations, it is difficult 
to test this empirically. Furthermore, some of the IPOs that failed should have been withdrawn but 
instead survived that stage and ultimately ended up as post-IPO failures. Empirically, however, it is 
difficult to test.  
Finally, some Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are highly correlated with each other. In particular, 
individualism (power distance) is highly correlated with power distance and long term orientation 
(long-term orientation (CVS)). The results must be therefore interpreted with caution when all the five 
cultural dimensions are included in the regressions because of potential multicollinearity problems. 
This thesis has attempted to alleviate some of these shortcomings by performing a wide range of 
robustness checks.  
The evidence supports the conclusion that country-level information asymmetry has a positive 
relation with IPO withdrawals around the world. Beyond the effect of country-level information 
asymmetry, future research can test if IPO withdrawal is affected by the interaction between the 
cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance and country-level information asymmetry. Future work 
can further explore the effects of individualism and CEO overconfidence on post-IPOs failures. Chui, 
Titman and Wei (2000) contend that individualism is associated with overconfidence. Are post-IPO 
failures more likely for firms with more overconfident CEOs or vice versa? Another interesting avenue 
would be to investigate the effects of investor sentiment in relation to IPO withdrawals. Attitudes, 
which may lead to deviations from rational choices, are culture-specific and may well impact IPO 
outcomes. 
                                                 
74 Some notable exceptions are for example the studies of Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) who examine a sample of 
69 Italian companies using a proprietary database supplied by a consortium of Italian banks, and that of Boehmer and 
Ljungqvist (2004) who investigate the timing of the going public decision using a sample of 330 German companies.  
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